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Background: In 2009 the UK National Patient Safety Agency relaunched its Being Open framework to
facilitate the open disclosure of adverse events to patients in the NHS. The implementation of the
framework has been, and remains, challenging in practice.
Aim: The aim of this work was to both critically evaluate and extend the current evidence base relating to
open disclosure, with a view to supporting the implementation of a policy of open disclosure of adverse
events in the NHS.
Methods: This work was conducted in three phases. The first phase comprised two focused systematic
literature reviews, one summarising empirical research on the effectiveness of interventions to enhance
open disclosure, and a second, broader scoping review, looking at reports of current opinion and practice
and wider knowledge. The second phase involved primary qualitative research with the objective of
generating new knowledge about UK-based stakeholders’ views on their role in and experiences of open
disclosure. Stakeholder interviews were analysed using the framework approach. The third phase
synthesised the findings from the first two phases to inform and develop a set of short pragmatic
suggestions for NHS trust management, to facilitate the implementation and evaluation of open disclosure.
Results: A total of 610 papers met the inclusion criteria for the broad review. A large body of literature
discussed open disclosure from a number of related, but sometimes conflicted, perspectives. Evidential
gaps persist and current practice is based largely on expert consensus rather than evidence. There appears
to be a tension between the existing pragmatic guidance and the more in-depth critiques of what being
consistent and transparent in health care really means. Eleven papers met the inclusion criteria for the
more focused review. There was little evidence for the effectiveness of disclosure alone on organisational
or individual outcomes or of interventions to promote and support open disclosure. Interviews with
stakeholders identified strong support for the basic principle of being honest with patients or relatives
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when someone was seriously harmed by health care. In practice however, the issues are complex and
there is confusion about a number of issues relating to disclosure policies in the UK. The interviews
generated insights into the difficulties perceived within health care at individual and institutional levels,
in relation to fully implementing the Being Open guidance.
Conclusions: There are several clear strategies that the NHS could learn from to implement and sustain a
policy of openness. Literature reviews and stakeholder accounts both identified the potential benefits of a
culture that was generally more open (not just retrospectively open about serious harm). Future work could
usefully evaluate the impact of disclosure on legal challenges within the NHS, best practice in models of
support and training for open disclosure, embedding disclosure conversations in critical incident analysis
and disclosure of less serious events.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
ABSTRACT
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
vi
Contents
List of tables ix
List of figures xi
List of abbreviations xiii
Plain English summary xv
Scientific summary xvii
Chapter 1 Background 1
Aim 3
Objectives 3
Chapter 2 Methods 5
Phase 1: reviews 5
Objectives 5
Definitions 5
Search strategy 6
Inclusion criteria 7
Exclusion criteria 8
Additional criteria for the effectiveness review 8
Study selection 9
Information extraction 9
Data collection and analysis 10
Phase 2: interviews 11
Ethical approval 11
Populations studied 11
Recruitment and consent 11
Data collection 12
Data analysis 12
Data sampling 13
Rigour and transparency in the analytic process 13
Chapter 3 Results 15
Phase 1: review 1 15
A broad description of the literature 15
Main findings 18
Summary 39
Phase 1: review 2 39
Results of the search 39
Excluded studies 39
Ongoing studies 39
Included studies where the intervention was disclosure 39
Included studies where the intervention was intended to support or promote disclosure 43
Summary 52
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
vii
Phase 2: qualitative interviews 52
Primary theme: broad understandings of open disclosure 52
Primary theme: motivators 53
Primary theme: the Being Open guidance and framework 53
Primary theme: ‘good’ disclosures 53
Primary theme: uncertainty 54
Primary theme: professional and organisational context 54
Overview of main findings 55
Chapter 4 Discussion 75
Strengths and weaknesses of the work 90
Chapter 5 Conclusion 93
Chapter 6 Future research 95
Chapter 7 Summary of evidence-based guidance for managers to facilitate the
implementation of open disclosure in individual trusts 97
Acknowledgements 99
References 101
Appendix 1 Sampling strategy for qualitative interviews 115
Appendix 2 Search strategy 117
Appendix 3 Databases searched 147
Appendix 4 Ethical permission 149
Appendix 5 Example topic guide 151
Appendix 6 Coding framework 153
Appendix 7 Key characteristics and numbers of study participants by
stakeholder group 155
Appendix 8 Detailed statement for reflexivity 157
Appendix 9 Reference list of included literature for reviews 161
Appendix 10 Studies excluded at second stage 193
Appendix 11 Patient and public involvement 195
CONTENTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
viii
List of tables
TABLE 1 Included studies where the intervention was disclosure 41
TABLE 2 Included studies where the intervention aimed to support or
promote disclosure 44
TABLE 3 Summary of findings in relation to the 10 principles of Being Open 78
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
ix

List of figures
FIGURE 1 Selection of literature 16
FIGURE 2 Countries of origin of the literature 17
FIGURE 3 Number of publications per year 18
FIGURE 4 Study selection flow chart 40
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
xi

List of abbreviations
ACSQH Australian Commission on Safety
and Quality in Healthcare
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality
ASSIA Applied Social Sciences Index
and Abstracts
AvMA Action Against Medical Accidents
BMA British Medical Association
CDSR Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews
CENTRAL Cochrane Central Register of
Controlled Trials
CINAHL Cumulative Index to Nursing and
Allied Health Literature
CPCI-S Conference Proceedings Citation
Index – Science
CPCI-SSH Conference Proceedings Citation
Index – Social Science &
Humanities
DARE Database of Abstracts of Reviews
of Effects
GMC General Medical Council
GP general practitioner
HMIC Health Management
Information Consortium
HSRProj Health Services Research Projects
in Progress
HTA Health Technology Assessment
JCAHO Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations
LILACS Latin American and Caribbean
Health Sciences Literature
LST large system transformation
MDU Medical Defence Union
MeSH medical subject heading
MPS Medical Protection Society
NHSLA NHS Litigation Authority
NMC Nursing and Midwifery Council
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency
NPSF National Patient Safety Foundation
NRLS National Reporting and
Learning System
NTIS National Technical
Information Service
SCI Science Citation Index
SSCI Social Sciences Citation Index
TJC The Joint Commission
UMHS University of Michigan
Health System
VA Veterans Affairs
VHA Veterans Health Administration
WHO World Health Organization
WHO ICTRP WHO International Clinical Trials
Registry Platform Search Portal
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
xiii

Plain English summary
Open disclosure of adverse events, in terms of health care, refers to the practice of telling people if theyhave been harmed by a mistake when receiving care. In 2009, the National Patient Safety Agency
relaunched its Being Open framework to support open disclosure in the UK. We explored how this
guidance has been received, combining the literature on open disclosure with findings from interviews.
We reviewed the international literature on open disclosure since 1980, identifying over 600 papers,
predominantly from the last 12 years. Simultaneously, we conducted 86 interviews with respondents
from a range of stakeholder groups, including policy-makers, health professionals, NHS managers,
representatives from professional bodies and patients. Evidence from both the literature and the interviews
showed that the principle of truthfulness was widely supported but not always upheld. Many factors seem
to create uncertainties over what should be disclosed, by whom, when and how. Being honest and open
about mistakes is theoretically supported but seems considerably more difficult in practice. In conclusion,
the evidence suggests that open disclosure should be a process and not a one-off event as it is often
described. Open disclosure should be a conversation whereby information is shared and the patient is both
listened to and responded to. The key message from this report seems to be that while open disclosure is
widely regarded as the right thing to do, creating a culture of openness remains challenging, yet
necessary, if patients are to be involved effectively in all aspects of their care.
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Scientific summary
Background
Estimates suggest that approximately 1 in 10 patients admitted to hospital will experience some sort of
unintended harm; approximately half of these cases are thought to be preventable. This represents a
significant proportion of patients, and the Department of Health in the UK has identified quality and safety
of care as a major concern. The disclosure of adverse events to patients who have been affected or their
families is considered to be a central feature of high-quality and safer patient care, but despite this, as few
as 30% of harmful errors may currently be disclosed to patients. Advocates of open disclosure propose
that failing to communicate effectively with patients following adverse events may have negative
repercussions for all stakeholders.
In the UK, after an original launch in 2005, the National Patient Safety Agency relaunched its Being Open
framework in November 2009. The framework describes Being Open as being about the way in which
health-care organisations and their staff communicate with patients and/or their carers following a patient
safety incident, and sets out 10 key principles that underpin the successful facilitation of this process.
These include providing a genuine and timely apology for what has happened, keeping patients and/or
their carers informed about the progress made with the incident investigation, reassuring patients and/or
carers that the incident is being taken seriously and ensuring that measures are taken to prevent the
incident from happening again. Being Open suggests that good communication and trust are fundamental
to the relationship between health-care professionals and patients, but also that it is the ethical course
of action.
A review of the available literature in 2008 revealed increasing recognition of open disclosure as an
important issue for both organisations and patients. Although the ethical arguments for open disclosure
are strong, there are many stakeholders, and the implementation of any initiative must take all of these
perspectives into consideration. A number of barriers to open disclosure have been identified for different
stakeholders, such as health professionals’ fears of litigation or damaged reputation. If such barriers are
not recognised, challenged and addressed appropriately they may cause significant problems for the
implementation of a more open safety culture.
Much of the research to date has been undertaken outside the UK. Little is known about how the policy
of open disclosure is being, or might be, implemented locally or nationally in the UK and how it is, or will
be, aligned with current incident reporting and analysis systems. There is also a lack of knowledge about
how open disclosure might best be evaluated and improved. The overall aim of this project was to critically
evaluate and extend both the evidence base and practice in relation to the implementation of a policy of
open disclosure of adverse events to patients within the UK.
Objectives
The study objectives were to:
l extend a previous literature review of open disclosure conducted in 2008
l identify the strategies considered or used to encourage an open disclosure, and to assess the evidence
of their effectiveness
l identify and critique the various ways in which open disclosure has been conceptualised and measured
l determine the understanding of, views on and interpretation of a policy of open disclosure among
UK stakeholders
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l explore stakeholders’ experiences of involvement in the disclosure of adverse events in the UK
l explore how open disclosure might be, and actually is, linked to safety and quality management
systems at all levels
l develop a summary of evidence-based guidance for managers to facilitate the implementation of open
disclosure in individual trusts.
Methods
Two reviews, a primary qualitative study and a final synthesis of these phases were conducted. The first
phase comprised two literature reviews, summarising current knowledge on open disclosure, discussions
and debates, and interventions to enhance disclosure. Supported by information specialists, a broad search
strategy was developed on MEDLINE (Ovid SP) using the two main concepts of open disclosure and patient
safety incident. A range of text words, synonyms and subject headings for each of the two concepts were
identified by scanning key papers identified at the beginning of the project, and through discussion with
the review team and collaborators, and the use of database thesauri. The terms for open disclosure were
combined using the AND Boolean operator with terms for adverse events. The MEDLINE strategy was
adapted for use in each database. Details of the documents identified as potentially relevant from the
electronic literature searches were entered into bibliographic software. Two reviewers assessed the titles
and abstracts for relevance. Full copies of all potentially relevant papers were obtained and assessed.
The second phase involved primary research (individual interviews) to generate new knowledge about
stakeholders’ views and experiences of open disclosure and the Being Open guidance in a UK health-care
context. Study participants were strategically selected from four different groups:
l policy-makers
l professional organisations
l NHS managers and health professionals
l patients and patient organisations.
Eighty-six interviews were audiotaped and fully transcribed. Transcripts were analysed using framework
analysis, involving a process of familiarisation with the data, thematic analysis to develop a coding scheme,
systematic coding and charting of data. Charts contained summaries of data (supported by references to
data points in the original transcripts), and the research team built a matrix to examine data across cases
and under themes. Finally, a mapping and interpretation of the data was carried out to explore
relationships between the codes.
The third phase involved synthesising the information from the reviews and interviews. This was achieved
through charting the data under the headings of the Being Open principles, examining data across the
phases and principles to identify the current state of knowledge, gaps in that knowledge and directions for
future research.
Results
Reviews
After deduplication, 10,527 records were identified, with 610 papers included in the final review. Review 1
highlighted the volume of literature that discussed or explored open disclosure. Much of this originated
from the USA, and much of the evidence was based on expert consensus rather than empirical pieces of
evidence. There was broad agreement that open disclosure is the ‘right’ thing to do. However,
justifications often sit within a context of managing risk and reducing legal costs to organisations. There
was a lack of evidence to underpin how open disclosure is operationalised in practice and how staff
negotiate the systems within which they operate, as well as interactions with patients and explicit links to
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related dimensions of quality and safety. Review 2 examined evidence for the effectiveness of open
disclosure and interventions to support open disclosure. From an initial field of 21 references, a total of
10 studies (11 publications) fulfilled the eligibility criteria and were included in the review. In two studies
the intervention was disclosure, and in eight studies (nine publications) the interventions were intended to
promote or support open disclosure. Two studies included a comparator group and eight were
uncontrolled before-and-after design. Findings from this review indicated that there was little high-quality
evidence for the effectiveness of open disclosure or interventions intended to support or enhance
open disclosure.
Interviews
Interviews with 86 stakeholders revealed six primary themes and a number of related discussion points.
Primary themes were:
l broad understandings of open disclosure
l motivators
l the framework
l ‘good’ disclosures
l uncertainty
l professional and organisational context.
A descriptive summary of these data was used to inform a preliminary but more theorised analysis which
helps to explain why implementation of the Being Open framework, and the principles of open disclosure
more generally, are not consistently evident in practice. The findings illustrated the complexity and
uncertainty surrounding many aspects of disclosure experienced by a range of stakeholders. From the
interviews, it was also evident that stakeholders converged on the importance of open disclosure as a
principle, but that different perspectives were largely related to the translation of the principles in practice.
Stakeholders discussed the need for cultural change when considering ways to embed Being Open in
health-care practice. It was suggested that intervention is required to address core values focused on
‘hitting targets’ and following economic incentives, which were viewed as detrimental to the quality of
patient care. A need for a cultural change, from the negative associations of reporting incidents to a focus
on the positive outcomes of learning from mistakes to improve practice and care, was identified. It was
suggested that a key factor in the poor take-up of the Being Open guidance was a lack of awareness of
the guidance. However, other factors were also considered important, such as the unique contextual
factors of each situation and the multiple value-based and moral factors which are involved prior to any
behaviours associated with disclosure. Respondents highlighted the slow pace of change in health care,
noting that a change in culture requires active drivers and that best practice would be unlikely to be
disseminated without intervention and incentives. Overall, it would appear that the situation does not
reflect a picture where health-care organisations and those that work within them are deliberately avoiding
disclosure conversations, but one where multiple but defensible values are apparent and may be in conflict
at times.
Synthesis
The synthesis of the reviews and interview data highlighted that the principles of acknowledgement,
apology, professional support, truthfulness, and timeliness and clarity of communication were widely
recognised as critical to disclosure. Although these principles featured heavily in the literature and the
interview data, uncertainties around terminology and inconsistent understanding across stakeholders
appeared to be the main barrier to their effective enactment. Further principles of continuity of care,
multidisciplinary team responsibility and recognising patient and carer expectations were raised consistently
by interviewees, but lacked focus in existing literature. Finally, discussions of confidentiality, risk
management and systems improvement, and clinical governance lacked representation in either phase of
the research, suggesting less awareness of their relationships to open disclosure.
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This synthesis highlighted that there is little information about the consistency with which Being Open
guidance is being interpreted, implemented or evaluated at a local policy level, or the factors that may
contribute to a better or worse quality disclosure process. The links between outcomes of interest for risk
managers and those concerned with clinical governance and open disclosure need to be explicit to
determine whether or not outcomes relating to safety can be used as proxy measures for successful
disclosure process.
Little training is provided for health-care professionals or managers with relation to disclosure. The training
that exists is not well known and there is little evidence to underpin claims for any effectiveness of one
model over another. Although open disclosure is consistently identified as a positive and morally sound
action, there is little understanding of the mechanisms through which open disclosure might address and
reduce some of the psychological and health-related consequences of error for patients, their families and
the health-care providers involved. Finally, there is little recognition of any role for patients and families in
the disclosure process beyond being ‘disclosed to’.
Existing theoretical perspectives were explored with a view to a possible future role in structuring
examinations of disclosure work, including current theories of quality and safety, ethical leadership and
complex adaptive systems theory as applied to large-scale transformational change. However, this is not an
exhaustive list and the lack of theoretical underpinning of the area is apparent.
Conclusions
The findings suggest numerous implications for health care in relation to the implementation of open
disclosure guidance in the UK. Enhancing stakeholders’ understanding of terminology associated with
open disclosure may be fundamental to ensuring that Being Open is delivered consistently across
health-care organisations and that health-care providers feel able to translate the principles in a diverse
range of circumstances that may arise in practice. The provision of professional support and training may
contribute to health professionals’ desire to be open and their ability to do this effectively. Consideration
of patients’ needs and perspectives regarding adverse events may also provide some useful insights.
The following recommendations for research are proposed:
1. Future studies may explore the mechanisms through which open disclosure might address and reduce
some of the psychological and health-related consequences of error for patients, their families and the
health-care providers involved.
2. Little is known about the effect of training models designed to support disclosure. Future research may
seek to determine whether or not educational and institutional interventions reduce the influence of
impeding factors or enhance the influence of facilitating factors.
3. The importance of context in examining efforts to improve disclosure practice is an important and
challenging task for future work. More focus on direct observational methods is required.
4. Further examination of patients’ perceptions of particular disclosure styles, and the impact of these on
objective and relational disclosure outcomes, may be of interest.
5. Most of the work looking at disclosure takes place in secondary care. There is a notable lack of work
from the UK in the areas of general practice and private health care or in relation to social care. Further
study may be directed to these contexts.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
xx
Chapter 1 Background
. . . there are no easy answers when it comes to making mistakes. That needs to be said outright lest
someone, especially someone in training who is less experienced, think that admitting a mistake stops
at quality control or sharing responsibility, and that there is then some way around the difficult task of
actually taking responsibility for the mistake. Within the culture of medicine and even more broadly in
modern society there seems to be a drive for finding the easy way out. In this case there is none, and
it needs to be made very clear that this is a defining moment in the life of a physician with regard to
integrity and professionalism
Reproduced from Medical Errors and Medical Culture. There is no Easy Way Around Taking
Responsibility for Mistakes, Lyckholm L, Vol. 323, p. 570, 20011
with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd.
Estimates suggest that approximately 1 in 10 patients admitted to hospital will experience some sort of
unintended harm; approximately half of these cases are thought to be preventable.2,3 In a recent review of
prevalence studies, between 3% and 16% of hospitalised patients were found to have suffered harm from
medical care.4 This represents a significant proportion of patients, and the Department of Health in the UK
has identified quality and safety of care as a major concern.5 The recent publication of the Francis report
has brought this into even sharper focus.6 Internationally, other agencies are dedicated to co-ordinating
improvement efforts [e.g. the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and The Joint
Commission (TJC) – formerly the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) – in the USA, and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare (ACSQH)].
A central component of a just patient safety culture is thought to include the disclosure of serious medical
incidents to patients who have been affected or their families, often termed open disclosure.7 The concept
of openly disclosing the details of medical incidents has been adopted by several organisations, including
ones in Canada,8 New Zealand,9 the UK,10,11 the USA12 and Australia,13 which implemented a national
open disclosure policy in 2003. However, it is estimated that as few as 30% of harmful errors may
currently be disclosed to patients.14
Historically, the disclosure of adverse events to patients was neglected. Prior to the 1970s there was a
general acceptance of medical expertise; medical notes were rarely seen by patients or families and, if
required, often had to be obtained through a legal process. Discussions recognising this as problematic
appear to have emerged during the 1970s and early 1980s, when it was identified that patients suffering
from ‘medical mishap’ were often unable to find out who was responsible for an error or whether or not
anyone had been at fault.15 The importance of transparency in relation to improving quality and safety in
health care became increasingly discussed in the wake of seminal documents such as To Err is Human16 in
the USA and An Organisation With a Memory17 in the UK. Standards that promote open communication
with patients following events where errors have occurred are rapidly emerging in both the UK and a wider
international setting.4,17–19 Advocates of open disclosure propose that failing to communicate effectively
with patients following errors could reduce patient trust in health services, perhaps with negative
consequences for future care, and may increase the likelihood of litigation. Patient trust may be diminished
if they consider that their health service provider has not honoured their commitment to care for patients
by apologising. There is some evidence, mainly emerging from the USA, to support such concerns.20,21
In the UK, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) relaunched its Being Open framework in November
2009.11 The framework describes Being Open as being about the way in which health-care organisations
and their staff communicate with patients and/or their carers following a patient safety incident, and sets
out 10 key principles that underpin the successful facilitation of this process. These include providing a
genuine and timely apology for what has happened, keeping patients and/or their carers informed about
the progress made with the incident investigation, reassuring patients and/or carers that the incident is
being taken seriously and ensuring that measures are taken to prevent the incident from happening again.
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An apology is described as different from an admission of liability, and though an apology may be referred
to in legal proceedings, the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) stresses that this should in no way deter
those involved from providing explanations and apologies following adverse events.22 Being Open suggests
that good communication and trust are fundamental to the relationship between health-care professionals
and patients, but also that it is the ethical course of action. The Being Open framework was part of a
broader NPSA initiative in the UK to create an open and fair culture in the NHS. The NPSA stressed that
open disclosure should be explicitly linked to systems of incident reporting and analysis in health-care
organisations.23 Reorganisation within the NHS meant that on 1 June 2012 the key functions and expertise
for patient safety developed by the NPSA transferred to the NHS Commissioning Board. It was anticipated
that this would ensure that patient safety remains at the heart of the NHS and builds on the learning and
expertise developed by the NPSA in driving patient safety improvement. The Board will continue to use the
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) to identify important patient safety issues at their root
cause. Health-care organisations are expected to report patient safety incidents to the NRLS as previously.
The approach to monitoring safety within UK NHS trusts is therefore unchanged, and the stance that
disclosure should be part of safer patient care remains.
Despite limited empirical work assessing the effectiveness of implementing open disclosure policies (largely
undertaken in the USA, Australia and New Zealand), a review of the available literature in 2008 revealed
increasing recognition of open disclosure as an important issue for both organisations and patients.24 The
review also highlighted key debates around the ethical principles of ‘being open’ versus the legal liability
and economic risk involved. The absence of investigation into non-hypothetical scenarios and individuals’
actual experiences of open disclosure was also noted. With growing acknowledgement of the challenges
associated with open disclosure, the literature in this field has rapidly expanded, and there is now a need
to update the synthesis undertaken in 2008 to identify a point from which to move forward, particularly in
relation to the UK. Further work undertaken by Iedema et al. includes the assessment of open disclosure
in terms of the impact on patients and health-care staff in Australia.25–27 Qualitative analysis of interviews
with 131 clinical staff and 23 patients/family members indicated that, despite some uncertainty
surrounding the use and consequences of open disclosure, the system was strongly supported.24 Further
work has examined 119 patients’ and family members’ responses to questions about whether or not, and
how, they experienced disclosure.27
Complementary work by Gallagher et al. has conducted an investigation into patients’ and doctors’
attitudes towards the disclosure of medical errors, which highlighted the need for doctors to meet
patients’ expectations of an apology following medical errors and also to provide information about the
error.28 Further work by Gallagher et al.,29 in line with findings from other studies,30,31 has discussed
the increasing need and desire for open disclosure of medical errors.
Although the ethical arguments for the open disclosure of adverse events to patients are strong, there are
many stakeholders (e.g. patients and clinicians, hospital managers, health policy-makers, unions, equipment
companies, insurers, legal advisers and indemnifying organisations) involved in the delivery of such a
framework at a variety of levels. (Future reference to stakeholders will include the aforementioned groups,
although this is not intended as an exhaustive list.) The complexities of the differing perspectives of all of
these stakeholders means that implementation of any initiative is challenging. Embedding incident disclosure
into national and local culture within the NHS is a substantial challenge for NHS managers, as well as for the
individuals involved in direct patient care. It has been suggested that this is due to a culture that favours risk
aversion over patient-centred disclosure, despite the suggestion that the latter produces better financial and
relational outcomes.32 Current barriers to disclosure, such as fear of litigation or damaged reputation, can
obstruct clinicians in maintaining good relationships with patients and becoming more open to learning
from error or mistakes. If such barriers are not recognised, challenged and addressed appropriately and
overtly, they may cause significant problems for the implementation of a more open safety culture.
There appears to be a small but significant literature within the area of patient safety which looks at the
open disclosure of adverse events, including the important area of the impact of open disclosure on the
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health professionals involved in the error and the link between disclosure and systems improvement.33
However, this research is almost exclusively grounded in contexts outside of the UK, and much of the
empirical work is based on training scenarios rather than in situ practice. We know little about how the
policy of open disclosure is being, or might be, implemented and applied locally or nationally in the UK
and how it is, or will be, aligned with current incident reporting and analysis systems in health-care
organisations. As is the case with many patient safety outcomes, there is also a lack of knowledge around
how open disclosure might best be evaluated and improved. In addition to examining the current breadth
and quality of the literature in the area of open disclosure to date, this research will provide information
about the implementation and current stakeholder perceptions of open disclosure within the UK.
Aim
The overall aim of this project was to critically evaluate and extend both the evidence base and practice in
relation to the implementation of a policy of open disclosure of adverse events to patients within the UK.
Objectives
1. To extend a previous literature review of open disclosure conducted by one of the applicants in 2008.
2. To identify the strategies which have been considered or used to encourage an open disclosure culture,
and to assess the evidence of effectiveness of such strategies.
3. To identify and critique the various ways in which open disclosure has been conceptualised and measured.
4. To determine the understanding of, views on and interpretation of a policy of open disclosure of
adverse events among a variety of UK stakeholders.
5. To identify specific situations and ways in which the various stakeholders have been involved in the
disclosure of adverse events in the UK, and their experiences of this.
6. To explore how open disclosure can be linked effectively into safety and quality management systems
at all levels.
7. To explore the extent to which disclosure activity is actually linked in practice to safety and
quality management.
8. To develop a summary of evidence-based guidance for managers to facilitate the implementation of
open disclosure in individual trusts.
The objectives were addressed in three main phases, each of which built on the previous work. The first
phase comprised a focused literature review, summarising current knowledge on different stakeholder
roles, current interventions and proposed interventions, underpinning theory and the ways in which
current strategies feed into established reporting systems. The second phase involved individual interviews,
with the objective of generating new knowledge about UK-based stakeholders’ views on their roles in and
experiences of open disclosure of safety incidents in health-care settings. The third phase involved the
development of a set of short pragmatic suggestions aimed at NHS trust executives and managers, to
facilitate the implementation and evaluation of open disclosure in UK NHS trusts.
The main product of this research was intended to be new information which can be used to:
1. identify areas where current evidence and knowledge remain sparse
2. supplement the current guidance on implementing open disclosure
3. inform training and support for organisations and individuals in this area
4. identify continuing barriers to the implementation of open disclosure
5. identify well-developed models for open disclosure.
We also aimed to produce a series of short and pragmatic guidelines for NHS trust managers to facilitate
the implementation and evaluation of open disclosure initiatives.
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Chapter 2 Methods
This study addressed the objectives via three main phases of work. A review phase and a qualitativephase directly contributed to a synthesis of the information, to address specific issues in relation to
delivery of the Being Open guidance in the UK in the final phase of the study.
Phase 1: reviews
The reviews were conducted to capture data from a diversity of sources, in a systematic way, to identify
how open disclosure (an openness with patients about avoidable potentially harmful incidents) has been
conceptualised, the key ethical and legal debates associated with the process, the roles of the different
stakeholder groups and the outcomes that have been used to assess its impact.
A more focused review of the effectiveness of open disclosure interventions to date was carried out to sit
within this broader conceptual synthesis.
Two previous reviews have been conducted, both of which involved one of the current project team (RI).
The authors of these reviews planned to search five electronic databases using terms related to open
disclosure, as well as the websites of health and government regulatory bodies in a number of
countries.34,35 Although both of these reviews are seminal pieces of work and comprehensive, the authors
adopted a less standard systematic search strategy than the strategy presented in this work. In the previous
work, searching was stopped after three databases had been searched as it was considered they had
‘reached saturation’ (the same articles began to appear), whereas all literature identified will be considered
in this work. This makes the current work the most comprehensive exploration of previous literature
to date.
Objectives
Review 1: scoping review
The aim of this review was to identify and critique the literature around open disclosure, including (i) the
ways in which it has been conceptualised and discussed within current systems of quality and safety,
(ii) the wider debates around legal and ethical issues in open disclosure, (iii) the outcomes used to explore
its impact, (iv) the roles of stakeholder groups, (v) the relationship between open disclosure policy and
systems of reporting and monitoring adverse events worldwide and (vi) the extent to which open
disclosure policies appear to have been informed by research evidence.
Review 2: effectiveness review
This review was carried out to identify, assess and summarise the effectiveness of open disclosure and
strategies/interventions that have been explicitly used with the intention of promoting and supporting
open disclosure of patient safety incidents in a health-care context.
Definitions
Patient safety incident
The term patient safety incident refers to any unintended or unexpected incident which could have, or did,
lead to harm for one or more patients.23
Open disclosure
There is no agreed international definition of open disclosure, but its underlying principle involves clinicians
informing patients and/or family members when a safety incident has occurred. Many policies describe the
use of an honest and consistent approach to communication which should happen as soon as possible
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following the incident (e.g. Canadian Patient Safety Institute,8 New Zealand Health and Disability
Commissioner,9 NPSA,10,11 Joint Commission Resources Inc.,12 ACSQH13). Elements of such policies,
including that of the UK, commonly include saying sorry for what has happened; keeping patients and/or
their carers informed about the progress of the incident investigation; reassuring patients and/or carers
that the incident is being taken seriously; and ensuring measures are taken to prevent the incident from
happening again.11
Search strategy
The aim of the search was to systematically identify literature on the open disclosure of adverse events in
health care to inform both systematic reviews. A broad search strategy was initially developed on MEDLINE
(Ovid SP) using the two main concepts of open disclosure and adverse events. A range of text words,
synonyms and subject headings for each of the two concepts were identified by scanning key papers
identified at the beginning of the project, and through discussion with the review team and collaborators,
and the use of database thesauri. The terms for open disclosure were combined with those for adverse
events using the AND Boolean operator (see Appendix 2 for the full search strategy). The MEDLINE
strategy was adapted for use in each database. These searches are considerably more detailed than those
adopted in the previous literature reviews.34,35
Retrieval of studies was restricted to those published after 1980 as little literature appears before this date.
The early reports which reinvigorated the drive for higher-quality and safer patient care began to appear
from the early 1990s, and a period of 10 years prior to this was felt reasonable to capture the vast
majority of the literature. No language restrictions were applied to the search strategy, to ensure that
non-English-language papers were retrieved. Study design filters were not applied to the search strategy,
so that any literature – including papers about the effectiveness of specific open disclosure interventions,
reviews, opinion pieces, policy documents and discussion articles – was identified by the search.
A wide range of electronic resources were searched, including databases, research registers, trials registers
and other internet resources, to retrieve both published and unpublished literature, grey literature and
ongoing research. The resources searched covered literature from the medical, health, nursing, social
science and legal fields. The full list of searched databases can be seen in Appendix 3.
The above searches were supplemented by searching key patient safety organisation websites and
government agency websites to identify reports, policy documents and grey literature not indexed in the
electronic databases. Further references were identified by scanning the reference lists of key papers and
reports identified during the searching process, from the personal collections of the review team and
consultations with key personnel from patient safety organisations, and by hand-searching the reference
lists of key seminal papers.
Records were managed within an EndNote library (EndNote version X3; Thomson Reuters, CA, USA).
After deduplication, 10,527 records in total were identified.
The literature search was designed and carried out by an information specialist from the Centre for
Reviews and Dissemination, University of York, with input from the review team. Peer review of the search
strategy was undertaken by a second information specialist at the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination.
Searching of the legal databases was carried out by an information specialist from Capsticks (a specialist
health and social care law firm), using a search strategy adapted from the initial MEDLINE strategy.
METHODS
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Inclusion criteria
Review 1: scoping review
Types of literature included
(a) Available in English.
(b) Produced after 1980 following the rise of patient safety/medical error research.
This could be any of the following:
(a) policy documents
(b) opinion pieces
(c) research that has investigated
– perceptions or experiences of open disclosure
– ethical or legal issues in open disclosure
– the process or outcomes of open disclosure
– the role of any stakeholder in open disclosure
(d) accounts of stakeholders’ experiences of open disclosure, including those of patients, patient support
groups, health professionals, health-care managers and litigation services
(e) literature developed to guide patients, health-care providers or litigation services about open disclosure
(f) grey literature reporting activities/initiatives/research that focuses on open disclosure.
Types of participants included
Participants could be stakeholders in open disclosure from any health-care context in any
location, including:
(a) health service users who may have been affected by safety incidents (patients, relatives, carers)
(b) potential health service users
(c) representatives or members of support groups for health service users
(d) health-care professionals
(e) health-care managers
(f) representatives or members of medical litigation services
(g) professional/regulatory bodies such as the General Medical Council (GMC) or Nursing and Midwifery
Council (NMC).
Nature of content
The content of the literature could be any of the following:
(a) conceptualisation of open disclosure
(b) discussion of the principles or implementation of open disclosure
(c) discussion of the ethics of open disclosure
(d) discussion of legal issues relating to open disclosure
(e) reporting or describing criteria for assessing quality and/or consequences of open disclosure
(f) reporting the implications of open disclosure for health services
(g) discussion of the roles of any of the stakeholders in the open disclosure process
(h) discussion or development of open disclosure policies or experiences of its use
(i) professional expectations from bodies/regulatory bodies.
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Exclusion criteria
Documents were excluded if they:
(a) did not include stakeholders in open disclosure from a health-care context, i.e. none of the types of
participants described above
(b) described/discussed/reported disclosure relating to deliberate acts of harm
(c) were not available in English
(d) were produced before 1980.
Additional criteria for the effectiveness review
Population
These could be stakeholders in open disclosure from any health-care context in any location, including
health service users, potential health service users, representatives or members of support groups
for health service users, health-care professionals, health-care managers and representatives or members
of medical litigation services.
Intervention
We included open disclosure as an intervention. Interventions that were explicitly intended to promote,
enhance or support open disclosure were also included.
The following comparisons were included:
l Open disclosure versus against non-disclosure. Any intervention which involved an act of informing a
patient and/or family member or representative that a patient safety incident had occurred.
Characteristics of open disclosure interventions were likely to differ, however seemed likely to include
elements commonly identified in open disclosure policy (see definition above).
l Interventions to promote or support open disclosure in combination with open disclosure versus against
open disclosure alone.
Any intervention that was explicitly intended to promote, enhance or support open disclosure of patient
safety incidents in a health-care context was included. It was anticipated that candidate interventions
would be, for example, training or education in communication techniques and peer support groups.
Studies of interventions using actual events (real cases) or hypothetical scenarios were included. Studies
where the intervention aimed to promote or improve communication of illness (‘bad or sad news’), such as
diagnosis of cancer or terminal illness, were excluded. Studies of interventions relating to deliberate acts of
harm were also excluded.
Outcomes
Outcomes included (but were not restricted to):
l patients’ and/or health professionals’ attitudes relating to the intervention
l rates and patterns of uptake of the intervention (among patients and/or health professionals) and of
any behaviours/practices it was designed to promote
l other behaviours relating to health service delivery or use
l patients’ assessments/evaluations of health-care quality, including their perceptions of involvement,
of the quality of their interactions with health-care professionals, and of their safety
l patients’ health status and sense of well-being
l psychological effects on staff.
METHODS
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Study design
The following study designs were included:
l Randomised controlled trials (including cross-over trials and cluster trials). Investigators allocated
participants to groups using randomisation.
l Quasi-experimental studies (non-randomised controlled studies, before-and-after studies and
interrupted time series). Investigators allocated participants to groups using a non-random method.
It was not anticipated that many studies of these designs would be available. Therefore, observational data
were included if there was a comparison group, as in the following studies:
l Cohort studies A defined group of participants is followed over time and a comparison is made
between those who did and those who did not receive the intervention.
l Case–control studies Groups from the same population, with (cases) and without (controls) a specific
outcome of interest, are compared to evaluate the association between exposure to an intervention
and the outcome.
Case series and case reports were excluded.
Study selection
Four reviewers screened citations of the title and abstract for potential relevance, with all citations being
viewed by two reviewers. Full papers were obtained for citations judged potentially relevant. On receipt of
the full paper, one reviewer applied the inclusion criteria for all papers to identify material of relevance.
A second reviewer screened a random subset (10%) of the sample to ensure that no potentially relevant
papers were missed and that the inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied consistently. Where decisions
were unresolved, the two reviewers discussed the decision, and a third party was consulted if agreement
could not be reached.
Information extraction
Review 1
Given the complexity and variety of literature explored, we specified that data extraction would be based
on the study objectives to ensure that the review had a clear and consistent focus and was carried out in a
systematic way.
Given the ultimate aim of developing current guidance on open disclosure in the NHS, we extracted data
from the reviewed papers that related to any of the 10 principles of open disclosure described in the Being
Open framework. These were:
1. acknowledgement
2. apology
3. truthfulness, timeliness and clarity
4. professional support
5. recognise patient and caregiver expectations
6. risk management and systems improvement
7. individual/multidisciplinary team responsibility
8. clinical governance
9. continuity of care
10. confidentiality.
It was anticipated that this would provide an idea of those aspects of the framework for which there was
currently supporting literature and those that had been implemented in health care, and the extent to which
implementation had been perceived as successful. It would also highlight the areas of the framework for which
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there was less evidence or support, that were less clearly defined or enacted or that had been less successfully
implemented to date. Both intended and unintended outcomes were documented during this process.
On this basis we extracted:
(a) author/investigator
(b) date
(c) location
(d) type of literature
(e) population
(f) study design (if applicable)
(g) outcomes/arguments/guidance, which were summarised in relation to
– acknowledgement
– truthfulness, timeliness and clarity of communication
– apology
– recognising patient and carer expectations
– professional support
– risk management and systems improvement
– multidisciplinary responsibility
– clinical governance
– confidentiality
– continuity of care.
There were two stages of information extraction: in the first stage, a basic extraction that provided an
outline of the paper, and in the second, a more detailed extraction in which particular aspects of the work
were drawn out, depending on the type of material and its salience to the review objectives and domains
outlined in the Being Open guidance.
Review 2
The following data were extracted from included studies (where available):
l general information (author, article title, type of publication, country of origin, source of funding)
l study characteristics (aims and objectives, study design, inclusion/exclusion criteria, recruitment
procedures, unit of allocation)
l participant characteristics (of both health-care workers/managers and patients, including age, gender,
ethnicity, profession/position of health-care worker, disease or condition/adverse event details of patient)
l intervention and setting (setting where the intervention was delivered, description of the intervention
and comparator)
l outcome data (for intervention and comparator groups the following were reported: number enrolled,
number included in analysis, number lost to follow-up, withdrawals and exclusions. For each reported
outcome the following were extracted: definition of outcome, measurement tool used, length of
follow-up, results of study analysis).
Data collection and analysis
In the larger primary review (review 1), each included paper was summarised to provide an overview of
research, discussion and policy or guidance documents relating to open disclosure of error.
In the smaller systematic review of interventions (review 2), no formal pooling of data was appropriate
owing to a lack of studies with a comparator group and uncontrolled before-and-after designs. Findings
were grouped into two sections:
1. studies where disclosure was the intervention
2. studies where interventions were intended to promote or support disclosure.
METHODS
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In each of these sections the included studies were described in terms of their setting, participants,
methods, intervention, outcomes, outcome measures and reported findings, and linked to tabulated
descriptions of studies.
Phase 2: interviews
Ethical approval
Ethical approval for this phase of the project was obtained from the Bradford NHS Research Ethics
Committee (ref. 10/1007/47). Research governance approval was obtained from the relevant NHS trusts
(see Appendix 4).
In-depth individual interviews were used to describe, explore and explain stakeholders’ views and
experiences of open disclosure in health care. The rationale for selecting a qualitative approach was
threefold. Firstly, little research has been conducted in the UK in this area to date; qualitative methods are
ideally suited to reveal the range of views or practices and key issues that might be missed through the use
of more structured data collection instruments. Secondly, in-depth interviews are the most effective and
valid way of exploring people’s experiences, beliefs and meanings, from the perspective of the respondent,
in order to provide a ‘rich’ data set which is grounded in the experiences of the interviewees themselves.
Thirdly, one of the strengths of qualitative research is that it can identify the complex ways in which
particular beliefs or experiences are likely to influence behaviour.
Perspectives were likely to vary according to stakeholder, health-care setting and participant demographics;
therefore, we employed sampling strategies and data collection techniques that allowed for an inductive,
hypothesis-generating approach to interpretation of the data.
Populations studied
In order to explore the views of a range of stakeholders who might contribute to open disclosure, with
diverse clinical backgrounds and differing degrees of patient contact in a variety of health-care contexts,
study participants were strategically selected from four different groups:
l Policy-makers Individuals with a current or previous position of responsibility for developing health
policy, and in particular the Being Open guidance.
l Professional organisations Individuals from professional organisations that represent or regulate the
health professions.
l NHS managers and health professionals Health-care managers included members of the senior
management team, some of whom had dual clinical and management roles. Health professionals were
staff who carried out work on the ‘shop floor’, from matron and consultant level to junior doctors and
nurses (from band 5 up).
l Patients and patient organisations Participants were approached through national patient groups.
Participants could include patient advocates and those with experiences of disclosure or a lack
of disclosure.
Details of the original sampling framework and the planned participant numbers in each group are shown
in Appendix 1.
Recruitment and consent
Recruitment procedures were tailored according to the stakeholder groups. Policy-makers, leaders of
professional and patient organisations and senior managers were contacted in the first instance by a
targeted letter from the research team. All other participants were contacted, in the first instance, by an
appropriate member of the identified organisation. In all cases, potential participants were sent
information about the study and asked to return a short slip (or contact the research team by e-mail or
telephone if preferred) to discuss participation.
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A member of the research team then contacted respondents to explain the nature and purpose of the
study. In the case of patient participants, we emphasised that the research would not directly help them to
seek a remedy or redress for any problems they may have experienced related to the disclosure of adverse
events. Where people expressed willingness to participate, the researcher made arrangements to hold an
individual interview at a time and place convenient for the respondent. A small number of interviews were
conducted over the telephone if specifically requested by the participant.
Prior to the commencement of interviews, the researcher reminded participants of the purpose of the
research; asked respondents if they had any further questions; checked that they were still happy to take
part; and reminded them that they could stop the interview or withdraw from the study at any time.
Data collection
The aim of the interviews was to explore:
l stakeholders’ general awareness and understanding of open disclosure
l their personal experiences and perceptions of both the principle of openness in relation to disclosure of
adverse incidents and the Being Open guidance, in the context of their own position in relation to
health care
l their views on the contribution that they might make to promote and enhance open disclosure
l their thoughts about the Being Open guidance.
Although all interviews shared these aims, the emphasis in the interviews varied by stakeholder group.
Interviews with policy-makers focused on the development of the Being Open guidance and perceptions of
its current use. With professional organisations, the translation of national and local guidance into practice
was emphasised, along with the perceived contribution that such organisations can make to support
health professionals in delivering open disclosure. Interviews with NHS managers and staff explored
experiences of open disclosure and of implementing the Being Open guidance specifically. We also
explored the challenges of discussing adverse events with patients. Representatives from patient
organisations were asked about their perceptions of open disclosure in the policy context and from a
broader patient perspective, and patients were asked to share their individual experiences and beliefs.
A core topic guide (see Appendix 5) covering these investigative areas was developed and piloted. This was
refined before interviews commenced with the target populations. Interviews opened with questions
exploring respondents’ broad understanding of the term ‘open disclosure’, the reasons for implementing
open disclosure, experiences or beliefs about the Being Open guidance and, finally, where the challenges
lie. Modified versions of the topic guide were developed for use with each stakeholder group. After initial
interviews, some minor alterations were made to the wording of the guide to be used with NHS
managers, to make it more sensitive to exploring the experiences of this group.
Data analysis
Interviews were audiotaped and fully transcribed. Transcripts were analysed using framework analysis.36
This approach was selected for several reasons. Firstly, it is especially well suited to applied qualitative
research, in which the objectives of the investigation are typically set a priori, and shaped by the
information requirements of the funding body, rather than wholly emerging from a reflexive research
process. Secondly, framework analysis provides a visible method which can be scrutinised, carried out, and
discussed and operated by individuals in a team. Lastly, the approach lends itself to reconsidering and
reworking ideas because the analysis follows a well-defined procedure, which can be documented
and accessed by several members of a research team.
Framework analysis comprised the following steps:
l Familiarisation with the data, sometimes referred to as ‘immersion’.
l Thematic analysis, carried out in order to develop a coding scheme.
METHODS
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l Systematic coding of the data.
l Charting of data using a Microsoft Excel 2010 spreadsheet (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA,
USA). Charts contained summaries of data (supported by references to data points in the original
transcripts), so the research team was able to build a matrix to see across cases and the range of data
under themes.
l Mapping and interpretation of the data in order to explore relationships between the codes.
Each of the three researchers (YB, RH, KB) most involved in fieldwork took a sample of interviews, and
initial data were open coded. The coding framework emerged from a focus on the questions posed by the
research document, but at initial stages was also open to emergent codes. The coding framework was
further developed through discussions with members of the wider research team with extensive qualitative
(VE) and clinical (IW) experience, to discuss emerging codes and categories, the interpretation of key texts
and potential new lines of enquiry. The coding framework is included in Appendix 6.
Data sampling
Sampling decisions always fluctuate between the aims of covering as wide a field as possible and
conducting analyses which are as deep as possible.37 A strategic decision was made to aim for depth in
analysing the qualitative interview data, as we sought to present findings which were ‘rich’ in relevant
information. All interviews were coded, and 33 interview transcripts were selected for in-depth analysis, to
represent diversity in the total data set of 86 interviews. The interviews were selected strategically from the
complete data set using maximum variation sampling;38 that is to say, they included ‘typical’ cases
(reflecting the views of the majority of respondents), ‘deviant’ cases (extreme cases of the phenomena
under investigation) and ‘critical’ cases (those that appeared to be especially information rich and thus
particularly illuminating). These 33 interviews related to 33 participants (four policy-makers, four
professional organisations, 10 health-care managers, 12 health professionals and three patients/family
members who had experienced error). Although these transcripts formed the basis of the analysis, data
from across the whole sample contributed to the analysis. The selected transcripts included interviews with
males and females, who had wide-ranging views and experiences of open disclosure (see Appendix 7 for a
detailed participant breakdown).
Rigour and transparency in the analytic process
Analytic rigour and accurate interpretation of data were promoted and enhanced in a number of ways.
The three team members most closely involved in fieldwork (YB, RH, KB) met frequently to discuss data
collection and analysis. At regular intervals, meetings were held with members of the wider research team
with extensive qualitative (VE) and clinical (IW) experience, to discuss emerging codes and categories, the
interpretation of key texts and potential new lines of enquiry. In this way, the combined insights of those
‘handling’ the data closely and members of the team with a wider perspective of methodological and open
disclosure issues could be incorporated into the coding framework to be used for all data analysis (see
Appendix 6). In addition, a small subsample of transcripts coded using this agreed framework (n=5) were
examined by a member of the wider research team (VE) as an independent check on the assignment of
codes to data.
The framework approach to data analysis allowed data to be compared within cases, facilitating the
exploration of contextual meaning; comparing cases across the data set facilitated the search for
regularities (key themes) and exceptions (negative cases). The use of memos during initial stages of analysis
provided a visible ‘audit trail’ as the analysis moved from ‘raw’ data, through interpretation to the
production of findings. A reflexive approach has been taken throughout the entire research process, from
the initial development of the research questions, through data collection and analysis (for a full statement
on reflexivity see Appendix 8).
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Chapter 3 Results
Phase 1: review 1
The searches identified over 10,000 pieces of literature. Of these, 1435 full copies were retrieved and
610 pieces of literature were included in the final review. Full details of the literature selection process are
illustrated in Figure 1.
A broad description of the literature
Literature published over a 22-year period was examined, with the majority of papers published from 2001
onwards. A broad description of the literature is presented below. We were interested in capturing the
volume and type of literature and the pattern of publications over time, which has been little discussed in
previous reviews.
The majority of literature discussing open disclosure is from the USA (65.1%). A further 20% is from
Canada, the UK and Australia. The remainder consists primarily of single publications from a range of
countries, and in just under 7% of papers the country of origin was not clear. Further details are shown in
Figure 2.
The literature search was restricted to 1980 onwards as previous work had demonstrated a surge in safety
literature in the 1990s,39 and this was felt to be an appropriately sensitive time frame in which to capture
the main body of literature. Figure 3 demonstrates that until 2000 there were few publications per year
relating to open disclosure. From 2001, the number of publications suddenly increased to an approximate
average of 50 publications per year. The rise in publications is likely to reflect the increased awareness of
patient safety issues and the publication of articles now regarded as seminal pieces in the safety literature,
such as To Err is Human in 1999;16 this article drew attention to the consequences and cost of medical
error in the US health system and other health systems worldwide.
The majority (just over two-thirds) of the literature comprised opinion or ‘think’ pieces, journalistic-type
articles and a variety of articles containing reports of other (previously published) publications and
guidelines. Thirty-five per cent consisted of either primary research or papers which were judged to be of
seminal importance to the topic, largely based on authorship by well-published or well-cited figures in the
open disclosure field. There were small pockets of literature emerging from Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa, as well as the better-known literature from North America and Australia, where discussion of the
area of disclosure of adverse events is well established. Largely, this consists of descriptive literature
outlining what clinicians feel about disclosing error and harm and what they report that they do in relation
to disclosure, as well as descriptions of patient preferences and experiences in the context of open
disclosure. There is little primary research and referencing back to early publications is common, with key
messages largely unchanged. Clinicians, in principle, and for the most part, agree that patients should be
informed of errors in their care that cause harm but are challenged by mixed messages from their
institutions about what they perceive to be their legal status in this context. This is further exacerbated by
concerns about their skills in disclosing error, due to a lack of specific training or exposure to this kind of
communication. Additionally, the literature includes inconsistent terminology and ideas about which events
should be disclosed, which adds further confusion.
Patients unequivocally report that they want disclosure of all unanticipated events and errors that occur
during care. In some literature, the barriers to disclosure are explored more deeply and there are some
in-depth critiques of what ‘telling the truth’ means. Although a good understanding of the concepts that
underpin openness is valuable, such theoretical accounts may have limited application in changing the
current culture in health care or persuading the NHS to fully implement the policy of open disclosure
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 Titles and abstracts
identified and screened
(n = 10,527)
 
 
Excluded 
(n = 8956)
Unobtainable 
(n = 53)
 
Duplicates 
(n = 83)
Full copies retrieved and
assessed for eligibility
(n = 1435)  
Publications identified from
internet resources
(n = 18) 
Excluded 
(n = 843)
Publications meeting inclusion
criteria and included in
the review 
(n = 610)
FIGURE 1 Selection of literature.
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rigorously and consistently. However, these accounts have been included alongside more practical
accounts and primary research to fully illustrate the types of literature available to inform each principle.
Main findings
Given the challenges which open disclosure appears to present for some individuals and health-care
organisations, it is surprising how little attention the topic has received in the UK. There is good reason to
think that open disclosure may be different in different contexts.40 In the limited evidence available, UK
doctors were more likely than US doctors to agree that significant medical errors should always be
disclosed to patients, and more US doctors reported that they had not disclosed an error to a patient
because they were afraid of litigation.40 The context of care may influence both how professional values
are expressed and the extent to which behaviours are in line with stated values. Lessons may be learned
from the largely US and other literature about the implementation of a policy of open disclosure, but the
clinical negligence contexts in each country may have implications for how open disclosure is perceived
locally. A large and growing body of literature exists in relation to open disclosure. Much of this is in
practice journals and summarises a small number of frequently cited pieces of original research in the area.
Thus, although there appears to be a great deal of activity in this field, there is limited underpinning
primary research to substantiate conclusions; received truth is perpetuated from past references often
based on small before-and-after studies or single cases.
Following detailed data extraction and appraisal of the literature, the results were synthesised under the
specific principles of Being Open. Although there are vigorous and ongoing debates within the literature
related to open disclosure, the nature of the UK health-care context, and in particular the NHS, means that
some of these debates have less relevance than in other countries. This is reflected in the attention
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afforded to some of the areas presented in this review and we did not seek to capture the very valid but
less applicable areas within State and Federal statute in other international contexts. The large volume of
literature on this topic has been surprising, but the aim of this project was to examine open disclosure
specifically in a UK context. The legal frameworks and statutory requirements differ in various contexts and
therefore some of the literature is less applicable to the UK. The review will address the international
literature but focus on its applicability to a UK context, concentrating on lessons which can be learned to
specifically address the implementation of open disclosure policy and duty of candour in relation to
unanticipated outcomes in the UK.
A complete list of included literature sources is included in Appendix 9.
Acknowledgement
The Being Open guidance10 states that all patient safety incidents should be acknowledged and reported
as soon as they are identified. In cases where the patient, or his or her family and carers, inform
health-care staff that something untoward has happened, this must be taken seriously from the outset.
Any concerns should be treated with compassion and understanding by all health-care professionals.
However, the literature suggests that defining the events that warrant disclosure presents a fundamental
challenge for organisations, managers and clinicians. Although a number of definitions of what constitutes
an error or an adverse event exist, there is much less clarity about what should be disclosed. Often the
need to disclose has been associated with whether or not an event is classed as an error or constitutes
harm. This is further complicated by an abundance of diverse error definitions in the literature. The
terminology used to describe and categorise errors is also complex and includes an array of synonyms such
as ‘bad outcome’, ‘sentinel event’, ‘adverse event’, ‘mishap’, ‘mistake’, and ‘untoward incident’. All are
used as synonyms or (partial) explanations of the word ‘error’.41 Additionally, errors can occur through acts
of commission or omission; that is, not only as a result of what is done, but also as a result of what is not
done.41 The guidance suggests that ‘error’ refers to ‘any unintended or unexpected incident that could
have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded healthcare’.10 ‘Error’ seems to be
problematic in its definition, and although harm, certainly in a biomedical context, may be easier to define,
it does not address issues of culpability. Although this appears to be a well-defined principle, the
discussions in the literature reflect continued ambiguity about the events that individuals feel are covered
by any principle of openness.
Definitions of error or harm
Patients and clinicians appear to define error differently.42 From the patient perspective, the distinctions
between the terms ‘error’, ‘adverse event’ and ‘unexpected outcome’ seem relatively unimportant. Such
definitions are largely constructed from the systems perspective and may be at odds with the way in which
patients interpret harm. In the patient experience, harm is perceived, and regardless of how members of
the health-care community and legal profession wish to classify this harm, patients who perceive that they
have suffered as a result of their treatment feel that they deserve a timely, supportive and informative
conversation about their concerns. In 2003, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario recognised
this with the publication of its policy on disclosure of harm.43 This describes a definition of harm as a
concept which is not always preventable nor necessarily an indicator of substandard care. According to this
definition, harm refers to any unintended outcome arising during the course of treatment, which may be
reasonably expected to negatively affect a patient’s health and/or quality of life. Such outcomes may occur
as a result of individual or systemic acts or omissions, and include adverse events related to the care and/or
services provided to the patient rather than to the patient’s underlying medical condition. This is a
considerably broader definition than many and has the potential to address the broader nature of patient
concerns which are often raised but not addressed.
What should be disclosed?
The definitions of which events should be disclosed have subtle differences but there are common
recommended elements of disclosure including ‘an expression of sympathy or regret’,10 as well as the
provision of practical and emotional support for the patient. Most guidance is keen to stress that disclosure
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discussions should ensure that no speculation, opinion or attribution of blame occurs and that an apology
to patients by health-care providers is not taken as an admission of liability. The Canadian Patient Safety
Institute44 has non-binding disclosure guidelines for adverse events which state that all harm must be
communicated to patients, irrespective of the reason for the harm. There does not appear to be any
consensus about the obligation to disclose adverse events with minor consequences,16,20,21,28,45–48 despite
the fact that most patients express the desire to be informed of these types of errors. It is proposed that
the need for disclosure is proportionate and increases as the harm or risk of harm to the patient
increases.49 Others have proposed the ‘view from below’, putting oneself in the patient’s position to
determine how he or she would want the situation to be handled.50 Disclosure should be the norm, with
practitioners expected to justify why there should be any exception to this rule. The 2008 Veterans Health
Administration (VHA) directive, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients,51 is one of the few policies which
has been explicit about its stance on serious and minor errors and events, stating that even when a near
miss occurs, disclosure of such ‘close calls’ is recommended if the patient may have become aware that
something strange had occurred.52,53 One account describes the useful role lay members can play in
informing decisions with regard to disclosure. Even in well-motivated organisations which try to implement
openness, it can be useful to have lay members as part of a review board to ensure decisions remain
patient centred.54
Truthfulness, timeliness and clarity of communication
Being Open guidance10 stresses the three principles of truthfulness, timeliness and clarity, mentioning
specifically an ‘appropriately nominated person’, a step-by-step explanation which is timely and based on
fact and that patients and families should be kept up to date with the progress of any investigation.
Additionally, communication should be clear and unambiguous with a single point of contact.
Why is truthfulness important?
There are a number of involved critiques of why disclosure should occur, which refer to philosophical
underpinnings. The most powerful argument in favour of disclosure is deontological in nature. This
deontological perspective, which is the perspective of duty-based ethics, is largely attributed to German
philosopher Immanuel Kant and suggests that, in principle, all errors must be disclosed.55,56 In this
argument, truth-telling is not mandated by the specific detail of the situation. Therefore, factors such as
whether or not an error is serious, or does or does not cause harm, or indeed whether or not an institution
or practitioner is liable for harm, are not relevant. The duty is simply one of honesty. The same ethical
principles insist that any proposed ethical rule must be universally applicable; it must bind everybody in all
situations or else individuals are unable to know if they are bound by it or not. An in-depth but accessible
critique of this perspective as it applies to disclosure is presented by Scheirton.41 In this critique, the reader
is asked to imagine that we propose a rule that therapists, nurses, pharmacists and physicians should
generally tell the truth but that sometimes it may be acceptable to hide the truth or even lie (for example,
in the case of an error). The outcome for patients in this scenario, as soon as they learn about this rule for
health-care practitioners, is likely to be suspicion. One family member’s account of non-disclosure refers to
the fact that they ‘know of no other industry where honesty is optional’.57 A practitioner may be telling the
truth, but the patient knows this may not be the case, as the practitioner is ethically allowed not to tell the
truth sometimes. Therefore, in this paradigm the practitioner’s moral duty to tell the truth cannot logically
accommodate exceptions for errors.
Scheirton also describes patient rights as the other side of a similar argument, as the flip side of duties.41
Laws, professional bodies and institutions agree that patients have a right to be informed about their own
medical situation and health care. This right is not conditional upon the individual qualities of the patient
or their condition. It is argued that any information is the patient’s and it does not matter whether the
particular condition or intervention is the result of an error or some other cause. The patient’s right is to be
informed, and this should be honoured by the health-care practitioners who have entered into a
therapeutic relationship with the patient.
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The picture of disclosure and non-disclosure
A recent paper looking at error and disclosure in emergency care in the USA has outlined the scale
of non-disclosure,58 at least in one context. A large number of medication errors (13,932) from
496 emergency departments were analysed. Physicians were responsible for 24% of errors, nurses for
54% and most occurred in the administration (36%). Although 3% of the errors resulted in harm, in only
2.7% of these cases were patients or family members notified. Other work59 indicates that willingness to
disclose was related to the severity of the error, with the majority of near misses not even reported to the
head of department or the hospital error committees. Such studies indicate that health professionals still
hesitate in their reports of many errors or adverse events unless serious harm occurs. A small number of
papers have looked at the kinds of factors which may affect whether or not a patient or his or her family
experiences disclosure.60–63 These tend to be conducted in survey work directed at either clinicians or
patients. One study60 conducted with patients who had experienced error suggests that patients were less
likely to report that disclosure had occurred if they were older than 50 years, did not generally report good
health, experienced preventable events, or were still affected by the event at the time of the interview.
Disclosure seems to have been more likely to occur when events required additional treatment and
among patients who reported good health.60 This suggests that disclosure occurs when individuals and
organisations feel compelled to do so because the error is more visible.61 Although there is little work
directly addressing attitudes to and rates of disclosure in Britain, one paper looking at trainee anaesthetists
as recently as 2009 reported that, although 57% had made an error which caused harm, only 68% of
these had informed the patient. In the 32% of cases where the patient had not been told, a number of
reasons, including negligible perception of patient harm, fear of litigation, fear of organisational or
professional reprisal, and the patient having moved, died or remained unconscious were cited as reasons
for non-disclosure.62 This highlights the need for further training among this group of clinicians in relation
to both current duty of candour and also medico-legal aspects of care. Other work in the UK63 has
demonstrated norms of selective disclosure in medical trainees whereby errors were disclosed informally to
colleagues, particularly when teams were seen as supportive, but formal reports and disclosures to patients
were rare.
The disclosure gap
There is an increasing literature stressing the importance of disclosing health-care errors, but the available,
largely USA-based evidence suggests that this enthusiasm for what is seen by many as the moral
imperative may not be reflected in practice.60,64–66 Disclosure still remains an elusive concept for some and
the evidence from a number of surveys points to a marked difference between what patients want from
their health-care provider, in terms of honest conversations about mistakes and errors, and what clinicians
(doctors in particular) say they would provide.67,68 This term has been referred to as the ‘disclosure gap’.69
Several sources give a number of well-cited reasons to explain this mismatch between patient expectations
and health-care provider practice, which are discussed at length in a wide variety of outputs from
academic papers to short journalistic pieces. However, they seem to fall into four main areas.69
1. Truthfulness requires an admission of a mistake. For clinicians, admitting that they have harmed a
patient is psychologically difficult. As well-trained and compassionate individuals they have a
professional and often personal commitment to helping patients. The challenge to this identity posed
by unanticipated outcomes and errors in particular is uncomfortable. Many physicians are upset by an
allegation that they have been negligent, even if this turns out not to be the case.70 This is further
complicated by a culture of self-regulation and one where the belief is that health-care professionals
heal rather than harm.
2. Health-care professionals undergo extensive training, both initially and as part of continuing
professional development. However, this rarely extends to conducting the challenging conversations
that are required by disclosures of errors or mistakes.71,72 US work by Gallagher revealed that only 9%
of physicians reported receiving any training in disclosing medical errors.71 Where work has used
standardised patients to explore skills in error disclosure, current evidence suggests that doctors are
relatively lacking in such skills.73,74 There is no literature to support training input in the UK.
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3. It seems likely that health-care organisations and the individuals who work within them may not fully
appreciate how important full disclosure is to their patients, and thus make interpretations about what
it is important to disclose. In fact, many examples are given where individuals argue that they are
protecting patients from difficult information. A number of studies show that physicians are less likely
to tell patients about errors if the error is not obvious to the patient.67,71
4. In the extensive literature from the USA, one of the arguments is that the biggest barrier to full
disclosure is fear of litigation.75 Risks and costs associated with malpractice are high, and physicians and
institutions are worried that admitting an error will increase the likelihood that patients will sue them.
The emphasis on this has changed with a number of reforms in state law and in the policy adopted by
a number of large insurers, but physicians remain sceptical about the power of such ‘apology clauses’
to protect them in practice. Additionally, most clinicians do not understand the law or update
themselves, as they are too busy with clinical decision-making and practising medicine.70
Delaying disclosure or non-disclosure
Common objections to open disclosure policies suggest that disclosures may not always be in the best
interest of the patient. Some work suggests that even if many physicians are perceived to prefer to limit
disclosure for their own rather than patients’ interests, or that as a society we believe paternalism is no
longer acceptable, there may still be good reasons not to inform a patient of an error, or at least not to
disclose immediately.41 The idea that information conveys power to the patient is sometimes questioned in
relation to whether or not such information may also harm them. Does the patient’s right to information
always trump emotional well-being? It has been suggested that if an error has no consequences for the
patient’s well-being and disclosure does not empower the patient, but is more likely to cause distress or
reduce the patient’s trust, then non-disclosure for the sake of sustaining the therapeutic relationship may
be the ethical course.76 However, this rule of therapeutic exception means that the burden of proof is on
the one who wishes to use the exception.41 At this point, proving that full disclosure will create an
unreasonable risk of serious harm to the patient before the patient has the information is impossible.
Unless research could demonstrate that patients would like clinicians to judge whether or not information
relating to an error would be more distressing than non-disclosure, this reasoning ultimately fails. Largely,
the limited literature suggests that the opposite appears to be the case, as patients have indicated when
surveyed that they would prefer to be told about errors.28 However, a patient can only judge how
distressing the conversation might be after the event, and often such surveys are conducted in patients
who have not experienced error and, as such, lack ecological validity. Even bearing this in mind, the
best argument for non-disclosure of errors may be difficult to navigate with conviction. Aside from
the well-intentioned motive of protecting the patient from what might be judged to be additional distress,
the decision not to disclose for whatever reason may backfire. Another member of the team may
(inadvertently) disclose the error, the patient may request copies of his or her records, or the error may be
discovered during another procedure or even at post-mortem.
The literature here highlights the consistent findings in relation to the disclosure gap. This work comes
largely from the USA, but some UK evidence also exists which indicates that disclosure policy is at best
inconsistently applied.28,41,76 There remain considerable challenges for and barriers to the principles and
enactment of any policy of open disclosure, which range from a well-intentioned but paternalistic view of
protecting patients and families from additional distress to a self-preserving strategy based on fear of
reprisals from a legal or professional perspective.
Apologies
Being Open guidance10 stresses that patients and families should receive a sincere apology and this may
include expressions of regret for the harm. The wording of the apology should be agreed as early as
possible and a decision about who should apologise and how would be based on local circumstances.
Characteristics of the person to apologise may include judgements of seniority, relationship to the patient,
and experience and expertise in the type of patient safety incident that has occurred. The role of both
verbal and written apology is stressed and the time frame suggested is ‘as soon as possible’. The purpose
of the verbal apology is stated as allowing face-to-face contact between the patient/family and the
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health-care team. It is stressed that an apology should not be withheld on the basis of setting up a more
formal enquiry, organisational apprehension or staff availability. The guidance also relates evidence from
focus groups that families are more likely to seek legal advice if apologies are not forthcoming.
The issue of an apology is related to, but distinct from, openness. The decision about whether or not and
when to give an apology, and about what an apology is, seems to be complicated in the literature by the
open disclosure process. Individuals often feel they are unable to apologise as this may be construed as an
admission of fault or negligence, or that a full investigation has to have been completed before an apology
can occur; that is, that an apology can only occur once fault has been determined. A key recommendation
of the various global policies on medical error disclosure is to apologise to the patient, which is thought to
reduce anger and increase trust.77 Apologies are recommended elements and processes of all disclosure
policies, which generally include who, when, where and what to disclose, as well as how disclosure
should be conducted. In a number of descriptive accounts from patients, the concept of an appropriate
and sincere apology is often raised as a key element of the perception of an adequate or inadequate
disclosure. There are often repeated and strong claims for the power of disclosure and apologies in a
number of contexts. Allan suggests that apologies are powerful factors in the healing of harmed
patients.78 This may or may not be the case, but there appears to be little evidence to support this belief.
Although a lack of openness, accompanied by little information and no apology, often causes a prolonged
and distressing period for patients or their families, we know very little about what ‘good’ disclosure
conversations might look like from the patient perspective beyond some common-sense recommendations.
The fact that an apology is made does not necessarily make a situation better for the patient who has
been harmed and there is little to substantiate this claim. It has been articulated that some feel that the
ability of current laws to protect against use of apologies in legal proceedings is perceived as inadequate in
the US and Australian contexts.79
What is an apology?
An apology refers to an encounter between two parties in which one party, the offender, acknowledges
responsibility for a harm or grievance and expresses regret or remorse to the aggrieved party.80 Building on
this core definition, Lazare, who has published extensively on the concept of apology,80 outlines the vital
components of an apology to include:
1. acknowledging offence
2. providing an explanation for committing the offence
3. expressing remorse
4. offering reparation.
However, it is thought that an apology may have a number of functions. For patients an apology can
restore self-respect and dignity, facilitate forgiveness and provide the basis for a reconciliation with an
individual health-care professional or institution; for the physician, it is thought to moderate feelings of
guilt, shame and fear of retaliation. For both parties, it may strengthen a previously satisfactory
relationship, or restore one that has been damaged.80 However, reassuring though these statements are,
there is currently little empirical evidence which can support these claims beyond expert opinion.
What do apologies achieve?
Zammit81 suggests that although people often fear giving an apology as it implies an admission of guilt,
the reality may be that the courts have a certain respect for apologies; apologies may actually be viewed
favourably. However, this work also suggests that there is little evidence that apologies reduce malpractice
claims, as the studies cited in support of this claim are often based on scenarios and have little ecological
validity. Additionally, the dangers of unskilled apologies, or weak and insincere apologies made by
clinicians who are unsure whether an apology may be protected or not, may actually inflame rather than
calm an angry patient or family. This point relates specifically to training in open disclosure conversations,
which will be followed up in a section addressing training (see Professional support).
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Recognising patient and caregiver expectations
Being Open recognises the need to fully inform patients and families and to attempt to ensure that the
process of disclosure meets their expectations. Although there are some practical suggestions for an
appropriate attitude from the health-care organisation reflecting sympathy and respect, addressing
additional support needs and informing the family of any appropriate support networks is less well
reported; we know relatively little about the patient experience of disclosure.
What do patients and families say they want?
Since 1996 there has been some evidence that patients report a wish for an acknowledgement of even
minor errors, that they may wish to be referred to another doctor if other treatment is required and that
they are more likely to litigate if they have not had an error disclosed.21 Since this paper, there has been
a limited amount of work exploring how patients feel after an error and exploring their responses to
disclosure. In survey work the majority of patients clearly indicate that they would want full disclosure of
medical error and wish to be informed of error immediately upon its detection.82 Patients also clearly
support reporting of errors to government agencies, state medical boards and hospital committees focused
on patient safety. Patients also indicate that they support teaching health-care professionals error
disclosure techniques, with honesty and compassion endorsed as a priority for educators who teach
clinicians about error management.83 Patients are clear that, as the person who has experienced harm,
they are important, and if apologies are perceived to be driven by regulatory standards and institutional
policies alone, and are felt to be insincere and purely managing risk to the organisation, then this may well
carry its own risks in terms of the subsequent patient or family response to any apology. One study which
explored how patients had experienced disclosure and error described patients reporting that the actual
error was less concerning than the continued relationship with their health-care provider.84 These
individuals described being treated not as experts in their own experience of care, but as outsiders. The
authors described this as patients feeling like a foreigner in a strange land experiencing a different culture
and language, and highlight how poor communication suggests a conflict between a model of
person-centred care, with the patient–provider relationship at its heart, and the business or corporate
model of health care. A number of other studies have suggested that when poor communication occurs,
it can be perceived as medical error by the patient.28,85
Patients are known to value apologies and expressions of remorse, empathy and caring. They indicate that
what they want from disclosure is an explanation of any potential harm and an acknowledgement of
responsibility, and they need to see efforts to prevent recurrences; however, these are often reported as
missing elements in the disclosure process.82,83 For many patients, actions and evidence of learning were
most important. Current reports of patients’ accounts of apology and disclosure suggest that clinicians’
and organisational responses continue to fall short of expectations.86
These accounts of what patients seek from open disclosure and apologies largely emanate from the US
literature, often from surveys where it is unclear whether or not the population has experienced harm or
error. However, from the few findings available from other contexts, these desires would seem to be
relatively consistent. Okamoto,87 for example, found that individuals in Japan reported that after the
immediate disclosure of a medical error by senior medical personnel, medical providers should create an
environment where communication is repeated and continuous to accommodate the shifting nature of the
perspectives of those who have experienced the error. Although the severity of the outcome remains the
most important single factor in a patient’s choice of actions following an error, the professional’s approach
to the error is regarded as essential in the overall evaluation of consequences. In errors with a severe
outcome, an honest, empathic and accountable approach to the error decreased the probability of
participants’ support for strong punitive action against the physician involved by 59%. These judgments in
this scenario study were only marginally affected by respondents’ characteristics.88
These findings are consistent but come from a context which is quite different from the UK and the NHS in
particular. Though it seems unlikely that UK participants would expect different standards in relation to
open disclosure or apology, we know little about this.
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Real accounts of disclosure by patients and families
There is still relatively little work exploring real accounts of disclosure and error, what worked well and
what was less successful from either a clinical or a patient perspective. A number of individual accounts of
what non-disclosure or poor disclosure feels like from the patients’ perspective are reported, often by the
individuals themselves,57,89 but few accounts exist in the academic literature.
One of the few pieces of work exploring this directly is a focus group study with patients who had been
subject to iatrogenic harm.85 This paper describes how trauma as a result of harm developed in two
ways, from the incident itself and/or from the manner in which the event was subsequently handled.
This has been previously described by Vincent.90 Those who experienced what they felt had been skilled
communication (demonstrable respect, active listening, caring) with their provider reported less emotional
trauma. The medical error literature has often ignored financial trauma but the participants in this group all
mentioned the devastating impact of financial problems following an incident; this may be from bills for
health care but also from loss of income, either temporarily or permanently. This paper also identified a
cycle where patients tried to work out what happened, what would happen next and finally whether or
not they would ever be the same. Often patients reported working through the process, feeling very alone.
Participants pointed out the importance of having information to help them cope, but also reported having
great trouble obtaining it. There were reports of frustration resulting from poor information about their
situation causing anger and a perceived need for battles or conflict. The provision of adequate information
was often accompanied by relief. Patients reported a perceived need to ‘threaten’ to get action. Some of
the group reported that apologies did not routinely happen, but an apology remained important to their
ability to resolve their situation and was associated with organisations or individuals taking responsibility
for the harm that occurred. Where the communication process was seen as satisfactory, the patients were
usually able to continue their relationship with the provider. Those patients who experienced a ‘good’
communication process with their provider also perceived a ‘no fault’ event. These patients were more
likely to call these events ‘mistakes or complications’. Conversely, those patients who were dissatisfied with
their communication with the provider had a tendency to see incompetence or malicious intent. Most
patient anger was directed at the way in which they were treated rather than at the event itself.91
The 100 Patient Stories project27 is the most comprehensive attempt to date to gather the accounts of
patients and relatives of patients who have experienced harm in their health care. From this work, so far,
the investigators have been able to gather that most individuals appreciated the opportunity to meet staff
and have the adverse event explained to them. There were a number of concerns about how disclosure
took place, including disclosure not occurring promptly or being conducted too informally; disclosure not
being adequately followed up with tangible support or change in practice; staff not offering an apology;
and disclosure not providing opportunities for individuals who have experienced error or harm to meet
with the staff originally involved in the adverse event. This work suggests that the practice which is likely to
best represent how individuals would prefer to experience disclosures is likely to consist of a combination
of formal open disclosure, a full apology and an offer of tangible and material support.25
There is little to suggest that the experiences of patients who have experienced harm and/or disclosure
in the UK are likely to be more or less positive than those described so far in other contexts. Although
financial issues are often overlooked, as health care is usually free at the point of care in the UK, the
subsequent financial burden for some patients is likely to be substantial if their ability to work is affected
or ongoing care is required for a member of their family. The majority of accounts raise the challenges
associated with obtaining accurate and timely information, and the frustration, anger and sense of having
to engage combatively with an organisation. Another strong account directed towards health-care
providers summarises messages from three individuals who had experienced error, either as individuals or
to a family member.92 These accounts leave the reader in no doubt as to the profound effects that poorly
conducted disclosure or non-disclosure has on patients and their families. They describe a sense of betrayal
and abandonment, likening their experience to a ‘hit-and-run health care accident’ where they were
abandoned by a clinician who was both personally afraid and worried about the legal implications of the
error. The non-disclosure of medical error is described as ‘the most destructive phenomenon in health
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care’, eroding trust and confidence and reflecting an ‘intolerable lack of integrity’ which was perceived to
be the result of poor leadership. One relative described knowing that something had gone wrong, and
that the outcome of the given explanation did not fit that explanation, but experiencing being faced with
‘stonewalling, lack of empathy, and lack of information that would have been helpful’. She perceived this
as ‘emotionally and viscerally insulting’ to her intelligence, and believed that if disclosure had occurred and
the organisation had given an expression of regret and instigated an investigation, this would have made a
great deal of difference to the following period in her life – a period she goes on to describe as ‘2 years of
solitary confinement in a prison of inconsolable pain’. The silence is not perceived as passive by these
individuals; it is perceived as an active and abusive strategy by individuals and organisations. In contrast,
one account describes a senior clinician coming to a child’s home, taking responsibility for the error and
maintaining a relationship with the child’s family all through the process of investigation. This was
interpreted as a courageous act by the family and they reported this as directly influencing their decision
not to litigate.
The perception of some commentators is that organisations and the individuals who work within them
have a general lack of knowledge of the suffering inflicted on patients and families when they do not
disclose. One participant in the work by Sheridan et al.92 stated: ‘When they harm us, it is typically a
passive event. When they consciously withhold information, cover up what happened, or seek to discredit
us in courts of law to preserve their precious financial resources, they are actively harming us’. This US
article also points out that consumers do not wish to litigate for monetary gain for the sake of it. Rather,
they suggest that people may risk their homes because they cannot pay medical bills and that medical
error expenses are an additional harm to the patient and his or her family. The accounts conclude that if
hospitals disclose errors and adverse events and work with the patient and/or family to improve the
system, they may well eliminate many lawsuits and at the same time continuously improve the system so
that the same errors do not repeat themselves. The strength of these accounts may reflect a situation
where the consequences for individual families of ongoing medical costs can be more catastrophic than is
common in the UK, but this should probably not be based on an assumption and requires more
examination in the UK context.
Professional support
The relevant literature and guidance for UK clinicians and managers would seem to be clear and originates
from a number of sources including the Being Open guidance itself.10,11,22,23 In the UK, open disclosure and
appropriate apologies or expressions of regret are not the same as admitting legal liability or negligence.
Openness and honesty towards patients are supported and actively encouraged by many professional
bodies, including the Medical Defence Union (MDU), the Medical Protection Society (MPS) and the GMC
for doctors, and the NMC for nurses and midwives.
The MDU advises that, if something goes wrong, patients are entitled to a prompt, sympathetic and,
above all, truthful account of what has happened, and it encourages its members to apologise where
appropriate.93 This approach has been given legislative support in section 2 of the Compensation Act,
which reads: ‘An apology, offer of treatment or other redress, shall not of itself amount to an admission of
negligence or breach of statutory duty’.94 Doctors’ ethical responsibilities are also clearly set out in
guidance from the GMC, which states:95
If a patient under your care has suffered harm or distress, you must act immediately to put matters
right, if that is possible. You should offer an apology and explain fully and promptly to the patient
what has happened, and the likely short-term and long-term effects. Patients who complain about the
care or treatment they have received have a right to expect a prompt, open, constructive and honest
response including an explanation and, if appropriate, an apology. You must not allow a patient’s
complaint to affect adversely the care or treatment you provide or arrange.
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However, this statement is framed in the context of harm or complaints rather than being aimed at a more
overarching spirit of openness. The GMC has also indicated that saying sorry and providing an explanation
to a patient or relative seldom does any harm and can often avoid a complaint.96
The role of training and support has been identified by a number of sources as fundamental to the success
of any open disclosure policy. Leape97 believes that hospitals must expand the training of physicians to
ensure that patients are treated with openness, honesty and compassion, and, when indicated, are given
an apology and compensation. Most physicians and other health-care professionals have little or no
training in the communication skills required for effective disclosure of adverse events or errors but there
are increasing efforts to teach these skills.69 Recent studies have used standardised patients and role play
to teach practising doctors, surgeons and medical residents these skills.73,98 As well as providing a relatively
safe environment in which to practise, this approach also allows individuals to receive feedback to improve
their communication. This method could be used for any training, from the highest level of management
to risk managers and front-line clinicians. Although the majority of training is directed at medical
professionals, a number of barriers to nurse involvement in disclosures have been identified, principally in
the area of training and knowledge of how to disclose incidents,99 alongside uncertainty around the
information that they could and should reveal.100,101
The evidence for the effectiveness of such interventions has been captured in detail in the second, more
specific review addressing effectiveness specifically (see Phase 1: review 2).
It is thought that patients often litigate to get information after failing through their routine contacts with
professionals and organisations. Doctors are often more likely to explain than admit errors.102 There are a
small number of accounts in the literature by health-care professionals discussing cases where they (or
one of their colleagues) have made an error, often accompanied by their account of disclosure or, in some
cases, no disclosure.103 There are big challenges in terms of addressing difficult concepts such as guilt and
shame in the professional education and continuing professional development of health-care professionals.
However, one suggestion is that a more candid discussion of such issues from senior members of
professions may help junior staff to talk publicly about their own errors and address the associated
emotions that arise as a result of error. Ofri104 suggests that, for junior staff, witnessing the fact that these
professionals continue to practise successfully despite their errors may be an important lesson,
demonstrating that it is possible to survive the distress associated with error and not be defined by it.
Making an error has been highlighted as a defining moment in the life of a physician with regard to
integrity and professionalism.1 A number of accounts have reflected on this, and the way in which a senior
physician deals with a more junior colleague who has made a mistake may be crucial in the way this
situation is modelled for trainees in any profession.105,106
An overview of the literature suggests that though professional, regulatory and indemnifying bodies
support professionals to be open, the norms within practice seem somewhat removed from this.
Discussing a change of ‘culture’ seems overly vague but there is a sense that medical societies, certifying
boards and accrediting bodies all play a role in integrating this into practice alongside institutions and
professionals, and a more consistent and joined-up approach to education needs to be undertaken.
Whether or not this requires statutory support is unclear, but it is likely to require to tackle the issue of
openness within health care using both bottom-up and top-down approaches which are reinforced
throughout career pathways. Information on the educational approaches which are most effective
is lacking.
Risk management and systems improvement
The importance of investigation of adverse events is emphasised in the Being Open guidance,10 which
stresses the need to embed this within a process which aims to improve systems of care. Local Being Open
policies should be integrated into local and national incident reporting and risk management policies.
The framework is aimed at boards and health-care staff responsible for clinical governance infrastructure
rather than front-line clinicians, with the emphasis on systems rather than individual failures.
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No-blame culture
Although the general thrust of patient safety literature is directed towards the promotion of what is often
termed a ‘no-blame’ culture as encouragement to promote the reporting of error, the idea of ‘no-blame’
is questioned by some as being misdirected.107 Robinson107 suggests that this focus will only lead
organisations to identify patterns of risk, but stop short of investigating primary causes. This may feel like a
safe climate for professionals, but it is unlikely to address the fears around damaged reputation. However,
the assumption that removal of penalties will automatically create a climate of honesty is unproven.
Occasionally the source of risk is the individual personality, not the system, and those people have to be
identified if they falsify documentation or are dishonest. It is important that institutions do not defend their
own staff against a patient or family in the name of a ‘no-blame’ culture.107
Learning from mistakes and error
Part of the rationale for disclosure is to allow learning to occur. This is obvious when disclosure occurs to
the system and to colleagues, but is perhaps less recognised in terms of the potential contribution of the
patient and family perspective to enhancing learning. Firstly, some valuable lessons may not be learnt if
disclosure does not occur for all patients for the majority of events. Secondly, the process of disclosure is
often one of information-giving rather than a dialogue around issues. A number of individuals highlight
the role that patients and families may have.84 Patients and their families often have a unique perspective
on their experiences and can provide information and insights that health-care providers and systems
administrators may not appreciate or know.108 Allowing patients and families to engage in a dialogue as
part of disclosure allows them to describe what may be important insights into factors leading up to and
following health-care incidents, and emotional harms that occur when these incidents are inadequately
communicated or responded to, and to make a potential contribution to patient safety.109
Evidence for the effect of disclosure on risk management outcomes
Calvert et al.110 have explored the strength of evidence around a number of common statements
concerning the belief that disclosure of a medical error improves a patient’s confidence in the physician
and leads to improved outcomes, and conclude that they are based on expert opinion rather than concrete
evidence. The idea that physicians and other staff may experience a resolution of anxiety and guilt that can
improve their well-being after an error may be true, but in terms of quality of evidence this is based on
survey data.110 There is limited evidence that disclosure increases assessments of quality by patients.111
Mazor has conducted a number of manipulated scenario and other studies in an attempt to build what we
know about how patients may respond to disclosure.13,20,47,86 Some of her work suggests non-disclosure
increases the likelihood of swapping to a new clinician and leads to reduced satisfaction and trust in
clinicians.112 Her work suggests that non-disclosure increases the likelihood of seeking legal advice and is
associated with a more negative emotional response in one experimental condition, although this was not
consistent across conditions.113 Interestingly, neither the existence of a positive relationship nor an offer to
waive health-care costs had a significant impact on outcomes.113
A current study114 to look at the effect of medical liability reforms and patient safety initiatives is under
way and may be able to answer the questions surrounding the effect on liability of offer with disclosure.
The experience of a number of US providers has pushed the perspective that open disclosure can be a
useful risk management strategy. It is suggested and borne out by some patient accounts that litigation is
often initiated by an injured patient in order to get the answers that they feel unable to get from their
health-care provider.41 Practitioners and organisations, when they fear litigation, may avoid open and
honest discussion with the injured patient. However, the widely described experience of the Veterans
Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Lexington, KY, has not resulted in higher liability as might be suspected.52
The VHA is not generally representative of the US health-care system,41 but many authors have remarked
on the low rates of litigation.115–117
In 2005, the Sorry Works! Coalition was formed to promote an approach to medical and surgical errors
that incorporates full disclosure, apology and reparation.48 However, a number of papers suggest that
there is little evidence to support the perspective that disclosure or apology will deter patients from seeking
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litigation,117,118 even if disclosure meets the patients’ expectations.20 Early adopters of this approach have
reported reduced liability costs, but the extent to which these results stem from effective disclosure and
apology practices, versus compensation offers, is unknown. A survey study119 using vignettes examined
the effects of different compensation offers on individuals’ responses to disclosures of medical errors
compared with explanation and apology alone. Although two-thirds of these individuals wanted
compensation offers, increasing the offer amount did not improve key outcomes. Full compensation offers
did not decrease the likelihood of seeking legal advice and increased the likelihood that people perceived
the disclosure and apology to be motivated by providers’ desire to avoid litigation, which suggests this
relationship is complex. Conversations with patients may benefit from separating disclosure conversations
and compensation offers and from excluding physicians from compensation discussions.119 However,
Boothman, a well-known advocate of moving compensation discussions away from the courts, has said it
is important to move discussions of compensation into the hands of physicians, hospitals and patients in
an attempt to defuse the adversarial nature of the process.120
Systems for compensation
A number of health-care systems have adopted different ways of addressing compensation for error.
New Zealand, Sweden and Denmark have replaced litigation with administrative compensation systems
in which patients who sustain an avoidable medical injury can apply directly, without any legal
representation, for compensation. However, fear of discipline arising from complaints and threats to
reputation remain a concern for doctors and are factors that are still thought to be a factor in inhibiting
disclosure.121,122 Suggested advantages of this system are a focus on compensation and learning from
system errors rather than attributing blame, as well as allowing injured patients to access compensation for
their injuries quickly without the additional stress and cost of the legal system. However, upper limits
attached to claims may not adequately compensate over time for care costs. It has been suggested that
many of these early compensation mechanisms which occur in the disclosure with offer programmes,
particularly in the USA, are capable of causing patients to reach a financial settlement before considering
their future medical costs or the need for non-economic damages.123
Apology laws
An admission of error to a patient is not the same as the admission of liability for the damages the patient
has suffered. In the USA this is the basis of a series of ‘apology laws’ that prohibit or limit the use of an
apology in the case against a health professional or organisation in litigation.124–126 At least 36 states have
passed, and others are considering passing, immunity for apology laws and five states have passed
mandatory disclosure laws.127 However, there continue to be a number of authors who warn individual
clinicians to be wary of making an admission of liability during the open disclosure process.128–130
Professional journals sometimes carry ‘health warnings’ which highlight the problems associated with
saying ‘sorry’.131 Although litigation is feared by clinicians, most patients do not bring a legal challenge to
court and physicians substantially overestimate the risk of being sued. When a clinician has apologised
to a patient, the legal case against him or her is likely to viewed differently by a jury, who will be more
likely to concern themselves with establishing just compensation rather than negligence in the face of an
honest clinician who has apologised.132
Apology laws emerged in the USA in the 1990s as part of efforts to enhance medical error reporting and
patient safety. As outlined earlier, it is thought that more disclosures and apologies, combined with early
settlement offers by hospitals, has led to a dramatic decrease in claims of malpractice in the USA.
However, the actual impact of apologies and of apology laws on litigation is less clear because both are
components of broader regulatory and institutional efforts to overcome the complex problem of resistance
to disclosure. Early settlements may well drive down the cost and number of claims with or without an
apology.133 Some consider that apology laws are unnecessary for the open disclosure of adverse events
and that they will make it more difficult for individuals to pursue negligence claims.134 But others suggest
that apology laws are unlikely to shield people in the case of gross negligence.135 The most important
distinction among apology laws is whether or not admissions of fault are protected. However, there are
many variations in these laws between states. Some protect oral, but not written, statements;46 some
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mandate that hospitals or their physicians notify patients of medical errors leading to adverse outcomes,
moving beyond voluntary disclosure52–54,57 with laws to protect the required disclosure from being used as
evidence of fault in any legal action. Some have suggested that apology laws usually do not protect
physicians who expressly admit fault or use explanations or statements that can be interpreted as
admitting fault, and that in such cases physicians could find themselves in difficulty regarding
explanations and disclosure of error.136 The perception of a lack of explicit legal protection for the
admission of faults and the fear that an apology will expose physicians to higher risk of litigation certainly
causes concern in the USA. If this is the perception of clinicians in the UK then it is likely to have a similar
effect. However, the NHSLA, which indemnifies NHS trusts for claims in England, stresses that apologies
and explanations should be provided and to do so will in no way affect the availability of the trust’s
indemnity.22 However, although risk managers in the USA tend to support disclosure, they are much less
enthusiastic than physicians about offering an overt apology.61,137 We have little evidence that would allow
us to determine the position of risk managers in the NHS.
Dissenting views on the need for apology laws do exist138 although they seem to exist in a Canadian rather
than a US context. Objections seem to rest on the premise that whereas apology laws exist to protect
admissions of liability, a better course is to express sympathy, discuss the facts and promise investigation,
followed up with further disclosure after a review has determined the most likely causes of the situation.
If an error has occurred and physicians or institutions admit an error that caused harm, then they should
encourage their liability insurer to negotiate reasonable compensation without requiring their patient to
sue them.
Consistency of patient experience
Some take a broader view of the culture in relation to apologies, looking at smaller steps leading to culture
change. If the broader approach of health care were to apologise for relatively minor violations like being
late or forgetting to do things, then apologising for bigger things should be easier. Woods139 discusses this
idea and points out that it seems convenient for organisations to believe that litigation is driven by
opportunistic solicitors and patients who see a way to profit from error in a way that seems to be beyond
the control of clinicians and organisations. However, she suggests that this may not be so if people feel
they have been treated honestly, and that if information has been shared perhaps people will sue less.139
Nonetheless, she cautions against the use of apology and openness as a risk management strategy in
itself, something that is seen as out of keeping with the rest of the patient experience. Patients are
perceptive to change. If no trust has been established by offering apologies and courtesy throughout care,
then any perception that an organisation is offering one up after a poor outcome to lower liability may
well make them angry.139 These suggestions link to the observations of others who have pointed out that
there is a general failure of openness across information-giving to patients, which means they are often
unprepared for what the system might consider disappointing, but not unexpected, outcomes. As such,
informing and managing expectations before, during and after treatment should always be part of
decision-making, ensuring that all possibilities have been discussed.140 Difficult and possibly adversarial
situations can arise when anxieties during care and then afterwards have been ignored, and defensive
and/or slow responses will cause problems. Others have observed that apologies might be easier if patients
are better prepared for complications or poor outcomes as a possibility.141
The responsibility/role of the patient and family
A slightly different perspective discusses patients having rights in relation to disclosure, but on the basis
that with rights come responsibilities.142 The emphasis here is that patients cannot expect the right of
disclosure without taking an active role in making challenges and information-giving in relation to safety.
The examples given in this work sit within a previously described literature in which patients are expected
to contribute their knowledge and input for the greater safety good. However, other work has
demonstrated how challenging these kinds of roles can be for patients and families who experience this
process as outsiders to a system in which they only know what the system chooses to disclose to them,
and where the implications and assumptions underlying roles are often not well thought through.39
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There appears to be little work exploring the roles that patients might play in informing disclosure policy
and in directly informing improvement after errors.
Liang143 suggests the patient/family should be asked to assist in the error investigation by the error
disclosure team during the initial contact, if appropriate, or by the patient care liaison at a later time. It is
proposed that this could range from discussion of any factor, problem and/or witnessed error that may or
may not have contributed to the negative outcome to a full debriefing on all stages of care, from before
admission to the event itself and even the time following the event. This kind of approach is consistent
with the systems nature of error and outcomes and is indicative of a more equal partnership approach
between health-care providers and patients. Additionally, the patient and/or family have a vested interest
in corrective action at the facility, which may allow something constructive to emerge from an otherwise
destructive situation. Perspectives gathered in the 100 Patient Stories work support the view that patients
and families feel they have a valuable perspective to contribute.27
Implementing disclosure policy
Sorensen et al.144 examined the implementation of open disclosure policy and concluded that health
service managers must formulate their own local approaches. This would include identifying ‘the
circumstances under which open disclosure is conducted, who should be involved, where and when
discussions take place and how patients are informed of the process, the plan of remedy and the means
for feedback of investigative results’ (p. 231). They too identify a gap where open disclosure policy fails
to be applied by those who have to undertake the process, and find that the necessary links between
policy-makers, those who have to conduct disclosure conversations and those who hold knowledge that
may improve the process remain unconnected. The organisational components required to improve
practice include improved competence at both the organisational and individual levels, but also the
removal of barriers such as the covering up of errors and a lack of commitment to disclosing error.
The identification of this organisational competency, they propose, would link the two currently
predominantly discussed areas of policy development and clinician–patient communication. On a practical
level, it is proposed that this would consist of networks where good practice can be shared, allowing
managers to examine models of care and appraise their possible implementation within their own local
context. This would allow more support for managers to move beyond what is referred to as a
complacency which talks about principles but fails to support their enactment in practice.145,146
There is little knowledge of how open disclosure policies are being implemented in the UK, but one recent
cross-sectional survey of UK risk mangers147 identified that 98% of the participants reported that they
were familiar with the Being Open guidance and 82% stated that they implemented it more than half the
time when incidents occur. However, provision of timely information was not reported as routine, with
two-thirds of the discussions taking place 3–6 weeks after the investigation. The frequency of taking
responsibility for harm was low for incidents of different severity levels but significantly lower for less
serious ones. Long-term follow-up of patients and ex-gratia payments to patients occurred less than half
the time. The most highly rated barriers to being open were reported by risk managers as clinical staff’s
fear of negative reactions from patients or their families and anxiety about litigation. Support practices for
staff, such as debriefing and training on being open, were acknowledged as highly important but not
always available. The authors concluded that though awareness of the importance of open disclosure
appeared to be high in their respondents there was still considerable scope for improvement in the
consistent application of the guidance.
Accounts of open disclosure policy perceived as successful
Instances where local policies of open disclosure have been successfully implemented do exist and are
frequently cited moving through the chronology of the literature. Such examples of implementation are
rarely discussed in the academic literature and are often limited to risk management conferences and
professional journals. There are a number of examples of individuals from practice who talk persuasively
for the power of disclosure of adverse events in terms of institutional learning and patient- and
clinician-centred outcomes, but a substantial evidence base has yet to be established. These individuals are
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often interviewed as part of more journalistic literature discussing the challenges they experienced in
implementing disclosure policy within their organisation. Often these policies emerged from serious errors
within their organisation. Such accounts must be taken at face value but have strong messages for the UK
in terms of how implementation may be able to succeed in the face of the barriers that are frequently
cited in literature from all contexts. It seems to be agreed that a number of key actions and individuals
need to be mobilised. Disclosure needs to take place systematically and based on agreed protocols, with
tangible support in the case of psychological health-related problems, accompanied by clear and
demonstrable efforts to learn from events and make the system for providing health care safer. Much
more could be done relatively quickly by hospital management and department leaders, who are identified
as key in implementing such comprehensive incident management approaches, educating staff in
collaboration with professional organisations and professional curricula and promoting an organisational
culture that supports open communication and learning from critical incidents.148 Although the principles
espoused in policies such as Being Open seem simple, operationalising these locally is often the point at
which a number of questions arise.149 All accounts stress that a focus on the patient perspective, not that
of the organisation, is key to making implementation credible. Resistance from the system to disclosure
should be expected and will need to be overcome.
Julie Morath from the Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota describes the commitment required
to change and describes a ‘wholesale revamping of philosophy at the hospital, not just the implementation
of a new policy handed down by risk management’.150 She has also highlighted that a focus on limiting
organisational liability does not fit well with full disclosure and should not compromise the philosophy.
Jo Shapiro from Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA, describes the use of Boothman’s principles
as the basis for the hospital’s process and describes having to convince her institution that it was the right
thing to do.151,152 The approach at Brigham is grounded within the Center for Professionalism and Peer
Support, which is able to offer a support hotline 24 hours a day and uses a ‘train the trainer’ model to
engage all staff with the principles of and skills need for disclosure. She credits the success at Brigham to
the joined-up approach between risk management, human resources, patient safety, and senior clinicians
and managers. There are monthly symposia and staff evaluate the effectiveness of full disclosure with
patients and families. Families continue to seek care, and safety is reported to have improved, as
have attitudes.
Richard Boothman is another well-known individual within US health care who has disseminated his
practice from the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS). Boothman describes what started out as
an effort to save money changing into a major patient safety and patient communication agenda, and
describes the issue of claims as ‘background noise’.153 As soon as UMHS learns of an error, risk
management staff are assigned to talk to patients. They apologise, letting the patient and/or family know
that UMHS will investigate the error and that whatever is learned from the investigation, as well as any
new practices to prevent the error in the future, will be shared with them. If UMHS has made an error,
compensation will also be offered. They will, however, vigorously defend their organisation if no error is
identified. Another initiative involves a team in risk management which supports doctors who find
themselves in difficult positions, helping them decide on an honest approach with patients. Sincere
apologies are encouraged, with support given to help clinicians make sure their conclusions and
evaluations are sound, that the event is discussed in context and that disclosure and follow-up plans are
supported. As with the approach described by Shapiro, the emphasis is on the whole team. Additionally,
Boothman describes the way in which the publicity of UMHS’s success has led to more reports of near
misses and patient injuries.153
In 2003, Trillium Health Centre in Toronto, ON, identified the need to develop a disclosure protocol as part
of its risk management approach. Key to this was training provided through a ‘train the trainer’ model and
this account also stresses the need to address and change norms which happened slowly over time.154
Sisters of Mercy Health System in St. Louis, MO, has described the questions it asked itself in developing a
policy for open disclosure.155 The process was clearly iterative and took a great deal of negotiation in
defining the policy; however, the advice from this risk management system was to begin a defined output
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and to choose a strong facilitator and multidisciplinary team members. Further steps involved looking at
the process and policy of other successful organisations and examining how these might apply to this
organisation in light of current guidance and statute. A number of other accounts of the application of
policies with the support of insurers can be drawn upon to examine concrete suggestions for change, at
least from the US literature.156–160 Common to these accounts is a sense of enthusiasm, but also often a
charismatic individual driving the process forward. There seem to be fewer of these accounts outside of
the US context and we found only one in the UK, which described Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation
Trust’s approach to embedding quality improvement and patient safety in the organisation.161
In a recent critique of the Consultation Draft of the Australian Open Disclosure Framework, Parker162
suggests that there appears to be movement towards ethical practice being prioritised over organisational
and individual learning from error, rather than an organisational risk-management approach. However, a
note of caution is stressed with the emphasis still being one of stating regret rather than accepting
responsibility. As has been pointed out previously, expressions of regret are not apologies, as an apology
presupposes the fault that health professionals are advised to avoid admitting. A criticism levelled by Parker
is that this may represent a continuing insincerity on the part of health professionals and their institutions
regarding the kind of apologies that patients look for, and suggests that though open disclosure policies
and practices are inconsistent and unclear about complete disclosure, admission of fault and genuine
apology, they will continue to lack respect for and empathy towards patients harmed by health care.
Finally, it is suggested that the National Open Disclosure Standard should be revised to encourage and
support full disclosure and genuine apology, but that if this fails, statutory reform should be considered.
This would chime with the recommendations of the Francis report6 in the UK.
Individual/multidisciplinary team responsibility
The Being Open framework10 stresses the role of all staff and suggests that this should be reflected in the
way that communication occurs when things go wrong. Multidisciplinary involvement is specifically drawn
out. Much of the literature is focused on the role of doctors in the disclosure process; however, there is
recognition that a number of other people may be involved in this. A small number of papers discuss a
multidisciplinary approach but most argue for the role of an individual profession, usually a physician or a
risk case manager.
Some argue that disclosure should be conducted by someone who is one step removed from the error;
that contact between the family or patient and those directly involved in an adverse outcome undermines
the systems approach. The delivery of health care is conducted in teams and errors typically involve several
members of the team, including nurses, physicians, pharmacists and others. When an error occurs, there
needs to be communication between the team members to discuss not only what went wrong but who
should tell the patient or family. These interprofessional team conversations can be challenging and most
team members are not experienced in conducting this type of conversation about a difficult issue such as
disclosing an error. Given the complexity of these conversations and the need for consistency, there is a
lack of research about how team members should participate in the disclosure process. Who should tell
the patient: one individual or several team members?69
Whereas some suggest that disclosure should be undertaken by the clinician with responsibility for the
patient’s care, or a delegated representative, others warn that delegation of this responsibility to a member
of the team who does not have sufficient knowledge to answer all the patient’s questions may be
problematic. Some policies specifically assign this task to the clinician who has overall responsibility for
patient care,163 but in certain settings other health-care professionals and/or senior administrators may be
better placed to disclose, particularly if they are more knowledgeable about the consequences of the error.
The same policy163 also recommended that at least one other member of staff is present during the
disclosure process. The VHA suggests that in instances with minor harm, an informal process is indicated
involving the clinical team, but in more serious cases of harm the institution should be represented by one
or more of its leaders in a more formal approach.51 The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health
Care stipulates clear guidance for the qualities and skills of the individuals involved in disclosure,164 stating
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that the individual making the disclosure should be the most senior health-care professional who is
responsible for the care of the patient. In serious incidents that person should have the support of a
senior staff member with good communication skills. The Council goes on to describe an individual who
should be known to the patient; familiar with the facts of the incident and care of the patient; senior
enough to be credible; trained in open disclosure; in possession of good interpersonal skills and the
ability to communicate clearly in everyday language; able and willing to offer reassurance and feedback
to the patient and family; and willing to maintain a medium- to long-term relationship with the patient
where possible.
However, a contrary view142 suggests the practitioner should not initially participate as a member of the
disclosure team because the emotional stress generated from the error could result in ineffective
communication or conflict. Liang142 argues for an objective approach which is characterised as calm,
non-reactive, caring and honest, and composed of senior institutional representatives such as a risk
manager. Although concern for distress in clinicians is valuable, others observe that health-care
practitioners who make an error may need to personally make amends and, hopefully, be forgiven by
the patient. It is their therapeutic relationship with the patient that may need to be maintained to
rebuild trust and preserve continuity of care where possible. Thus, others view delegation not as the rule,
but as the exception.
A large body of publications comes from a risk management perspective in literature from the USA, and
many of the most vocal and proactive proponents of open disclosure, with or without compensation, are
from a risk management perspective. The role of risk management in the UK is less discussed and possibly
less defined than in the USA. In the UK, who risk managers are and what they do may differ from trust to
trust. Risk managers usually work away from front-line care. Their focus is on service quality and safety,
and they occupy an important position in the handling of incidents. They assist clinicians and patients in
resolving incidents, and they guard the service against undue risk. Their perspective is often couched in
terms of operating a policy of disclosure while keeping liability minimised.165 The role of clinicians involved
in error disclosure, and the personal nature of their involvement, is seen as a disadvantage in some
accounts, where they are perceived to weaken the approach to dealing with incidents, disclosure and
blame. Risk managers may regard themselves as less personally implicated and therefore more able to be
proactive about disclosure and incident investigation; however, with this comes a less pressing perception
that an apology may be required. In a critique of the role, Iedema suggests that the current stance
adopted by risk management dilutes the function of the role in avoiding simplistic assumptions about
incident causality, service responsibility for an error and disclosure.33 He also suggests that clarity of role
remains ill-defined for risk managers and health-care professionals over the main components of patient
safety related to systems thinking and just culture.166 Other work suggests that risk managers have more
favourable attitudes towards disclosing errors to patients compared with physicians, but are less supportive
of providing a full apology. These differences may create conflicts between risk managers and physicians
regarding disclosure. If clinicians are to be clear about the nature of disclosure conversations and
encouraged to disclose then greater collaboration between risk management and clinicians needs to take
place.137 Certainly, in the USA, where communication after an event can be viewed as evidence, it is likely
that risk managers will be keen to promote expressions of empathy but guard against full apologies.167
There appears to be no exploration of whether or not such a divergence of views exists among risk
managers in the UK context.
Although historically the role of discloser has often fallen to the doctor, there appears to be an increasing
awareness of the role that nurses may have to play. Nurses are intimately involved in patient care and,
inevitably, in the patient safety incidents that occur. This may create additional dilemmas for nurses when
faced with the responsibility of disclosure and has been identified as posing challenges when continuing to
provide day-to-day care.100,168,169 Though a small number of papers make comment on the potential role of
the nurse,170,171 empirical literature exploring nurse disclosure is limited. The literature suggests that while
nurses are confident in reporting safety incidents through organisational mechanisms, feelings about the
contribution of nurses to disclosing those incidents are more varied. Nurses expressed a desire for a more
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senior member of staff, such as the lead physician or nurse manager, to be primarily responsible for the
disclosure of more serious events99 but reported discontent with exclusion from the planning and delivery
of such disclosures.100 Uncertainty around what and how to tell patients about issues arising in their care
appears to leave nurses feeling that they cannot freely address patients’ queries about their care, which
may result in inaccurate, incomplete or ill-timed disclosures.100
Disparity between the perceived potential contribution that nurses can make to disclosure and their current
contribution was evident. For example, in an emergency care setting nurses reported much lower rates of
disclosure conversations than physicians.172,173 Furthermore, in simulated error disclosures nurses expressed
a lack of clarity about the nature of their input and expressed fears around overstepping professional
boundaries.174 A secondary, supportive contribution was apparent across the reviewed papers, whereby
nurses balanced being the patient’s advocate and supporting doctors; this meant offering additional
explanation and comfort to the patient, or contributing detail to the knowledge of the medical team about
the circumstances of the incident or the patient involved.
Recent studies described facilitating a more active contribution for nurses in accounts of training for
multiprofessional teams.174,175 Nurses described this as a valuable opportunity to explain their contribution
to an incident and be apportioned blame fairly when the patient was in contact with a number of
health-care professionals, but the tendency for lead physicians to drive and manage the process of
disclosure in practice was identified as a key limitation.
A hierarchical structure within health care has been highlighted in relation to junior and senior doctors and
medical students, and in relation to nurses. Ineffective team working, specifically with regard to exclusion
of nurses from decision-making processes, has been cited as an obstacle to nurses ensuring that events are
disclosed.100,168,174 Even when empowered to disclose an event, the likelihood of a nurse challenging the
decision of a physician or taking the lead for the disclosure was perceived to be rare.174 Nurses often
perceive more than medical staff that they will be punished or treated unfairly by managers or the
organisation, supporting the notion that a fair blame environment that encourages consideration of
systems factors in patient care may foster a more open and honest culture.100,169,176,177 Nurses perceive that
exclusion from disclosure planning or delivery may expose them to disproportionate blame for an incident,
especially where an error was made.175,178
Although the majority of literature within this review came from or was directed towards doctors, nurses
and risk managers, a number of outputs were seen in journals specifically addressing dentists, podiatrists,
pharmacists, physiotherapists, laboratory-based health professionals and general practitioners. However,
there was notable bias towards secondary care literature and primary care was identified as an area that
required further work.
Clinical governance
Being Open stresses the support of quality and improvement processes and the importance of
disseminating lessons learned to health professionals, alongside implementation of learning and
subsequent monitoring of change.
The application of this approach is articulated in the seminal documents relating to patient safety, To Err is
Human16 and, in the UK, An Organisation with a Memory.17 The Joint Commission, one of the most
influential organisations to develop patient safety-related standards for hospitals, explicitly links disclosure
of errors and adverse events to hospital accreditation. They require that a ‘responsible licensed
independent practitioner or his or her designee clearly explains the outcomes of any treatments or
procedures to the patient and, when appropriate, the family, whenever those outcomes differ significantly
from the anticipated outcomes’.179 However, many hospitals in North America had developed error
disclosure protocols addressing the patient’s right to be informed some years before these documents
existed, for example the Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal, QC,180 Minneapolis Children’s Hospital and
Clinics, MN,181 and the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston, MA.163 More recent model disclosure
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programmes and policies are those of the University of Illinois Medical Center, UMHS, Kaiser Permanente,
Catholic Health Initiatives and COPIC Insurance Company, which covers a number of Colorado
providers.151,152 However, the best-known examples are probably the VA medical centres.52 In each of
these examples, a set of policies and procedures has been developed to address medical errors committed
while caring for patients. In the case of the VA it is required that a mistake be disclosed to the patient,
usually by the leader of the treatment team. The 2008 policy of the VHA on Disclosure of Adverse Events
to Patients starts out by emphasising that:
VHA facilities and individual VHA providers have an ethical and legal obligation to disclose to patients
adverse events that have been sustained in the course of their care, including cases where the adverse
event may not be obvious or severe, or where the harm may only be evident in the future.
VHA 200851
Litigation
One way of measuring disclosure of medical error might be supposed to be examining litigation activity.
The most commonly asserted claim for the advantages of disclosure is the link between disclosure, apology
and reduced litigation or malpractice activity.52 There are number of problems with assuming this link, and
indeed there is disagreement in the literature about the strength of this assertion. There is an extensive
body of literature which discusses the advantages of disclosure in terms of reduced litigation. It is argued
that patients who feel that they have been deprived of full disclosure and, if required, an appropriate
apology may be more likely to pursue malpractice litigation.52 Some evidence (controlled and uncontrolled)
suggests that full disclosure, apology and fair compensation may result in lower litigation costs arising from
medical error. The University of Michigan has reported that since it adopted a policy of full disclosure of
medical error in 2001, a marked reduction in claims and decrease in legal expenses has occurred.182
A similar experience has been reported by the Lexington VA Medical Center in Lexington, KY. After it
adopted a full disclosure and fair settlement approach, the hospital had more settled claims, fewer
plaintiffs’ verdicts and reduced payments per claim,183 and subsequently adopted a full disclosure policy
across all hospitals in the VA system.52 The remainder of the literature in this area tends to cite these two
papers as evidence of the link between disclosure and reduction in litigation (the publication regarding VA
centre experience has been cited by 399 related articles to date). However, in both of these studies
disclosure was combined with financial settlement and hence it is impossible to disentangle the effects of
the two. We would argue that no clear link has been established between disclosure and reduction in
litigation. A review by the Canadian Patient Safety Institute in 2007 also came to similar conclusion.184
Advocates of a fault-based civil compensation system suggest that the award of damages is not only
intended to compensate the patient but to act as a deterrent, reducing medical error and resulting injury
to patients.185 Negligence law is generally treated with suspicion by health-care professionals but is viewed
by others as one system to promote the implementation of mechanisms to improve care to patients.186
This is unlikely to persuade individual practitioners who have committed an error to disclose it to the
patient, but there may be good legal reasons for disclosing error even in the face of an increased risk of
litigation.41 Although the error itself can instigate legal action, failing to disclose may deprive the patient
of a timely opportunity to receive treatment for the injury, thus potentially increasing the amount of
damages awarded.187
Few cases are resolved through a trial; many are resolved through negotiations following an assessment of
risk by both parties. As a result, using reported court cases is unlikely to be useful as a way of examining
disclosure effectiveness. However, fear of litigation continues to be cited as a reason preventing disclosure.
Lord Woolf,188 with reference to the UK context, has alluded to a role for lawyers with regard to their
primary responsibility to facilitate a settlement rather than to encourage litigious exchanges, and has
promoted better co-operation and understanding between the courts and the medical profession.
Barach189 has suggested that if the fear of litigation continues to undermine the efforts to improve patient
safety through disclosure as a mechanism for learning, then transforming the present unsatisfactory
situation into a culture promoting safety for patients may never be fully realised. This said, current
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evidence, albeit further survey work, suggests that full disclosure seems to have little effect on the
likelihood that an injured patient will seek legal advice, and although the positive results of individual
systems, such as the one in Michigan, are able to describe a decrease in malpractice suits, even the most
enthusiastic supporters such as Boothman suggest that it is probably overstating the case to directly link
the policy to fewer claims for compensation.190 The effect of disclosure practice on litigation in terms of
numbers and value of claims is by no means clear. Studdert et al.,191 in a somewhat controversial
mathematical modelling study, concluded that the number of malpractice lawsuits is likely to rise if and
when full disclosure occurs. However, the literature is vocal on the benefits of disclosure in reducing
litigation and the size of settlements.52,124,153,192,193 Hickson et al.194 concluded that nearly half of all
perinatal injury actions were motivated by parents’ suspicion of a cover-up. Another study suggests that
patients are significantly more likely to sue if their physician failed to disclose an error.21 Patients want to
know the facts when an injury has occurred as a result of medical error.
Scheirton41 suggests that law follows ethics, and that as more and more hospitals adopt policies on error
disclosure, and professional associations and quality assurance organisations insist on such policies, the
courts may start to adopt these standards as normative. The MPS argues for changes whereby health-care
managers facilitate and encourage organisations to develop policies and processes to support open
disclosure alongside notification of both adverse events and near misses. Crucially, it envisages that this
will include strategies which provide ongoing support, training, mentorship and investment in leadership
by example. It feels that this will allow staff to be effective in participating in open discussions in health
care and will allow them to fulfil their professional obligations.195
Duty of candour
As early as 1995, a discussion around a duty of disclosure highlighted that doctors suggested they did not
have time to disclose, that they had not done so in the past and were unlikely to start without some kind
of professional obligation to do so.196 This was proposed as a measure to increase trust in hospitals and
doctors and possibly defuse negligence cases. Some have observed that there may be many incentives to
conceal an error when we compare the possible consequences of concealment with those of disclosure. If
a clinician or organisation does not disclose an error in particular, this might never be discovered and there
may be no legal sanctions or negative effects, including any impact on reputation. If the error is discovered
and the patient actually sues, some have argued that the legal consequences seem very similar to those
that would occur if disclosure had occurred right from the start.197 Thus, the current sanctions for
non-disclosure would seem to some to be inadequate.
The codes of a number of professional bodies and indemnifying bodies advocate openness as a
professional obligation, including the British Medical Association (BMA), the GMC, the NMC and the MPS.
However, in response to a persisting lack of consistency in openness with patients over error, there have
been calls to introduce a statutory duty of candour in the UK. Others argue that openness should be
encouraged through supporting a culture of change rather than a change in the law.
After much lobbying and debate, the UK introduced a contractual duty of candour for health-care
institutions which came into effect in April 2013. This duty is imposed by the NHS Commissioning Board
on all contracts with NHS providers. The Department of Health suggests this will cost £130M over a
10-year period, the cost being incurred by clinical commissioning groups taking over the contracts in
breach of duty and costs associated with the disclosure of events to patients. However, it is also thought
that savings will be in the region of £541M over the same period.198,199 An amendment to the Health and
Social Care Bill was rejected, meaning that no law would be enacted to require the NHS to be open with
patients about errors that cause harm. A coalition of patients’ charities and health organisations had
lobbied for the amendment and a further new report has stressed the importance of transparency.200
Critics argued that the measure would be woefully inadequate to protect patients’ rights because it would
lack statutory force and would not apply to non-hospital care providers such as general practitioners (GPs)
and dentists.201 A compromise was introduced: a ‘contractual’ duty of candour, a standard clause to be
included in hospitals’ contracts. Recent events related to the questioning of the quality and safety of care
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in the NHS, and the Francis report6 and most recent report by Berwick et al.,200 may lead to this being
reviewed with a view to mandating statute; however, it is to date unchanged.
Confidentiality
There was very little literature specifically addressing the area of confidentiality within disclosure of adverse
events to patients. As the review concerned itself with disclosure to patients rather than the broader topic
of whether or not events are disclosed to systems either local or nationally, this may be one area of the
Being Open guidance which requires further examination specifically. Similarly, we did not approach
whistleblowing as an area within this review. The area of confidentiality with respect to patients did raise
one interesting account, which to some extent addresses how confidentiality may be more difficult to
manage once the error has been disclosed to a patient or family. In one disclosure scenario where the
parents of a baby had been alerted to an error while their baby was still in the care of the unit, the family
alerted other families within the same neonatal unit to be vigilant about the care of their babies following
this disclosure.202 Staff described the dilemma their unit faced as they had to talk to many families as a
result of one disclosure discussion, and the time this took. The implication of this did not seem to be that
the parents should not talk to other patients but they did seem to be arguing that the disclosure should
have been delayed until the parents did not have ‘access’ to other parents. However, that parents should
be vigilant about the care of their children, and that they should question it, seems to be exactly the
message given in the pamphlets and books produced around the world to encourage patients to
contribute to the greater safety agenda. There is a real question about what harmed patients may do with
disclosed information, and it seems impossible to control who patients choose to discuss their error with
once it has been disclosed. The Being Open guidance10 seems more focused on ensuring confidentiality
within the organisation to protect the no-blame systems approach, but how and whether or not it applies
to patients and families is less clear.
Continuity of care
It is well established that patients and families wish to have early, and complete, information wherever and
whenever possible. However, what is often lacking is an understanding of the ongoing nature of the
disclosure process. If patients are alerted to an error or adverse event as soon as it becomes apparent
then it is likely that there are a number of facts to be established and that an ongoing discussion will
be required. Further information will emerge, and in time the nature of any further treatment or
compensation will need to be discussed alongside any system learning.203 The literature suggests that
it is still common for medical organisations to approach open disclosure with less than a high-level
commitment and belief in the process.27 Disclosure should begin shortly after a medical incident is
recognised, and not when all the internal fact-finding and analysis are complete. Those affected need
specific and timely information and the use of any generic approach is unlikely to be helpful. Clinicians
require support to effectively deliver an apology and demonstrate empathy for the patient and family.
In some situations this may require coaching and role playing before the first disclosure meeting.
As part of a continuing package of care and skilled disclosure process it is crucial that the care team does
not abandon patients or families when something goes wrong. Disclosure needs to be viewed as a
process, not a single meeting.31 It is unlikely that affected people will understand all the components or
complexities of an incident in one meeting. Organisations should expect a multivisit process, even if the
clinicians are involved only in the initial meeting. A single meeting often cannot deal with more than
reviewing the event, expressing an apology or expression of regret and answering questions. Subsequent
meetings allow for additional questions, further information disclosure, discussion of steps taken to lessen
the chance of a recurrence and possibly financial discussions. Any attempt to define a number of meetings
in advance is unlikely to be helpful as different individuals and different errors will require a flexible
approach. Those affected need someone who can help them collect information, find answers to
questions, provide updates and help complete any financial support arrangements.85 This person must
be seen as someone who is supportive of those who have been affected, not someone who is seeking
to play down the incident, obscure the content of information, or protect the medical system or
clinicians involved.156
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Amori and Popp203 suggests that the role of a skilled risk manager who is committed to effective disclosure
is in determining where the family is in the process of coming to terms with an adverse outcome. This
allows both coaching and support for the staff involved, ensuring the proper timing and mechanisms for
the various conversations that need to take place.203 Whoever leads the process must be available when
needed by the patient or family, even when the timing is inconvenient.
Summary
A huge body of work exists which discusses open disclosure of adverse events; however, key messages,
although useful and positive, are often handed down as received wisdom on the basis of little theoretical
underpinning or research. There seems to be broad agreement that open disclosure is the ‘right’ thing to
do. However, justifications often sit within a context of reducing costs to organisations in terms of
lawsuits. If being open is the right course of action, and in some contexts the legal one, then perhaps it
does not require such evidence and the focus of research should lie more within implementation and
monitoring and the most effective and acceptable models of training. Gallagher et al.204 have identified
that more work is needed to examine how open disclosure is operationalised in practice, and how staff
negotiate the systems within which they operate as well as interactions with patients. Research needs to
focus on how we can best capture dimensions of quality in relation to disclosure conversations and
whether or not these are measurable.
Phase 1: review 2
Results of the search
After deduplication, 10,527 records were identified. Screening of the titles and abstracts identified
21 references that potentially fulfilled the inclusion criteria for this review and copies of the full papers
were sought. A total of 10 studies (11 publications) fulfilled the eligibility criteria and were included in the
review.52,205–214 In two studies the intervention was disclosure (combined with another intervention)52,208
and in eight studies (nine publications) the interventions were intended to promote or support open
disclosure.205–207,209–214 Two studies included a comparator group52,212 and eight were uncontrolled
before-and-after design.205–211,213,214 Two literature reviews were identified117,215 and one of the included
studies52 was identified from the reference list of the review by Kachalia et al.117 Three references to
completed research funding grants were identified.216–218 Authors identified as the award holder were
contacted but we were unable to identify any publications for inclusion. One ongoing study was
identified.219 Figure 4 explains the study selection process.
Excluded studies
Eight studies were excluded after reviewing the papers.98,220–226 Seven studies were excluded on the basis
of the study design. One study225 was excluded as the intervention was not open disclosure or an
intervention to support open disclosure. A list of the excluded studies detailing the reason(s) for exclusion
is available in Appendix 10.
Ongoing studies
One ongoing study was identified. Researchers in the USA are undertaking a randomised controlled study
of training physicians in disclosure.219 The intervention includes a disclosure training webcast, practice and
feedback with standardised patients, and a refresher training webcast. The primary outcome is patient
satisfaction with a disclosure that they experience, measured using the Patient Assessment of Disclosure
Quality. The project was due to complete in 2012.
Included studies where the intervention was disclosure
Two studies included disclosure as an intervention,52,208 combined with another intervention; in both cases
this was an offer of financial compensation (Table 1).
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Kachalia 2010
Kachalia et al.208 compared civil claims and costs at UMHS before and after implementation of a
disclosure-with-offer (of compensation) programme (July 1995 to September 2007). Once fully
implemented, the disclosure-with-offer programme was fully integrated with other efforts to improve
patient safety. Experienced risk managers with clinical backgrounds led the investigations and mediated
patient concerns through a process of collation of facts, evaluation of care quality and disclosure of the
conclusions. The authors report that UMHS emphasises honesty and transparency with patients and staff,
regardless of whether or not events resulted from error. After full implementation of the programme, the
average monthly rate of new claims and lawsuits both decreased. Time to resolution decreased and
average monthly cost rates also decreased for total liability, patient compensation and non-compensation-
related legal costs. The authors acknowledge that the study design cannot establish causality.
Kraman 1999
This was a retrospective cohort study52 of the effects of a new risk management policy intervention which
was implemented at one Department of Veterans Affairs facility in Lexington, KY. The policy had two
components: disclosure of the incident to the affected patient (or family) and assistance with filing a claim
for compensation. The comparator group comprised 38 facilities where there was no organised effort to
standardise or track the notification of affected patients. The main outcome was tort claim experience
during the 7-year period, measured using data from the Department of Veterans Affairs tort claim
information system. It was reported by the authors that liability payments at the intervention facility were
moderate and comparable with those of similar facilities (analysis based on 35 facilities in the comparator
group). No data were provided; however, a bar chart depicting liability payments ranked the intervention
facility eighth out of 36 (first= lowest liability payments, 36th= highest liability payments). The authors
draw attention to issues with the comparator facilities and the analysis which should be taken into account
in interpreting the findings.
Included studies where the intervention was intended to support or
promote disclosure
Eight studies (nine publications) were included in which the interventions aimed to promote
disclosure.205–207,209–214 One included a comparator group212 and seven were uncontrolled before-and-after
design.205,207,209–211,213,214 Study characteristics are provided in Table 2.
Setting
All studies took place in North America, seven in the USA and one in Canada.213 The majority of studies
took place in educational establishments, six in training schools/colleges or universities205,207,209–212 and one
in a specialised simulation-based training centre.214 In one study it was unclear from the published report
where the intervention took place.213
Participants
The majority of participants were students from a variety of health-related disciplines including medicine,
nursing, pharmacy and dentistry.205,207,209–212 Two studies recruited qualified health-care professionals
(paediatric oncology nurses, and postgraduate obstetrics and gynaecological residents).213,214
Interventions
In all eight studies the interventions were delivered as educational or curricular modules and workshops
(either solely about disclosure or incorporated into a broader theme of patient safety). They included
features such as didactic lecture sessions, pre reading materials, DVD materials, observation, small-group
work, and discussions and role play or simulated training to practise open disclosure, often including
feedback sessions. Further details of content are described in Table 2.
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Outcomes/outcome measures
A variety of outcomes were evaluated related to knowledge about safety and disclosure, perceived
self-efficacy to perform disclosure and confidence in dealing with error and disclosure. These included
perceived self-efficacy to understand full disclosure, conduct a full disclosure, admit an error to a supervisor
and admit an error to a patient,205 self-awareness about patient communication and safety,207 students’
knowledge of medication safety,209 students’ confidence in medication safety,209 comfort with the skills of
disclosure,210 attitudes and beliefs about patient safety,211 knowledge about medical error212 and perceived
self-efficacy in communication.214 Four studies also carried out descriptive evaluations of
the curriculum.207,209,210,214
Outcome measures were nearly always designed for the study itself with no validation reported. These
included a true/false questionnaire,209 multiple choice questionnaire212 and a number of rating
scales.207,209,214 Role play in which participants enacted disclosure with patient actors was measured by
subjective evaluation,205 a checklist of performed tasks extracted from the guidelines for disclosure of
adverse events developed by the Canadian Patient Safety Institute213 and a Likert-type scale self-assessment
of comfort with skills of disclosure.210
Reported findings
All studies evaluating outcomes such as knowledge and confidence reported positive results, comparing
pre- with post-test scores. Although one study included a comparator group, results were presented for
within-group analyses only and did not compare the outcomes for intervention versus
comparator groups.212
Summary
This review examined evidence for the effectiveness of open disclosure and interventions to support open
disclosure. To our knowledge, this is the first time a systematic review of this topic has been undertaken.
Findings from this review indicate that there is almost no evidence for the effectiveness of open disclosure,
nor of interventions intended to support or enhance open disclosure. This finding is in line with a previous,
wide-ranging review of the open disclosure literature.35
Phase 2: qualitative interviews
We generated an extremely rich data set. From our initial analysis of the sampled interviews we identified
six primary themes and produced descriptive summaries of our data relating to these, using subheadings to
help organise the material.
The primary themes are briefly described below.
Primary theme: broad understandings of open disclosure
When asked what they understood by the term ‘open disclosure’, stakeholders were all able to give an
answer, and most talked about honesty and transparency. Despite some variations in its conceptualisation,
from a very broad principle to a discrete set of behaviours, there was agreement across the sample that
open disclosure in principle was the right thing to do. Most respondents defined the term open disclosure
in terms of being ‘honest’ and ‘transparent’. Typically, open disclosure was reduced to quite a simple set of
values to be applied to practice.
Although widely understood, the conceptualisation varied. Some respondents suggested that it is a
patient’s right to know what has happened in the course of their care, whatever the outcome. Others
articulated a position of openness as a way of providing an opportunity for patients to be involved in their
care, recognising that patients may have a unique perspective and know or capture different information
to that available to and from health professionals.
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Other respondents conceptualised open disclosure in the context of, and with reference to, the Being
Open policy framework. These respondents conceptualised open disclosure in terms of specific behaviour
and processes. They tended to focus on how and when the process of open disclosure should be
initiated and how it should proceed. A number of participants indicated the importance of face-to-face
discussion and that a dialogue should follow between patients and/or families and those providing or
overseeing care provision. Dialogue was described as critical in enabling patients and their families or
carers to engage with health professionals, to ask questions, to be listened to and to promote the
understanding of all parties.
The idea that there is ‘no one size fits all’ and that the disclosure process must be flexible and responsive
to individuals’ needs was identified.
Respondents identified the importance of health professionals choosing language carefully when
communicating with patients and families, specifying the need to avoid using jargon or technical terms
which can hinder understanding and be misinterpreted.
Primary theme: motivators
A dominant theme throughout the interviews was the role and conduct of the person or team who was
responsible for disclosing information to a patient. Respondents discussed the motivators for health
professionals to disclose, placing emphasis on the proposed relationship between open disclosure and
the likelihood of litigation. Explicit links were made between openness and health professionals’
self-preservation. Respondents commonly expressed beliefs that being open and honest might minimise
complaints and the likelihood of litigation, and that this was a main driver for health professionals and
managers. Openness with patients was also described as the essence of behaving professionally and
providing a good standard of care.
Primary theme: the Being Open guidance and framework
Although nearly all of those interviewed seemed to have a good understanding of the term ‘open
disclosure’, very few were familiar with the Being Open guidance – the exceptions being those patients and
families interviewed who had first-hand experience of error and identified a lack of its application, and those
involved in developing the guidance or associated policies. Only a minority of health-care managers indicated
any degree of familiarity with its 10 guiding principles. Health professionals rarely had any knowledge of
these nor of the existence of any national guidance; however, some respondents were aware of a local
Being Open policy at their trust, and despite a lack of awareness of the NPSA Framework, most participants
talked about open disclosure in terms that reflect the concept as delivered through the 10 principles.
Primary theme: ‘good’ disclosures
Although respondents lacked clarity around the Being Open guidance, it was clear from the numerous
accounts of direct and indirect involvement in disclosures that there some common features which marked
a better or worse disclosure. From these accounts, it was evident that open disclosure can take many
forms and that the several different approaches described by interviewees were perceived to yield positive
outcomes. The common features described as important for delivering effective and appropriate
disclosures included the degree to which (a) responsibility was accepted on behalf of an individual, team or
organisation, (b) language was used that patients understood, (c) an apology was given, (d) the reasons for
the event were explained, and (e) the patient perceived the health provider to be genuine, transparent
and compassionate.
The opportunity to prepare for a disclosure was described as important by some respondents, including
taking time to consider what to say and who should deliver the information, speaking to other members
of staff and having opportunities to pre-empt how the information might be received before approaching
the patient or carers. Any recommendation of this approach may, however, present a dilemma. The desire
to prepare for disclosure, while potentially enhancing the discussion, may also lead to negative feelings
and uncertainty for the patient if dialogue with them is delayed as a consequence.
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Although some common features of more effective disclosures were evident, scrutiny of accounts of
disclosure suggest that the parameters of a ‘good’ disclosure are extremely difficult to delineate. Even in
those disclosures perceived as effective, the tendency to attribute blame to team members and to deliver
patients a monologue rather than engage them in dialogue was apparent. Moreover, qualities such as the
degree to which patients perceive the provider as genuine and compassionate are subjective and complex
to evaluate.
Primary theme: uncertainty
Although respondents expressed clarity around some common features of good or poor open disclosure,
uncertainty and confusion about how to manage specific situations was apparent. Uncertainty was
expressed specifically in relation to identifying an adverse event, handling complex circumstances, defining
the circumstances in which disclosure is needed and deciding who should speak with patients and carers.
Issues around the timing and nature of an apology were identified as a further source of confusion.
Definitional uncertainties
Considerable uncertainty was expressed by many stakeholders around defining when to be open and what
constitutes an incident of the kind that needs to be disclosed. The primary concern appeared to be how to
define an incident when little or no harm has been caused.
Circumstances of the event
Respondents recognised the complexity of the system in which disclosure is to be enacted. There was
widespread acknowledgement from most respondents that health care is a complex system and unpicking
events in any health-care incident is made more arduous by its complexity. The diversity of events that
occur within this system creates a lack of clarity around how to proceed with disclosure in any given
situation, as each circumstance is unique.
In spite of the complexity that characterises health care, some respondents suggested that the
standardisation of process would aid the disclosure practice.
Although each situation is unique, common situations that presented dilemmas were reported, particularly
missing information and the delayed discovery of an event. Missing information about what has happened
was often mentioned by respondents in the context of decisions around whether or not to disclose and
when to begin the disclosure process. Our findings revealed uncertainty and mixed messages around the
level of information needed to begin the disclosure process.
Patients and families reinforced the notion that disclosure should begin as soon as it becomes apparent
that something has gone wrong, even if not all the facts are clear. They were unequivocal about the need
to be included from the outset in the process, the dialogue and the incident investigation.
The late discovery of an event was also a source of uncertainty. A number of respondents discussed the
difficulties associated with making a disclosure when the event only became apparent after some time.
The challenges associated with a late discovery included patients not being on site, uncertainty about how
to make contact and uncertainty about whether or not to tell them at all.
Primary theme: professional and organisational context
Features of the professional and organisational context appeared to be significant drivers of decisions
made around whether or not to be open with patients and the circumstances in which to do this.
Patient–professional relationships
The patient–professional dynamic was frequently discussed. Despite espousing openness, stories told by
health professionals and managers directly involved in the practice of disclosure (or decision-making about
disclosure) suggested that decisions about whether or not to share information with a patient, what
information to share and when to do this were made by health-care providers. Dilemmas were generally
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presented when the patient had come to no harm and would not otherwise find out that something had
gone wrong. The perspective presented in such circumstances reinforced the position that information
about the patient was perceived as the property of the health-care provider rather than of the patient.
The health-care team’s judgement of the degree of resulting patient harm appeared to be a central driver
of practice. Current guidance from the GMC,95 local policy and national Being Open guidance10 suggest
that health providers must inform patients of events which caused them harm. Some respondents in
management roles referred to these sources of guidance as a reason for not talking to patients about
non-harmful events and for health professionals to use their own judgement regarding what information
to disclose.
The changing dynamic of power relations between doctor and patient also created a sense of confusion
for some professionals about the type of information to provide to patients. With more access to
information, particularly from online sources, patients were described as more questioning and active in
decisions about their care and as having higher expectations of the care they received. Both health
professionals and managers described not always knowing how to respond appropriately, particularly
when issuing information about things that have gone wrong.
Overview of main findings
There was inevitable overlap in terms of the issues that featured under the primary theme headings.
Further consideration supported the development of a more theorised analysis that may help to explain
why implementation of the Being Open framework, and indeed the principles of open disclosure
more generally, are not consistently evident in practice. The analysis highlights the complexities of
interpreting and acting on widely endorsed moral principles that underpin calls for open disclosure, and
the inevitable limitations of attempts to promote good practice by prescribing quite standardised
communication procedures.
Support for the values that underpin calls for open disclosure
Our interviews revealed broad-based and strong support for the idea of open disclosure. Strong
associations were made with moral concepts of honesty, openness and transparency.
Being honest and open . . . the basics of being a good human being. You should be honest and open
whether you’re a builder, or an engineer or a pilot, it doesn’t really matter, that’s just being a
good person.
Manager 1
The principles behind it are laudable, understandable; I don’t think there’s anything that you can
argue against on sort of moral grounds, on ethical grounds, transferring that into practice is much
more difficult than you would expect.
Health professional 6
These broad value statements were associated, by some, with the rights of individuals to know about all
aspects of their care and the obligations of health professionals to tell them about all matters that affect
them or influence their care. Both health professionals and patients suggested that it is a patient’s right to
know what has happened in the course of their care, whatever the outcome; that they have ownership of
any information in relation to their health and their body.
Deference to professionals is definitely moving away. There’s a sense in which people have a sense of
having rights . . . and patients regard themselves as having rights to this information as I think we
would probably say that they do, both legal rights to information that’s relevant and also moral rights
to information.
Professional organisation 2
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If we don’t adopt sort of an open approach to mistakes and errors we are never going to treat them
as human beings because they have a right to know, it’s their bodies, not ours, we only look after it
but it belongs to them. And it should be treated with respect and so should their wishes and feelings.
Health professional 2
Anything that happens in the course of health care, including errors and omissions in health care, it
should be the absolute, unequivocal right of the patient, or in the case of them being dead or lacking
capacity, then their next of kin know about.
Patient organisation 1
The links between learning from safety incidents and improving care for the future were also apparent,
and were linked to patient involvement in promoting safer care. Some stakeholders in senior positions
(often slightly removed from the clinical front line) identified coming from a general stance of openness as
an identified way of engaging with related concepts of patient ownership of health-care decisions and
entitlement to a fully informed perspective. This included the view that patients may have a unique
perspective and know or capture different information.
If the patient is still on the ward and you know the patients and the relatives become involved in it . . .
and they can often help us as well.
Health professional 3
The patient or the family say . . . had you asked me, I could have told you that when I came into A&E
[accident and emergency], I did report the symptoms . . . sometimes it’s one person’s word against
another, you know. It may be recorded in the notes, patient attended A&E; didn’t report this
symptom, that symptom; full record taken. But the patient will say, oh no! I did say exactly I was
having a bad headache or, you know, I was reporting these symptoms. So even from a practical
reason, it’s bad practice not to involve people from an early stage.
Patient organisation 2
The other thing we need to do is be much better at involving patients in their own safety so giving
them permission to challenge us when they think something’s going to go wrong . . . patients might
just get a better sense of where the risk areas are but most of the evidence suggests that it improves
their safety.
Professional organisation 3
Multiple meanings of open disclosure
Individuals held various ideas about what open disclosure entails in practice. When people talked about
open disclosure in terms of communicative actions or processes, there was no consistent, clear,
comprehensive definition in evidence. References to a number of features of communication were present
in many of the accounts of examples of open disclosure, and were lamentable in their absence from
accounts of examples where disclosure was deemed not to have occurred.
The common features described as important for delivering effective and appropriate disclosures included
the degree to which (a) responsibility was accepted on behalf of an individual, team or organisation,
(b) language was used that patients understood, (c) an apology was given, (d) the reasons for the event
were explained, and (e) the patient perceived the health provider to be genuine, transparent and
compassionate. The quote below provides a typical description of a ‘good’ disclosure that is representative
of many of the examples given; the features commonly emphasised by respondents across the sample are
shown in bold text.
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If we take where I had to go and do it because I had made a mistake or played a part in the mistake,
it was a young lad with his mum and I just said, you know . . . it was about analgesia and because it
clearly hadn’t worked so I had then subsequently given him the right intravenous formulation and I
said ‘I’m really sorry, as you know I came to review you because your pain relief didn’t seem to be
working and I know now why it wasn’t working and I’m sorry to have to tell you that we gave a
drug that’s normally taken orally, I gave it into your vein’. That didn’t really mean anything to
them so I tried to explain why that was important and why that shouldn’t happen, told them
what I’d done about it and really in that particular instance it was about the main reason there’s a
problem in this particular drug is that it wasn’t made . . . usually the problem is around sterility, is it
made in a sterile environment, if it’s going intravenously. So I had to wait for someone from pharmacy
to ring and talk to the manufacturer and in fact this was made in a sterile fashion. So I explained it
to him I said ‘You don’t seem to have come to any harm from what has happened but clearly
it is something that wouldn’t normally . . . this should not normally happen’ and I told them
why it had happened, the nurses giving the drugs for some reason despite it saying ‘IV
[intravenous] morphine’ had thought I must have meant Oramorph and given it to him.
My part was that I didn’t ask to see the little vial of morphine which you would normally get
with an intravenous morphine so I had played a part and I think I just told them what had happened
and told them what would happen as a result so that it would be reported formally and we
would have a look at it to see if there were any things we could put in place to stop it from
happening again and I just apologised and they were fine and I never heard anything else about it.
Manager 10
Instances in which poor disclosures were described reinforced the importance of accepting responsibility,
explaining things clearly, and instigating and maintaining contact with the patient and family as early
as possible.
He came in for surgery . . . and it didn’t go quite right. It was part of the risks, one of the things that
went wrong is part of the risks that they do, they sign the consent and are given the information and I
think that was the start of it because I don’t know how much this gentleman actually realised
could go wrong with what he sees as quite routine surgery . . . So it started off quite badly in
that sense because his family have said well we didn’t realise that was one of the side effects,
that was one of the risks. So he was then passed from the orthopaedic department to the
vascular department and again the vascular people were saying well actually it is the
orthopaedic department, they have made a bit of a blunder and then of course the orthopaedic
department are then saying no you can’t say that because it was a risk . . . actually the patient has
got quite a bad history, a lot of comorbidities and so it was a disaster waiting to happen. And it’s
been going on . . . he’s had recent meetings where nobody has actually been clear. Now in the
patient[’s] and the patient’s relative[’s minds] it’s that, we are not being clear to him because we’ve
got something to hide. And actually when you come down to it we haven’t got anything to hide at
all. But that is how they perceive it, that we are hiding and we are actually not . . . you know you
can bring people in but they have this preconceived idea that hospitals don’t make mistakes or
if they do we hide it.
Health professional 3
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A number of respondents (mainly policy-makers and managers) were keen to ‘pin down’ exactly what
should be done to ensure open disclosure and saw the prescription of a standardised process as the key
to this.
What I am clear on is that when you are in distress, process is really important. And if it’s one thing
that happens in one trust and it’s different to another trust or whatever, I think the public are
bemused and upset . . . so I do think we should certainly have some sort of standardisation of process
. . . if you walk through the door of Primark, it says Primark, you know what you’re going to get.
If you walk through the door of Hugo Boss, you know what you’re going to get, you know, it varies in
cost and quality. If you go through the door that says NHS, you don’t think it’s going to vary in terms
of cost and quality from another door that says NHS . . . So we should have standardised processes
around handling something like this.
Policy stakeholder 5
However, others, specifically clinicians, emphasised the complexities of practice and insisted there could be
no ‘one size fits all’ approach for disclosure, with each encounter requiring careful situational
interpretation and value judgements which would always be needed to communicate appropriately about
safety problems.
I think we should work towards that being a kind of professional value and responsibility rather than
something that is enshrined in some sort of legislative framework because I think it is too difficult to
put in there. And I think every circumstance needs individual interpretation on what the best thing to
do . . . my concern is that kind of legal, making it a legal duty would lead to inappropriate responses
sometimes for patients.
Health professional 10
We suggest that the distinction between agreement about the importance of several moral concepts that
supported the case for open disclosure and diversity of opinion about how these concepts should be
interpreted and reflected in practice is one important key to understanding why the NPSA’s Being Open
guidance, or even the concept of openness more generally, is not consistently implemented. When
individuals want to act well they appear to be attempting to integrate a number of values into their
decision-making and action. Judgements about the particular situation are context dependent and
interpretive, and consider how a particular action may be related to other matters, morally or otherwise.
As people do not always agree about what is required to reflect moral values, these can be variously
interpreted and multiply realised in practice, although some actions are quite closely tied to particular
moral concepts.
We draw on this distinction again below when we consider uncertainties and tensions in judgement;
however, before doing so we consider the policy itself and its use.
The Being Open Framework and its use
Very few of the stakeholders we interviewed were familiar with the Being Open document. A number
suggested this was because they did not have time to read all the policy documents that were issued and
relevant to them. Some of the principles of Being Open were reflected in local trust policies on open
disclosure, and we stress again that both types of guidance reflect the underlying moral concepts that
were widely endorsed by stakeholders.
Being completely open about what’s happened, why it’s happened and informing those involved
and affected.
Manager 2
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It is common sense . . . it is basically just about not lying to people, being honest, being open, being
explicit and sorting out problems when they occur.
Health professional 1
One reason offered for the limited use of Being Open was the fact that it was not designed for timely,
practical application at the time of the safety incident.
In common with other policies we have in this organisation . . . it’s just not easy to draw out the
information you actually want on the spot. So when an incident happens, you don’t have time to go
and spend an hour wading through the policy and picking out the key points and making a plan,
what you need is just do this, do that, do that first.
Manager 8
If you start getting into fifty pages for a policy, nobody’s going to read that, they won’t have time to
read that and I think it’s about taking what’s in the national stuff but also then translating that to
what’s workable locally . . . thinking about anything that can make it more manageable for the staff
on the ward, sometimes it might be a checklist, sometimes it might be a flowchart, as I say, something
that people can see at a glance and think, ‘that’s what I need to do’ or ‘this is the person that I need
to ask’.
Manager 9
Some of the stakeholders who were familiar with the Being Open document raised concerns about the
scope of application and particularly the way it made different recommendations for incidents of different
severity. Incident severity was consistently identified as a key determinant in deciding whether or not to
follow the guidance. Notably, most health professionals and managers reported enacting the principles
espoused through the Being Open guidance in circumstances of moderate or severe patient harm.
Respondents repeatedly indicated that the Being Open process was not followed for near misses or minor
incidents. Furthermore, it was often argued that disclosing events that were minor or did not result in
harm may not be in the patient’s or the organisation’s interests.
The Being Open policy does say that there is no obligation to report, to let people know about near
misses . . . or I think the low harm ones, again, it’s whether it does more harm than good.
Manager 8
As things stand at the moment, we would expect to disclose to a patient any harm, moderate or
severe harm, that has been caused by the treatment that they have received from us . . . I would
imagine that (the Being Open process) happens more where there’s a serious incident . . . If there was
very limited or no harm we would expect clinicians to use their discretion as to whether it is in the
patient’s best interest at that moment, and I think that is based on the national policy.
Manager 6
I do not think that if things are minor or near misses you necessarily want to think about that in terms
of patient involvement, but for serious incidents the family is told by the investigating team at CSU
[commissioning support unit] level that an investigation is being undertaken and that the results of
that investigation will be shared with them.
Manager 4
Uncertainties and tensions in judgements about whether and how to discuss
safety issues
Between them, the stakeholders we interviewed identified a range of issues that they deemed salient to
considerations of whether or not and how safety issues should be discussed with patients and family
members. These included, but were not restricted to, ideas about why health professionals or managers
did not behave well. There was widespread recognition of uncertainty and complexity, especially in relation
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to the multiple values at stake in the complex situations referred to earlier in which decisions about the
‘right thing to do’ are being made. The diversity of events that occur within health care creates a lack of
clarity around how to proceed with disclosure in any given situation as each circumstance is unique.
Health care is just not that cut and dried, so when something goes wrong it’s usually a bit of a jigsaw.
Policy stakeholder 2
Respondents also recognised the complexity of the system in which disclosure is to be enacted. There was
widespread acknowledgment from most respondents that health care is an intricate system and unpicking
adverse events that occur within it is made more arduous by its complexity.
The main issues appear to be interlinked but we have separated them here to allow for examination of
each in turn.
The first main consideration seems to involve whether or not the event or issue should be disclosed or
discussed. Considerations include the type of incidents which need to be discussed and why, the
implications for the patient and his or her family, which health professionals and health services are
involved and whether or not there are opportunities to learn from the incident.
Simply identifying what it was necessary to disclose presented a source of confusion for a number of those
interviewed across all stakeholder groups, with the exception of patients and families. Although the
guidance appears to offer clarity on this in principle and suggests ‘providing a full and frank explanation of
the circumstances without regard to any other factor which might have influence in the situation’,10 many
of those interviewed identified exceptions to this and circumstances in which it was not always considered
necessary to disclose.
I am not saying that we would absolutely always at all costs think well we’ve found this we’d better
let the family know, I think you’ve always got to weigh up what the risks and benefits are of talking to
the family as well.
Manager 11
Somebody reports an incident because there was a delay in taking somebody to theatre because the
theatres were full and then that person deteriorated and died, and you know they might be aged
ninety-five and came in seriously ill in the first place with an acute abdomen, and yes it’s a report of
an incident because there’s no barrier, people can report anything they like and they report it as an
incident involving inappropriate delay . . . what do you go to the relatives and say, do you say well I’m
terribly sorry she died, she was very seriously ill and elderly but there was a three-hour delay before
theatre which isn’t desirable. Well I suppose that is what you would say being open but then where
does that leave the relatives thinking for the rest of their life that their mother or father would have
you know lived another two years if it hadn’t been for a three-hour delay in the hospital?
Policy stakeholder 4
I think truth will out and so I support the concept of openness and as an institution we will support it
very, very strongly. But you will always get examples where you know it may not be in the interests of
the patient to reveal all.
Professional organisation 4
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Uncertainties around what types of incidents should be disclosed were often related to particular areas; for
example, where there was a near miss or the patient appeared to have suffered no harm.
As things stand at the moment, we would expect to disclose to a patient any harm, moderate or
severe harm, that has been caused by the treatment that they have received from us . . . I would
imagine that [the Being Open process] happens more where there’s a serious incident . . . If there was
very limited or no harm we would expect clinicians to use their discretion as to whether it is in the
patient’s best interest at that moment, and I think that is based on the national policy.
Manager 6
I didn’t disclose it actually but we had a patient who . . . was receiving chemotherapy for leukaemia
and she was on the ward and . . . the chemotherapy came up for her and one of the nurses had to
make it up as pharmacy had sent it up to be reconstituted on the ward, and the nurse did that . . . and
she came to me a little bit later and said ‘I’ve just thought about it and actually I’ve given the wrong
dose’. And we sat down and worked it out and she’d given too much but not enough that it would
make any difference. It wouldn’t put the patient at risk but it was a bit more than she should have
had and she was a very anxious girl . . . she’d had a rough time . . . I know she’d been through a lot
and . . . she was quite emotionally fragile and we discussed what we should do about it and whether
we should tell her or not. And we . . . decided between us really that . . . it would probably be
detrimental to tell her that it had happened because she was so emotionally fragile we felt she might
lose a bit of confidence, she’d be upset, she’d be worried . . . and we thought it would probably just
do more harm than good by telling her about it really.
Health professional 9
Sometimes . . . the risk is that . . . you might undermine the confidence in the system that’s one thing,
perhaps you undermine . . . the patient’s confidence in you as a practitioner . . . you make the patient
feel anxious and insecure without any real benefit . . . if you undermine that trust what’s the benefit.
Health professional 10
They [health-care team] had a patient who fell off the operating table. Now potentially that is very
serious, you can do huge damage if you are unconscious and you fall like a sack of potatoes from a
height like that onto a stone floor in an operating theatre. But there wasn’t any damage and it was
then questioned whether the patient needed to be told that they had fallen off the operating table
because there was . . . no actual consequential damage to the patient . . . and that is a grey area which
I think is quite difficult to work out.
Professional organisation 5
Situations where events might be seen as routine or unavoidable imperfections in care were
also highlighted.
You know one surgeon said to me when this was first being discussed, he said: ‘well if I was taking
out somebody’s gall bladder and I made a tiny nick on the liver which bled for two seconds and then
I cauterised it and it stopped would I have to go to the patient afterwards and tell them this is what
had happened?’ He said, ‘because that would happen kind of twenty times in an average operation.’
I said well of course not you know that’s just normal dissection in surgery that’s not an error or an
avoidable incident. He said: ‘well what if the scrub nurse reported me to the GMC and then I was
accused not just of doing it but not disclosing it, what would happen then?’.
Policy stakeholder 4
The arguments that there are more or less severe harms, and that disclosure may cause a particular patient
more harm were individual and complex. If the situations were considered as a spectrum, it would be
possible to ask questions of a similar situation, replacing variables to try to identify at what point a
situation becomes an event that requires disclosure. However, if the relationship between patient and
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health-care professional or organisation is viewed as one of transparency and is focused on facilitating
involvement in care generally, then the ‘step up’ to disclosure of minor events may not be required. The
discussions may take place within ongoing conversations rather than being viewed as ‘incidents’ per se.
There will be gains and losses for both patients and health professionals in decisions about whether or not
to disclose. For example, we might ask what the patient could gain or lose from the discussion of the error
described above by health professional 9 in relation to the chemotherapy dosing error. It is possible to
argue that the right to know what has happened to you as a result of your care is a matter of treating
patients with dignity, of an individual or organisation respecting the fact that it is the right of an individual
to know about events, whether they harm or not. Although this may vary across situations and patients,
needing to know that things have occurred in order to be able to move forward responsibly is highlighted
by some and there is an increasing expectation that patients and families will be informed.
I see it as being entirely open and honest about things that have happened in health care. Which have
caused harm or may have caused harm. It’s as simple as that, that people’s treatment and health care
belongs to them. It doesn’t belong to the institution or the health professional who has been treating
them, and with that goes the information around what happens. Anything that happens in the course
of health care, including errors and omissions in health care, it should be the absolute, unequivocal
right of the patient, or in the case of them being dead or lacking capacity, then their next of kin
know about.
Professional organisation 1
Deference to professionals is definitely moving away. There’s a sense in which people have a sense of
having rights . . . and patients regard themselves as having rights to this information as I think we
would probably say that they do, both legal rights to information that’s relevant and also moral rights
to information.
Professional organisation 2
Some patients are real experts on their conditions, more than we could ever be. That dynamic has
changed and therefore being open is way more relevant than it used to be.
Policy stakeholder 2
Health professionals may perceive a number of negative consequences from the disclosure of safety
events. Professionals often identified impacts in terms of their professional identity, even in cases where
they were not at fault or where no consequences arose for their employment, or no litigation or
investigation ensued. However, professional self-integrity is also maintained by doing what a professional
perceives to be the right thing.
There are a number of issues specific to the health-care organisation which principally concern reputation
and litigation. There appears to be uncertainty in relation to the impact of disclosure on organisational
issues. There are general ideas that being open and honest with patients will lead to less litigation but also
a recognition that this cannot be guaranteed. Respondents explicitly discussed the value of openness for
minimising the likelihood of becoming involved in complaints or legal proceedings.
The fact that he had discussed it [the error], had been open about it, hadn’t tried to conceal it, meant
that the patient wasn’t moved to make a complaint.
Professional organisation 3
I think if we are not being open there are all kinds of consequences and one may be a complaint. But
you know could be legal action, whatever. Which is one of the many reasons why being open
makes sense.
Manager 6
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We are taught that if you’re open and honest and frank with your patient and apologise if appropriate
then the subsequent difficulties in terms of litigation and what have you for the doctor will
be reduced.
Professional organisation 6
I’ve learned that it’s [being open] also quite a self-preserving thing to do . . . the worst thing . . . is if
they [patients] get it into their heads that there’s some sort of cover up going on, then they get the bit
between their teeth and solicitors get involved and it’s all very difficult.
Health professional 4
If you are very honest and straightforward and treat the patients right then often they feel that, they
take a generous view towards the mistake as opposed to getting very litigious about it, which I think
they are more inclined to do if there’s a big cover up and people aren’t honest.
Health professional 1
I think the culture is, you say sorry, you explain what’s happened and you do it promptly and openly
and honestly . . . I think the understanding now is that it’s much less likely to go to litigation if you are
open and honest and say, ‘I’m sorry’.
Manager 2
Health professionals described situations in which they perceived that an open and honest disclosure had
enhanced patient satisfaction with the outcome, the ongoing patient–practitioner relationship and the way
that the event was handled. Critically, even in such instances, health professionals described their initial
fear that open disclosure might actually invite complaints or litigation.
Part of me was telling me you shouldn’t do this, why ask for trouble, this is going to just lead to
litigation or complaints . . . just let it be and hopefully things will quieten down. But you know every
time I’ve done this has been a positive and rewarding experience, I’ve not regretted it.
Health professional 5
Through the course of my career, so many times I’ve seen very bad things have happened and patients
have in the end not taken any kind of legal action and not taken grievance with the doctors when
they’ve immediately said: ‘Look, I’m very sorry, this went wrong and this is why it went wrong and this
is what we’re going to do to try and fix it’.
Health professional 4
Despite concerns regarding the likelihood of openness inviting complaints or legal action, many health
professionals recognised the patient’s and carer’s right to take legal action and distinguished this from
their decision to be open and honest.
I think there are going to be times where I might meet with a family . . . who have got a threshold for
complaining . . . who would you know take this opportunity with both arms and take it forward to a
full litigation process and what have you but that is their right at the end of the day and it shouldn’t in
principle put me off being honest and upfront with my patients.
Health professional 5
If I’d made a mistake I’ve got to go and see that person and say look I am sorry it was my fault, I am
not saying it was right, you know it was me that did it and I did it and it was an error and I apologise.
And if they then want to take that further well that is their prerogative.
Health professional 2
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If errors have been made, and those errors are to lead to long-term health problems, then it seems to
me entirely appropriate, or where it’s appropriate, for patients to make claims for compensation, in
order that they can, quite directly, be compensated for errors that have been made.
Professional organisation 2
However, links between communication processes in relation to disclosure of error were not uniformly
linked to outcomes at the organisational or the patient level. Patients will vary in their propensity to take
legal action and what satisfies in one context cannot be guaranteed in another.
A number of respondents indicated a clash between the principles underpinning open disclosure and
maintaining their professional identity, reputation and relationships with colleagues. Openness about
incidents was perceived by some to have broader implications for breaching professional loyalties and to
some degree siding with the patient. This concern may add an additional complexity and sense of
confusion about the appropriate course of action to take following an adverse incident.
There is a sense in the medical profession I think, that they look after their own. They look after their
own. They look after their own interests. I still think there’s a kind of us and them between doctors
and patients . . . at the moment I still think there is a kind of defensive mechanism, defensive instincts
that you should cover up, look inside, protect the interests of the profession and the hospital and I still
think it can be very difficult for patients to make inroads against that. My sense at the moment is
that there’s a lot of, there are big changes taking place, but they haven’t bedded down in certain
kinds of areas, and I don’t think there’s an instinctive culture of openness and candour.
Professional organisation 2
Therefore, in each context individuals will consider the attitudes of their colleagues, the stance that they
perceive their employer will take or has taken and the likelihood of litigation, although this is not an
exhaustive list of variables.
The opportunity to learn from error or improve care is also a factor in decisions about disclosure of patient
safety events. Transparency around errors was identified as particularly important at the early stages of the
process in facilitating learning.
I think as well, it’s [openness] important because medicine has not always been great at learning from
its mistakes. And partly that’s been because there has been a culture of concealing them.
Professional organisation 2
[Not] being open with patients or families is, on the one hand, fairly terrible dereliction of duty to
another human being, and a dereliction of ethical and moral duties. But it’s also perpetuating a
culture where people go into denial – where people refuse to accept that there’s been error, or when
there has been error, fail to investigate the root causes and any lessons that there might be to help
prevent reoccurrence.
Patient organisation 1
There was notably less reference to disclosure as a proactive way of engaging with patients to enhance the
quality and safety of their care, and that of service delivery more broadly, than to benefits associated with
reduction of complaints or litigation.
The first issues may be moderated by how disclosure is or is not conducted. There were uncertainties and
value tensions in relation to a number of areas. For example, deciding who should disclose error involved
judgements balancing closeness to the patient, seniority, competence, well-being of the patient and
available support for health-care professionals involved.
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Many felt strongly that information should be delivered by the senior clinician closest to the patient if the
incident was serious, and that junior staff should not lead formal disclosures. Others highlighted
individual responsibility.
The obligation is on the person who made the mistake . . . I think there’s a problem, documented to
the point of absurdity, that dehumanising in medicine and dehumanising particularly in the hospitals,
and if a doctor or another health professional makes a mistake, and three months later, someone, an
administrator comes round to your house and knocks on the door and says, ‘oh by the way, a mistake
was . . .’ it seems to me you further entrench those kinds of . . . if I make a mistake, and I harm
somebody, then I’ve got a responsibility to discuss the mistake I’ve made with them.
Professional organisation 2
However, other respondents highlighted that junior staff may often be present or directly involved in an
event and therefore make a critical contribution to its disclosure. Moreover, some respondents suggested
that decisions around who should be involved in a disclosure should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis
to ensure that the most appropriate person or team is involved.
If something’s been designated as a serious incident and there’s been an incident investigation and
there’s a formal ‘being open’ meeting set up with the relatives, that’s where I think you can’t leave
junior staff unsupported to do it on their own. But, on an everyday basis, they’re the actual first
people who would probably see that something’s gone wrong and so, of course, if they do, you can’t,
well, we shouldn’t have a system which says they shouldn’t apologise.
Policy stakeholder 3
There isn’t clear guidance but we almost don’t mind that so much because sometimes if you say it has
to be the lead consultant that person may not be the best person, they may not have the best
communication skills or they may be too emotionally involved to do it so sometimes it’s better to have
lots of flexibility in that and sometimes the family has been really close to a certain nurse who’s
actually quite gentle and they might, their communication skills might be amazing, they might be the
perfect person.
Policy stakeholder 2
The different standpoints presented regarding responsibility for disclosure are likely to give rise to
confusion among health-care team members when presented with an adverse event.
Apology appeared to be critical to a good disclosure. Patients expressed an understanding and acceptance
that mistakes will be made but were unanimous in their expectation of an authentic and timely apology.
In situations where individuals had fought for insights into health-care incidents, the lack of any genuine
and sensitive apology was often highlighted as particularly distressing.
‘All these meetings,’ he said [Chief Executive], ‘and you’ve never had an apology’, but he said, ‘if
that’s what you want I’ll go over and write you a letter of apology now’. I thought just go you
condescending, patronising man.
Patient 2
Never had a proper apology, a genuine apology . . . given a sort of a one-paragraph apology from the
legal authorities . . . signed by the chief executive but it was clearly dictated by a solicitor, and it was
the minimal possible grouping of words that would technically satisfy the NHS’s requirement that
apologies are given for accidents, but it was meaningless.
Patient 3
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And the apology came after two and a half years . . . one two-sentenced paragraph and one
one-sentence paragraph, and it started off with the chief executive two and a half years down the line
said: ‘it has come to my attention that’, as if oh suddenly somebody’s just dropped this on my desk,
I didn’t know anything about it and, ‘the standard of care was not everything it should have been’,
and that’s life-changing disabilities, and ‘there have been some unfortunate side effects’. I mean that’s
how he actually phrased it!
Patient 3
Many other stakeholders suggested that an apology is a necessary and unquestionable aspect
of disclosure.
We really need to question how we’ve got to a situation where we’re even questioning whether we
should apologise or not. Why are health-care staff having conversations about whether it’s appropriate
to offer an apology ’cause it should be a no brainer.
Policy stakeholder 3
The expectation on anyone and everyone in the NHS should be, you apologise and you apologise early
on, irrespective of what your role is.
Policy stakeholder 2
If you’ve got someone who is man enough to say, ‘look this is what’s happened and we are very sorry,
it shouldn’t have done, we are taking steps to sort it out and so it doesn’t happen to anyone else, we
are willing to accept blame’, you will then get people who will say, ‘well all right, they made a mistake
and it is not good, it shouldn’t happen but it did. And we can move on, and we feel that our concerns
have been addressed properly’ . . . a simple ‘I am sorry’ works wonders . . . just tell them the truth,
they are not idiots.
Health professional 2
Despite this recognition, uncertainty over whether or not to apologise, when to apologise, who should
offer an apology and what this might include persists. A number of respondents discussed the variation in
apology depending on level of harm.
So the way that the ‘being open’ policy is structured is . . . you have a formal ‘being open’ discussion
with patients and carers when they suffer from moderate harm, severe harm or when a patient’s died
. . . if there’s minor harm, then you just leave it up to the health-care team and if there’s no harm,
then they can just make a decision about whether an apology is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
So, in some ways, one of the weaknesses with the policy as it’s written, is that we’ve linked the level
of apology to the level of patient harm.
Policy stakeholder 3
We also identified the reluctance of staff to reveal that something has gone wrong in the process of care
as inhibiting apology.
I don’t think often that members of staff do apologise, I think things are still covered up to a degree.
Health professional 2
Organisational incident reporting systems were described as a barrier to giving a timely apology, as the
reporting process and subsequent investigation (where relevant) was perceived to inhibit open discussion
of events with patients and carers. Having to wait until information was gathered and documentation
completed before issuing an apology was seen by some respondents as creating unnecessary delay.
Incorporating apology into the uncertainty of the situation following an error is supported by some, and
the need to apologise on different levels at different times in a process was stressed.
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The internal bureaucracy that we’ve created around incidents and incident reporting, and claims and
complaints, and time frames to respond to these things, acts as a barrier . . . it just creates a level of
bureaucracy that can sometimes get in the way of a prompt apology.
Policy stakeholder 2
What I think needs to be clear is what you’re saying sorry for is the outcome and I don’t think that’s
clear, so you’re saying, I’m sorry this has happened, this is awful, I’m really sorry this person’s died, we
don’t know what happened but we’re going to find out.
Manager 3
Linked to the earlier issue of more general transparency in health-care consultations, guidance on
apologies was seen to miss the point if saved only for moderate and serious harm.
I think what is wrong with the ‘being open’ policy . . . the expectations should be on health-care
staff to apologise even for minor things and the policy as it currently is written is that there’s no
requirement to offer an apology or it’s left down to fight the local jurisdiction as a team . . . if there
was no harm. But, if you can actually instil a culture where, even if someone’s delayed in outpatients,
someone offers them an apology and that’s not an incident, that’s just an efficiency issue. And, if
people get into that habit of good customer service, then maybe it’ll be more ingrained in NHS staff to
apologise irrespective of the severity of outcome. And it’ll make apology exercising more pervasive
per say.
Policy stakeholder 3
Organisational, professional and policy support (what can be done to
promote open disclosure?)
Policy is able to provide guidance to support the disclosure of adverse events to patients. However, rigid
recipes for what to say and do will inevitably be limited and can lead to problems if they are not used in
combination with discretion and judgement. Employing guidance for the disclosure of adverse events
requires a number of sophisticated moral and value judgements which are contextual, usually unique and
may or may not lead to a desired behaviour. Individuals are required to recognise a problem and also the
individual components that make a particular issue a problem in that situation. As well as making their
own judgements, they may be required to support junior colleagues to make judgements, individuals who
may not have the experience or confidence to do so. Guidance conflates moral concepts with behaviours,
and thus inevitably runs the risk of not being consistent in its outcomes. Therefore, the problem is not that
individuals behave badly, but that the guidance fails to address the conflicting but multiple defensible
values at play.
Organisational culture and managerial leadership can act as a facilitator of or a barrier to open disclosure
and good disclosure practice. A reluctance to be open and honest about mistakes made in care can be
due to fears of the repercussions for the health professional(s) involved. This may even extend to
deliberately concealing mistakes in an attempt to protect their job or reputation.
[We] had to dismiss a number of staff who have made medicine errors . . . not . . . as a result of the
medicine error, it’s been as a result of them trying to cover up and hide the fact and the potential
harm that could have come to the patient because they’ve either hidden it or falsified documentation
to try and hide it.
Manager 5
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Sometimes there’s a culture of well if I admit I am wrong . . . my employer would sack me because
I’ve been open and honest and if I don’t say anything they can’t sack me . . . if you are there in a
situation where you know that something is not right and you daren’t say anything because you are
frightened of what might happen to you, you won’t say it, it’s your job. And I think that goes with
colleagues as well, you may have a colleague who is not performing well but you don’t always say
something because you don’t want to upset them.
Health professional 2
There may be numerous reasons for a health professional’s decision to conceal either their error or that of
a colleague, but the most feared repercussions were of damaging professional standing or of disciplinary
action. Current organisational support systems to support health professionals dealing with the experience
of making an error may be inadequate.
There’s a sort of culture of disclosing mistakes in most trusts but where I think things probably
fall down if you look at the most extreme cases is in terms of support for doctors and other
health-care professionals.
Professional organisation 4
I don’t think we do talk very openly about these things at the moment and the levels of support are
poor . . . I think at the moment the feeling is just go to an occupational health service but doctors
don’t do that, just don’t do it . . . I think you need better support services for doctors because a lot
hangs in our decisions, both in terms of consequences for patients and use of resources . . . I think
there’s certainly benefits for the health service in providing better support and certainly a duty of
candour without appropriate support would be, I don’t think would be useful or productive.
Professional organisation 6
The big gap is how we support staff. I think we’re really not good at that and I think we think they’re
more robust than they are over these things because they don’t show it outwardly, they go away
and feel it deeply. I think we don’t know the toll it takes on staff until it is too late.
Policy stakeholder 2
Health professionals commonly described the feeling that they experienced when realising they had made
an error and the concerns this raised for them as an individual. Failure to manage these concerns may
present a greater likelihood of either non-disclosure or a poor disclosure of the incident to the patient
and/or carer. An individual who is struggling to manage his or her own anxiety is unlikely to provide the
support required by patients and families in the event of a health-care incident.
Where I think doctors get very worried . . . is about the prospect that is then going to lead to litigation,
a referral to the GMC . . . if you then say to a patient I am sorry, I blew it, I should have seen that sign,
I should have picked this up earlier. If by apologising and saying . . . that’s a lesson I must learn and if
you think then those words are going to be quoted in a GMC hearing . . . then you are much less
likely to say I am sorry I blew it, you are much more likely to say I am really sorry about what
happened to your husband, it is really tragic what happened but actually I did everything I could and
you . . . take a defensive pose.
Professional organisation 7
I think there’s still a fear of the action that might be taken against you, but I think people are much
more aware of, and responsible really about the failure to disclose a mistake that they’ve made . . .
there’s still a concern I guess for everyone that there will be a whole weight off something coming
on them.
Health professional 11
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Furthermore, respondents identified links between reluctance to discuss mistakes and the inhibition of an
open culture leading to reduced likelihood of learning from events.
I think as well, it’s [openness] important because medicine has not always been great at learning from
its mistakes. And partly that’s been because there has been a culture of concealing them.
Professional organisation 2
[Not] being open with patients or families is, on the one hand, fairly terrible dereliction of duty to
another human being, and a dereliction of ethical and moral duties. But it’s also perpetuating a
culture where people go into denial – where people refuse to accept that there’s been error, or when
there has been error, fail to investigate the root causes and any lessons that there might be to help
prevent reoccurrence.
Patient organisation 1
I imagine if you’re a unit that works on total honesty, total disclosure you’ll probably find the quality
of care in that unit is far better because it is just symptomatic of openness which can only be good.
Professional organisation 4
Staff often seem to be very doubtful about whether they should actually tell people about what has
happened. So I would say the more scared staff are about what the consequences might be for them,
the more chances are that they’re unlikely to tell the person something has happened.
Patient organisation 2
The need to develop a culture of improvement and transparency with relation to error and unintended
harm was clearly articulated by the majority of respondents. The importance of incentivising the desired
behaviours is crucial to success. When staff or patients are concerned or suspect error the organisation
needs to be receptive and welcome reports. This would be echoed in current patient safety thinking which
emphasises feedback and learning, but existing systems, particularly those used to capture patient
feedback, need to be improved.
There first of all on the whole needs to be a no-blame culture which is often misunderstood, it doesn’t
mean nobody’s ever held to account because there are negligent acts but when there’s a genuine
error, that well you know was in good faith as it were, then I think first of all not to take appropriate
disciplinary action and then to provide the sort of counselling and support.
Policy stakeholder 4
And it’s about placing responsibility on organisations to ensure that staff aren’t unfairly dealt with if
they have unintentionally been involved in mistakes which have led to harm. Or unfairly dealt with if
they’ve been open about incidents with patients and families where the organisation is worried about
the consequence for itself. A lot of this is about raising awareness, about facilitating a change in
culture, about showing understanding and support for people.
Professional organisation 5
It was also noted by some that patients should be given access to information regarding the incident
report, and be included in its dissemination and learning.
I think we could be much more transparent not just about reporting the incident but also reporting
what subsequently happened and how people have been allowed to learn really.
Policy stakeholder 5
Creating an open environment which facilitates staff to feel confident about being honest with patients
and colleagues after making a mistake, and able to handle uncertainties associated with adverse events,
was recognised as a key prerequisite to facilitating open disclosure.
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There was little evidence of any training for staff in disclosing events, with many admitting that they did
not know such training was even available.
I’ve never, me personally, I’ve never received training along those lines.
Health professional 6
I haven’t had any personal training. Certainly, the trust offers a sort of day if you like around breaking
bad news, however, I think that tends to be more related to breaking, you know, cancers and
diagnoses type thing, rather than adverse events that happened.
Health professional 12
No there isn’t any training, the only training is life experience, nursing experience and, as you
go along.
Health professional 3
However, training was highlighted, described as being necessary to improve both the culture and the
practice of open disclosure. There was demand for training to be administered locally and internally by
trusts, and to be inclusive, involving clinical and managerial staff at all levels.
They’ve got to have training and to understand what the policy means to them at their level, and
what they should be dealing with at their level, and what they should be escalating to more senior
people to come in and support them . . . handling a patient’s negative impression of something at an
early point is so important.
Professional organisation 8
Different people expressed different opinions as to the best way to implement training to support open
disclosure. A bottom-up approach, where training takes place on the ‘shop floor’ and juniors learn by
example from their seniors, led by clinicians, was contrasted with a more top-down approach. Few made a
case for continuous training integrated into basic training and reiterated as part of ongoing development,
including individuals from across the organisation to ensure a uniform and coherent message in terms
of practice.
To be honest, it’s people who’ve led by example. So, consultants who’ve shown that actually they’re
open and honest and they’re still practising, they haven’t been struck off . . . it’s partly leadership by
example and I mean I was, I did have particularly good bosses for a lot of the time I was training, so I
did pick up some particularly good habits and I try to pass them on to my juniors. And juniors pass
through lots of consultants, so if they pick up good things off each consultant, they should pick up a
lot of good things and that should help disseminate good practice.
Health professional 7
It all boils down to see one, do one, teach one, which the educationalists say that but actually I think
that worked quite well for doctors for a few hundred years. You watch people who are good at things
and you think, ‘that went well, I might do that myself’.
Health professional 4
I think the policy needs to be clear, I think it needs to be. I think it’s up to senior people in an
organisation to train people within that organisation so that they understand at their level what is
expected to comply with that policy of openness.
Health professional 12
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What might be useful is in formulating effective training programmes for junior medics, junior nurses,
medical students, that sort of thing. I should think a lot of that sort of stuff’s been hijacked by
non-clinicians and doesn’t reflect the reality of the situation often and there are some people that
are very good at it.
Health professional 4
I think if we are going to talk about training you’d need to talk about it at undergraduate level so it
would need, in my personal opinion it needs to be written in at the bottom end of medicine not at
the top end.
Professional organisation 5
Doctors should ideally get it just through their training . . . inductions and so on are the ideal place to
introduce how to report a problem and just encourage doctors that that’s something that they can do
without fear and all the rest of it.
Health professional 7
If you are really going to get into the culture you’ve got to do it at undergraduate level, you’ve got to
do it to medical students who then grow up with those ideas and it’s the same as any other education
in life, if you take small children you can educate them much more freely than everyday teenagers
because they will mop the knowledge up more easily. And I think that is true of undergraduate and
postgraduate medicine as well, I think undergraduates will take it on board and accept it as part of
the culture . . . so I think that is where it needs to be pitched at.
Professional organisation 5
Conception of formal training appeared isolated, specific to professional groups and stand-alone. We
suggest that this is likely to perpetuate the professional tensions between groups already evident in the
literature. Methods involving video filming practice in real-time and inviting clinicians to feedback on their
own performance, discussion of complex events in multiprofessional groups, and reflection on the
knowledge and questions that patients and families have about their care and about unexpected
outcomes and clinical incidents, address the considered exploration of the evident tensions in patient
safety events. Such methods could be used to underpin specific training in relation to disclosure
conversations and encourage reflexive practice.
The wider concept of a statutory duty of candour was multiply described and has been a point of debate
throughout the life of the project. This was raised as a broader contextual factor that might influence
decisions around disclosure. Most policy-makers, patients and families expressed unremitting support for a
statutory duty. In contrast, most health professionals and managers expressed reservations, although there
were some exceptions to this. Those in favour of a legal duty of candour argued that it would be the most
effective way of initiating culture change around open disclosure.
Passing a law doesn’t change the culture, but the creation of that law has helped create a change in
culture, a change in attitudes. It’s a demonstration that society is no longer prepared to accept that
behaviour. Similarly, with using seat belts or drink-driving, it wasn’t the passing of the actual
legislation that led to people changing their behaviour. It was cultural change underpinned by society
making that strong, unequivocal statement this is no longer acceptable in this society.
Professional organisation 1
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I would like to see a legal underpinning, I think it’s very, very difficult to have it as a voluntary
thing . . . it would be hard to police but all professional practice is hard to police and I just think a lot
of it would be dealt with at the procedural level so if you’re receiving an incident report to a risk
management system in the hospital which is what happens at the moment then part of the
procedure would be, you know, has the conversation taken place with the relatives or the patient if
they’ve survived.
Policy stakeholder 4
We see it [substandard care] all the time and I hate it. And you just think, oh, if that’d been my
mother, I’d be distraught, so I don’t think you should, it should be legal.
Manager 7
You’re relying on people’s personal integrity, I don’t think that’s enough, I just don’t think it’s enough.
Patient 3
It’s just saying look if you screw up you’ve got to be honest and is it really that harmful to put that
into law?
Manager 3
I believe and my organisation believes that all of this also needs to be underpinned with a completely
unequivocal understanding that these things are requirements. That at the end of the day they’re not
optional . . . I believe there’s a lot of confusion around on the part of health professionals, managers
and institutions about whether it’s really absolutely required upon them to be fully open and honest.
Professional organisation 1
The NHS is a public service and we have a duty to be honest. So I think if there are people out there
that aren’t honest, it should be made a statutory requirement.
Manager 12
There were acknowledged tensions and limitations highlighted in relation to the ongoing lack of clarity
that would remain in terms of defining an incident.
[It] would help to move everything towards disclosure when it should be disclosed, but it isn’t
obviously going to be able to deal with some of those areas of uncertainty.
Policy stakeholder 4
The alignment of professional and regulatory drivers requires professional directives and engagement of
high-profile physician leaders; professional incentives in the form of revalidation, indemnity and
professional development will need to be linked to patient-centred outcomes to align values in the
direction of openness.
If I do something when I’m on my own and nobody else is aware of it, how is that going to be legally
enforceable? I think that’s the difficulty of it and you know when these things are legally enforceable,
if you don’t do it are you going to get a policeman knocking on your office door and saying, ‘you’re
under arrest for not telling this person about X, Y and Z’? I think it makes the whole process more
likely to go underground, rather than less. I think people would be less inclined to engage with it, if
there was a legal status to it, than not.
Health professional 6
It’d be almost impossible to enforce and really challenging because how you do it is as important as
doing it. And I think forcing people to be open and everyone doing it really, really badly will actually
cause more harm than good.
Manager 2
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I think we should work towards that being a kind of professional value and responsibility rather than
something that is enshrined in some sort of legislative framework because I think it is too difficult to
put in there. And I think every circumstance needs individual interpretation on what the best thing to
do . . . my concern is that kind of legal, making it a legal duty would lead to inappropriate responses
sometimes for patients.
Health professional 10
The identified need for opportunities for the careful exploration of held and multiple values which may
conflict were apparent in our data. For any identified situation there is a need for a forum where
individuals can discuss interpretations and reason through situations in a supported way, rather than
over-reliance on a prescribed recipe outlined in guidance. This may promote a more reflexive approach
which is likely to be critical to underpinning attempts to enhance safety and suggested methods for
achieving both a more open culture but also more skilful disclosure.
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Chapter 4 Discussion
This project set out to critically evaluate and extend both the evidence base and practice in relation tothe implementation of a policy of open disclosure of adverse events to patients within the UK. The
findings have been presented and the implications of both reviews and the primary research will be
summarised here in relation to our original purpose highlighted below. The project set out to:
l identify current areas where evidence and knowledge remain sparse
l supplement the current guidance on implementing open disclosure
l inform training and support for organisations and individuals in this area
l identify continuing barriers to the implementation of open disclosure
l identify well-developed models for open disclosure
and:
l develop a series of short and pragmatic guidelines for NHS trust managers to facilitate the
implementation and evaluation of open disclosure initiatives.
The following discussion will situate the findings from the reviews and the qualitative work within our
research aim. We have been able to identify current areas where evidence and knowledge remain sparse
and within identified limits we are able to supplement the current guidance on implementing open
disclosure. The supplementation of the guidance is reviewed in the context of findings from the work
conducted within the context of this report. Similarly, we have been able to identify issues and evidence
which can inform training and support for organisations and individuals in open disclosure practice.
The gaps observed in the literature in relation to open disclosure of adverse events to some extent mirror
observations which have been made in relation to patient safety research in a broader sense. Although
patient safety research has made progress since To Err is Human16 and evidence of success is apparent, this
largely falls in quite specific clinical areas such as decreasing catheter-related infections227 or surgical
checklists.228 Shekelle et al.,229 in their appraisal of patient safety science, have suggested that a view that
patient safety interventions have improved outcomes for patients is not entirely convincing based on a
number of other reports (e.g. Landrigan et al.230). Their view that the science behind patient safety
improvement is still developing and maturing holds true for the related area of disclosure of adverse
events. Shekelle et al. have made four key recommendations for improving evaluation of safety initiatives:
describing the theory, describing the practice in detail, detailing the implementation process and assessing
the outcomes including unintended effects. They also stress the importance of attention to context when
making conclusions about successful implementation.229 The literature reviews that we have produced
have emphasised the gaps that still exist in relation to these recommendations when considering open
disclosure. Although the reviews have highlighted the lack of conventional empirical studies as a means of
evaluation, they have located a body of useful opinion which raises a number of issues and provides useful
illustrations. However, the area is undertheorised.
The development of theory is perhaps particularly important in relation to the design and evaluation of
efforts to improve communication with patients and families about safety incidents that have (or may
have) affected their care. The significance of the multiplicity of value considerations at play in these
situations needs to be taken seriously, and considerations of context will be both particularly difficult and
particularly important for good judgement both in and of practice. In relation to the conceptualisation of
open disclosure, both the literature reviews and the interviews have highlighted the challenges in
conceptualising acts of disclosure as processes, because these cannot be prescribed in any simple or
linearly direct way from a broader principle of openness in health care or the moral concepts that lie
behind this.
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The act of disclosing (Being Open) and the broader issue of openness or transparency in health-care
systems more generally are often discussed interchangeably but conceptually are quite different. There is a
definitional problem around the area of Being Open which is highlighted in both the literature reviews and
the qualitative data. Open disclosure in relation to so-called ‘never events’ presents a picture of greater
agreement in that health services are morally obliged to communicate with patients and families in
a way that is somehow ‘open’. However, what exactly is required and why still seems to be open to
interpretation. Events that are catastrophic, life-changing for all concerned and considered avoidable are
the main focus of the Being Open guidance. However, the language of the Being Open guidance strays
into a much wider domain which speaks to a broader perspective on openness. The broader principle of
transparency within health care is highlighted in the content of the second Francis report6 and in the very
recent report by Berwick et al.,200 which address a broader concept of openness and duty of candour.
However, the lack of distinction between moral constructs and behaviour may cause confusion for those
attempting to implement the guidance in that the definitions provided within it allow for interpretation,
and it is this that appears to cause tensions within our data.
An alternative approach in addressing the disclosure of adverse events is to focus on the wider problem of
candour on a bigger scale and to change the emphasis from candour associated with discrete events to
candour associated with health care per se. This emerged as a theme in both the literature and in our
primary data. If health-care providers were generally more open with patients then openness in the
aftermath of error may be easier to achieve. However, there is a lack of exploration of the impact of such a
blanket promotion of general candour, and even if such a culture were promoted and existed, the reliance
on interpretation would still require good judgement in the promotion of moral behaviour. Organisations
need to be clear about the focus of attempts to change. It is relatively easy to capture whether or not
events are disclosed but more challenging to capture a change in broader concepts of openness. This
broader focus would increase patients’ confidence that all aspects of their care are being shared with
them, extending from everyday decision-making about their care to a more involved consent process. This
is not to say that care should be one long disclosure process but more to emphasise a culture shift which
sees candour incorporated into everyday conversations in relation to care, which may in itself help with the
process when things do go wrong.
There was little literature from the UK which allowed us to determine understanding, views and
interpretation of a policy of open disclosure of adverse events among UK stakeholders, but the qualitative
data from the wide variety of stakeholders we were able to access has provided a valuable starting point
on which to base future efforts to promote both disclosure of discrete events and a wider principle of
openness in care provision.
Many of our stakeholders were willing and able, in the context of anonymised individual interviews, to
articulate clear examples of situations where they had made errors or had been involved in situations
where errors needed to be or were disclosed. However, the reluctance of those who we approached to
engage in focus group discussions highlights the considerable challenge of embedding discussion of real
error and disclosure events into quality and safety improvement efforts at national and organisational level.
The persistent reluctance of individual clinicians and managers to engage in reflective and reflexive
processes around particular errors hampers attempts to unpick ways in which this is embedded and linked
to quality and safety reporting and management in practice. This is an important finding and reflects
the continued lack of confidence of individuals employed in health care that the professional and
organisational systems in which they work will be supportive in managing the context in which a particular
event has occurred.
The previous sections have presented the findings from the literature reviews and the primary research.
The following section will discuss how the synthesis of these findings might further inform an evidence
base and practice in relation to the implementation of a policy of open disclosure of adverse events to
patients within the UK. Although no formal mixed-methods synthesis was applied, we have summarised
the findings from both phases and presented them as a matrix (see Table 3) to allow simple comparisons
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of the evidence in relation to each of the 10 principles of Being Open. The matrix summarises areas of
convergence or divergence between the reviewed papers and our primary data, and identifies where gaps
in knowledge remain. This synthesis has been used to explore ways in which future research might further
inform and extend current practice and implementation of open disclosure and produce a series of short
and pragmatic guidelines for NHS trust managers to inform and facilitate the implementation and
evaluation of open disclosure initiatives.
During the course of the work reported here there has been a fast-paced change in the landscape of the
NHS. Significant challenges to the belief that the NHS presents a safe and high-quality service at point of
care have been raised. The recent Francis report6 has highlighted the urgent need to address transparency
and openness within the NHS, and the decision to implement a contractual duty of candour within health
care from April 2013 has been challenged by Francis, with a recommendation for a statutory duty of
candour. Although the debate appears to have moved from a contractual duty of candour to a statutory
duty, the implications of this for organisations and individuals remains unclear. The current attention to
openness within the NHS means that our examination of the existing evidence and thinking around open
disclosure of unanticipated outcomes in health is not only useful but timely.
A synthesis of the literature exploring open disclosure and primary data from stakeholder interviews reveal
that although knowledge around some of the concepts presented in the 10 principles of Being Open is
well established, little is known about the way in which other principles feature in practice or in the
perceptions of stakeholders.
This discussion will examine areas where literature exists and which are aligned with the issues raised by
respondents in our primary data collection, and raises novel concepts which are highlighted in the primary
data but where little literature exists. We also propose to look at the areas where little evidence was
identified from either phase and begin to situate our findings within a broader theoretical perspective of
safety and organisational change.
A summary of the evidence and brief synopsis of the synthesised findings is presented in Table 3.
An abundance of literature was identified in relation to four of the principles of the Being Open
guidance: acknowledgement, apology, professional support, and truthfulness, timeliness and clarity of
communication. These issues were also some of the most pertinent arising in stakeholder interviews. It was
apparent that these issues were perceived as critical to open disclosure by all stakeholders, but also as
problematic when not implemented effectively.
The acknowledgement of an adverse event demonstrates one such example of where there was a
large amount of literature and was widely discussed by respondents. There was an emphasis in the
literature review on the importance of health professionals and organisations acknowledging events
(e.g. Mazor et al.,20 Gallagher et al.,28 Wojcieszak et al.,48 Berlinger,50 Anon.,231 Brahams232), and this belief
was echoed by patients and many other stakeholders in interviews. Despite this, one of the most
commonly reported features of poor or non-disclosure emerging throughout this project was the lack of
consistent acknowledgement of adverse events (e.g. Pham et al.,58 White et al.,62 Kroll et al.,63 Martinez
and Lo,66 Garbutt et al.,68 Gallagher et al.,71 López et al.111). The primary reason cited for this in our
interview data seems to be the difficulty health professionals experience in defining an adverse event and
the particular circumstances in which disclosure is required. Most interview respondents raised the difficulty
of knowing which events should be disclosed; as the Being Open and GMC guidance both use patient
harm as the determinant for whether or not disclosure is needed,11,95 respondents who were familiar with
either defined the need for disclosure in these terms. The dissonance between patient or family and health
professional definitions of harm shown in the review69,233 may mean that the use of patient harm to define
what should be disclosed is problematic. Although one solution may be to define the types of events that
warrant disclosure, it was apparent from the range of search terms required to capture all of the relevant
literature (see Appendix 2) that numerous terms were used to describe adverse events in health care.
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TABLE 3 Summary of findings in relation to the 10 principles of Being Open
Being Open
principle Reviews Primary data/interviews
Synthesised
findings/conclusions
Acknowledgement Clear events for disclosure are
serious errors which lead to
harm that is obvious to the
patient. Difficulties with
definitions of what should be
disclosed persist. Terms are
inconsistent and patients,
professionals, organisations
and the legal profession do not
view or define patient safety
incidents uniformly. Harm is
usually conceptualised within a
biomedical model, discounting
patient reports of incidents
which are sometimes dismissed
or treated with discourtesy
Concern around defining an
incident particularly related to
minor/little or no events.
Borderline cases present
definitional difficulties. Widely
held understanding that only
events of moderate to severe
harm are disclosed. Opinion
divided over whether or not to
tell the patient as soon as
event becomes apparent or
wait until information is gained
from an investigation. Patients
stress disclosure should begin
immediately, irrespective of
missing information
Differences of opinion remain
about which kinds of incidents
should be mentioned to
patients and families. Further
work could investigate
conceptual variations between
clinicians and patients to
establish what is relevant to
patients. Beginning the process
of disclosure as soon as an
event is discovered may help
patients to feel more confident
and trusting in the process.
Being honest about uncertainty
and missing information seems
preferable to withholding
information which patients may
perceive as covering up
Truthfulness,
timeliness and
clarity of
communication
The disclosure gap persists. The
number of errors disclosed to
patients does not map to the
number of errors that occur.
Although the principle of
disclosure is largely supported
by most people, there are a
number of identified barriers
including fears around
litigation, being unfairly
punished, tarnished reputation
and loss of trust. Additionally,
clinicians report a need to
gatekeep information to
protect patients, despite
evidence suggesting that
patients wish for honest
disclosure of all incidents
Wide support for ideas of
truthfulness, timeliness and
clarity of communication being
important although evidence
suggests challenges associated
with translating principles into
practice. Uncertainty over how
to react when information is
missing or discovery of event
is delayed. Concern over how
to deal with complex
circumstances where causes
are unclear. Dilemma over who
should disclose, where and
how. Fear of legal action and
desire to self-preserve seemed
to be more active drivers for
clinicians’ openness than
concern for patient.
Gatekeeping approach endures
with clinicians deciding
whether or not it is in patient’s
best interest to disclose
There appears to be a need for
standardisation of the process
associated with disclosure to
ensure quality and consistency
in how being open is practised.
Perhaps patients should be
asked who they would like to
lead the disclosure process.
Organisations and individuals
may need to consider the use
of language carefully, avoid
jargon and technical
terminology and check
patients’ understanding of the
discussions. It would appear
that disclosure should begin as
soon as it becomes apparent
that something has gone
wrong and should be
considered as a process,
ongoing from its inception to
final closure and not regarded
as a single entity
Apology Apology has a strong presence
spanning ethical, legal and
medical literature. It appears to
be regarded as a fundamental
feature of disclosure. Widely
documented debates focus on
whether or not apology can be
used as evidence of fault, and
what constitutes an apology.
Less practical guidance
is available
Evidence of conflicting opinion
on apology. Some support
waiting until investigations
complete before apologising.
Others see delay as missing the
point that apology must be
prompt even if all that can be
said initially is ‘sorry for the
outcome’. Patients stated
apologies must be sincere and
timely to be authentic
Some feel that apologising for
any untoward event, like being
late for an appointment, should
be actively encouraged. It is
thought that by doing so,
saying sorry and empathising
with patients becomes
commonplace and part of the
culture. Clinicians need to be
clear and confident about
associations between apology
and liability
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TABLE 3 Summary of findings in relation to the 10 principles of Being Open (continued )
Being Open
principle Reviews Primary data/interviews
Synthesised
findings/conclusions
Recognising
patient and carer
expectations
There seemed to be a lack of
focus on the need to think
about patient expectations.
Patients’ actual expectations of
disclosure were only studied in
a small number of papers
Managers and professional
organisations highlighted the
need to consider patient and
carer expectations within
disclosure. Health professionals
did not conceptualise
disclosure as a dialogue, in
direct contrast to expressed
patient perspective
By considering disclosure as a
dialogue in which the patient is
an active participant, health
professionals might
acknowledge the need to
adjust the interaction to
respond to patients’
expectations. Policy material
could make explicit reference
to the role of the patient
within disclosure
Professional
support
Clear and consistent messages
from professional bodies,
NHSLA and Being Open
guidance. Openness should
be the norm and expressions
of regret and apologies are
not the same as admissions
of liability. The discussion
of apologies in a wider
international literature may be
confusing for the UK context.
Professionals receive little
training in disclosure but this is
identified as a key to any
successful implementation.
Patient reports identify
unskilled and clumsy
disclosures which often add
insult to injury. The evidence
for the effectiveness of current
training is weak
Evidence that openness is
considered part of duty of
care, adhering to guidance
from professional bodies.
Support to implement
professional guidance from
local trusts often reported as
lacking. Reluctance to be open
attributed to fears of negative
repercussions relating to
professional identity,
reputation and litigation.
Sparse evidence of training
despite most viewing it as
critical to adopting a culture of
openness. Suggested that
training should be inclusive
and delivered to both
clinicians and non-clinical
stakeholders and at all levels
Professional bodies could
facilitate dissemination of
guidance on being open to
optimise clinician engagement.
Most people believe that
support is critical to both
clinicians and patients/families
if a change in culture is to
succeed. This needs to take
place throughout any
disclosure process, inside and
outside of office hours.
Training may be best delivered
locally and internally through
trusts, although more evidence
for effectiveness of different
models is required. Training of
all staff who may be involved in
disclosure is required but
awareness of transparency
should exist throughout
the organisation
Risk management
and systems
improvement
The majority of literature is
focused towards a ‘no-blame’
culture although there is little
evidence that this will create
a climate of openness.
The wider effort to involve
patients in ensuring their own
safety seems to offer few
opportunities within the
disclosure context. Little
evidence to support statements
in support of disclosure in
relation to reducing litigation,
improving well-being for
patients and clinicians,
patient satisfaction. Areas of
policy development and
communication cited as key for
embedding a culture
of openness
Openness is seen as presenting
an opportunity for patients to
be involved in their care and
offer a unique perspective,
capturing different information
from health professionals.
Discussed by many as
minimising likelihood of
becoming involved in
complaints or legal
proceedings. Openness often
linked to risk management
processes. Such links highlight
reactive rather than proactive
link between openness and
quality and safety via these risk
management processes
Expert opinion stresses links
between openness about
adverse events and reduced
organisational risk. Openness
may have practical benefits,
enabling learning from
mistakes, improving systems
and finding solutions;
however, the mechanisms by
which this may occur are
under-researched. There is a
consistent emphasis on culture
change from the negative
associations with reporting
incidents to a focus on positive
outcomes of learning from
mistakes, and improving
practice and care
continued
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TABLE 3 Summary of findings in relation to the 10 principles of Being Open (continued )
Being Open
principle Reviews Primary data/interviews
Synthesised
findings/conclusions
Multidisciplinary
responsibility
The majority of literature
focuses on the role of doctors
but recognition that a number
of key professions may have
useful roles within disclosure
process. No clear consensus as
to who should disclose. Given
the complexity of disclosure
conversations there is a lack of
research about how team
members could or should
participate. The role of risk
managers is more widely
discussed in the US literature
and the role of risk managers
in the UK is less well defined in
relation to disclosure
conversations. Nurses are
identified as often feeling
excluded and vulnerable in
relation to disclosure
Evidence of constant dilemma
over who should disclose.
Often seen as responsibility of
senior clinician closest to
patient, particularly for serious
incidents. Lack of consensus
over role of junior staff and
whether or not to ‘burden’
them with responsibility of
disclosing. Question of how to
gain experience if responsibility
not shared. Nurses reported
limited opportunities to be
involved. Scarce evidence of
multidisciplinary disclosure. The
role of risk managers is clearer
at some trusts displaying
practice consistent with Being
Open guidance. Patients ask
for those directly involved to
disclose events
There remains a lack of
evidence to support what
might be considered best
practice with relation to
individual vs. team disclosures
and the role of risk
management in the UK.
Accounts suggest that junior
staff are often ‘protected’ from
being involved in disclosures
rather than using such
opportunities for learning and
modelling best practice.
Patients express a desire to
interact with staff involved in
error and reports often describe
staff who meet patients as
courageous and authentic. Lack
of evidence to underpin the
effect of this on patients or
health professionals remains
the case
Clinical
governance
The implementation of learning
and subsequent monitoring of
change is challenging in
relation to fostering a culture
of openness with patients.
Over-reliance on measurement
and reporting open disclosure
conversations may miss the
point. The focus on moderate
to severe harms may miss
opportunities for organisational
learning. The policy and patient
perspectives seem to indicate
disclosure within an ethical
framework rather than
focusing on governance and
risk management. Lack of
information about what a
‘good’ disclosure looks like,
and the reports of unskilled
and insincere disclosures,
supports the need to ensure a
focus on quality as well as
quantity is maintained
Statutory duty is supported by
policy-makers and patients/
families to initiate cultural
change. Contrasts with most
clinicians/managers who
oppose it as difficult to police
and promoting a negative
image of clinicians. There is a
suggestion from practice that
professionals may not give the
best care when they feel
policed rather than valued
The recent debate on duty of
candour as a contractual rather
than statutory duty was
contentious; however, the
recent Francis report and new
announcements with relation
to statutory duty of candour
may have implications for the
current Being Open guidance.
However, the implications of
what this statutory duty will
mean for organisations and
individual clinicians remains
unclear. Championing a
no-blame culture may be
challenging but there is an
enduring concern that genuine
mistakes should not be
punished to ensure that health
professionals are confident to
be open and feel supported by
their organisation
Over-reliance on measurement
and reporting of open
disclosure could reduce the
principle of openness to
numbers of disclosures, with a
focus on documentation of
disclosures which may lose
information on aspects that
represent a good-quality
disclosure
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The use of diverse terminology means that even when issuing guidance in relation to events that warrant
disclosure, organisations, health professionals and patients may not always attribute the same type of
event to each term.
The literature and the interviews relating to the topic of acknowledgement demonstrate the complexity of
developing appropriate strategies to ensure that open disclosure occurs; at a basic level, simply recognising
that an event has taken place and that disclosure is needed can be challenging. In the context of patient
safety and protecting patients from harm, decisions regarding events that warrant disclosure become
additionally complex as they appear to link the potential for patient harm and what may be the subjective
judgements of providers. An additionally complicating aspect seems to be that the further from obvious
error with apparent harm an event moves, the more opaque the decision seems to become. However,
when conceptualised in the context of care quality, the complexity relating to terminology may be
lessened. In providing high-quality care, health providers may need to consider whether or not a general
principle of adopting an open and ongoing dialogue with patients may contribute to improvements in
TABLE 3 Summary of findings in relation to the 10 principles of Being Open (continued )
Being Open
principle Reviews Primary data/interviews
Synthesised
findings/conclusions
Confidentiality There is little focus on issues of
confidentiality within the
literature. Discussions about
confidentiality seem to centre
more on internal rather than
outward, patient-facing
conversations. Some literature
discusses the right of an
organisation to protect an
individual staff member from
being exposed to patient or
family contact
Confidentiality of any party
involved in disclosure was not
identified as a concern among
most interviewees. Some
patient respondents identified
difficulty in accessing
information in relation to their
case. They were often told the
information was confidential
as a justification for not
sharing this
The links between the
principles underpinning
confidentiality in relation to
individuals or information are
underexplored. It is unclear
how confidentiality sits in
relation to disclosure of events
to patients. Sometimes patients
perceive the principle of
confidentiality as a barrier to
accessing information in
relation to an error or harm.
It is not possible to legislate
for confidentiality in patient
accounts of error once these
have been disclosed
Continuity of care It is well established that
patients and families express a
desire to have early and
complete information wherever
and whenever possible. There
is a small literature emphasising
the ongoing nature of
disclosure conversations in
relation to individual events
and the importance of having
one individual as a common
point for patients and families.
Current expert consensus
would appear to be that
continuity of care seems to
be the ability to convey a
supportive dialogue for those
affected, even when emotions
run high. Continuity does not
relate well to playing down
the incident, obscuring the
content of information or
being perceived as protecting
the medical system or
clinicians involved
Ongoing support and dialogue
described as critical to enable
patients and families/carers
to engage with health
professionals, ask questions
and be listened to, to promote
understanding for all parties
It seems unlikely that one
approach will provide perceived
continuity of care for all
affected individuals. It is likely
that there will be a need to be
flexible. Disclosure processes
require judgements to be made
responding to individuals’
needs. Current consensus
stresses the need to adopt an
empathic and transparent
process focused on the need of
the patient or family rather
than focusing on the risk to
the organisation
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patients’ perceptions of quality and commitment to it; this includes discussions about everything that
occurs in their care, including minor or more serious undesirable events.
Discussion of patient–provider communication featured prominently in the interview data and in the
literature around the ethics of disclosure and disclosure training. This evidence relates closely to the
principle of truthfulness, timeliness and clarity of communication. Data from both the reviews and
interviews consistently demonstrated that most stakeholders strongly support the principle of being
truthful with patients (e.g. Kohn et al.,16 NHSLA,22 Scheirton,41 Shapiro152). This consensus about broad
values sits alongside reports from practice in which interviewees describe staff withholding information
from patients. The discrepancy might be variously explained by failures to reflect the key value of
truthfulness appropriately in practice and/or by appropriate efforts to balance this value with other values
that suggest different ways of acting in particular circumstances.
We found it striking that a number of health professionals considered it their prerogative or role to
determine the type of information patients and carers needed to know, and that they used the aim of
protecting patients from harm as the primary reason for withholding information. They seemed to have
few reasons that might strengthen their imperative to act on considerations of truthfulness, but potential
to develop these can be found in the reasoning of some of their peers who gave accounts of what seemed
to be more open and truthful disclosures. The professionals who seemed to adopt more truthful practices
were not neglectful of considerations of harm, but also mentioned considerations of who owned the
information, and of patients’ rights to know. The language of rights and concepts of information
ownership that they used might not be ideal, but could be further explored and developed for use in
efforts to encourage a greater emphasis on truthfulness in relation to the discussion of safety incidents.
Similarly, the literature and patient accounts suggest that timely and clear communication are central to
good disclosure, and though this view was reflected in interview data, descriptions of the complexities that
prevented this happening were also described. More complex (but possibly common) scenarios in which
information was missing or the discovery of an event was delayed led to uncertainty regarding when
communication with the patient should take place and what this might include. There is a tension
between acknowledging promptly and presenting a delayed, but more complete, picture of the
implications and cause of errors. Early disclosure conversations may leave patients with uncertainty in
relation to their current condition and vulnerable to delayed and unclear communication from health
providers. Communication could be further hampered by dilemmas regarding who should disclose,
where and how.
One of the most widely discussed barriers to truthfulness was health professionals’ fears regarding
litigation. This was discussed in interviews and apparent in the literature. Concerns about litigation and
studies of the impact of disclosure on litigation commonly featured in the reviews, particularly those
originating from the USA (e.g. Gallagher et al.,67,71 Studdert et al.,79 Wu et al.193). In relation to these,
numerous articles presented disclosure as a strategy for health professionals to protect against litigation,
suggesting that openness with patients may prevent legal action (e.g. Boothman et al.,32,182 Kraman and
Hamm,52 Kachalia et al.208). However, a marked lack of any evidence to support this widely held belief was
apparent from the reviews. The stakeholder interviews suggested that though health professionals were
aware of the potential for litigation in relation to adverse events, this did not appear to be such a pervasive
fear in our UK sample. Health-care managers discussed the possibility of litigation more than front-line
staff, suggesting that this may be a more salient barrier for managers attempting to manage organisational
risk than for clinicians. However, where health professionals made reference to litigation, it was generally
to suggest that their fears had not been realised in their own experience, and that patients had not
pursued legal action as a result of disclosure. The literature review suggests that patients often litigate to
obtain information that they feel they have failed to access through other discussions and this was
reinforced by the patient respondents in our sample. However, litigation may be pursued as a legitimate
claim for loss of earnings or care costs even though individual patients and families are happy with
explanations of error and apologies.
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Professional support is identified as a principle of Being Open which can be conceptualised as support for
professionals in a number of ways. Support may be in the form of support from professional organisations,
the organisation that employs the health professional and managerial support. Additionally, support may
be from peers and may occur within and between professional groups. Support can be enacted in ways
that promote learning and inform how to disclose effectively, and as emotional and instrumental
interventions for health professionals to cope with the burden of clinical work and emotional responses to
adverse outcomes that may impact on their ability to disclose effectively. With regard to the former,
although training was developed to accompany the Being Open guidance and support its implementation,
both the review and interviews revealed a lack of awareness of its availability. No evaluation of any
training specifically associated with the UK Being Open guidance was identified in the reviews. Only
interviewees involved in developing or delivering the training, and senior leaders in one trust in which it
was used, were aware of its existence. Those who were aware of the training package cited cost as the
main barrier to wider uptake. Beyond the training that was explicitly developed in relation to the UK
guidance, there was a wider absence of any evaluation of training approaches to support disclosure,
although in the accounts of successful implementation of a disclosure policy, training was always featured
as key to success.150–152,154 Interview participants consistently articulated the view that professional training
is imperative to support and enhance the disclosure process. Such findings suggest that while professional
support and training are widely recognised as valuable, little is known about the most acceptable and
effective models on which to base such interventions. Further research may help to clarify the most
effective training models, the most appropriate outcomes on which to judge effectiveness and ways to
support implementation. Iedema234 suggested that the promotion of reflexivity may be critical to
underpinning attempts to enhance safety, and suggested methods for achieving this, such as video filming
real-time clinical practice and inviting clinicians to feedback on their own film, and reflection on the
knowledge and questions that patients and families have about their care and about unexpected
outcomes and clinical incidents. Such methods could be used to underpin specific training in relation to
disclosure conversations and encourage reflexive practice, enabling individuals and teams to reflect upon
and appraise their actions in light of a range of salient values.
With reference to broader support for health professionals, interviewees recognised the lack of support
available to staff to manage their experience of making an error or of being involved in an adverse event;
this is reflected in a growing body of literature about the distress experienced by health professionals in
these situations. This literature was not included in this review but has a growing evidence base.235 A small
number of papers referred to the belief that disclosure may help professionals involved in error to come to
terms with their own associated distress; however, while this may convey empathy in some situations this
may not always be the case, and we currently know little about how disclosure affects either health
professional or patient well-being. Interview respondents (particularly those representing professional
bodies) indicated that without the necessary support for health professionals, they may not be as willing to
disclose events or may do so with low levels of commitment or skill. This belief is reflected in the broader
literature (e.g. Levinson,69 Stroud et al.73). There is a well-established literature and understanding (shown
through our interview data) that broader professional support is important to enhance open disclosure, but
the availability of support appears to be inconsistent and, as with training, based more on the motivation
of well-intentioned institutions than evidence-based guidance. US-based accounts of providers who have
implemented such support are enthusiastic152 but no evaluation data seem to be available.
Apology was one of the most widely debated issues identified in the review, spanning the medical, ethical
and legal literature. Literature reporting patients’ beliefs indicated that a genuine and timely apology was
one of the most important aspects of effective disclosure.86 Policy material from the NHSLA also supported
the notion that health professionals should be free to give an apology without fear of the possible impact
it may have on a claim.22 Although the value of apology was widely discussed, health professionals and
managers described several dilemmas in deciding when to apologise, who should apologise and what this
should include. Additionally, there is a sense that although the message seems to be that apologies are
welcomed by patients, and often by professionals and their regulatory organisations, this may sometimes
conflict with interpretations of that message from those involved in risk management. This can be
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understood as reflecting different interpretations of the concept of apology and how it relates to a range
of values and consequences. For instance, the legal system in the USA in particular means that the caveats
placed on apology translate to nervousness around the timing and content of apology, which may appear
to convey insincerity and a lack of empathy if not handled sensitively by the individual or team making
the disclosure. The absence of pragmatic guidance around apology to support professionals to translate
the principle into practice was evident; however, as we have emphasised throughout this discussion, the
presence of guidance that may be interpreted as a recipe for what to say is unlikely to facilitate any
progress towards helping individuals in appraising their moral reasoning about apologies. In the UK, an
apology is clearly articulated as not being the same as an admission of fault. There seems to be a present
need, articulated in patient accounts, to distinguish between an ‘apology’ whereby a health-care provider
accepts responsibility for something that happened or did not happen and apologises for this, and the
situation where a provider expresses sympathy or regret at an outcome but fails to take responsibility for
harm. Confusing these two situations appears to have the potential to cause more harm than good when
a patient feels that failing to accept responsibility for an error fails to address the impact it has had.
Continuity of care and multidisciplinary team responsibility were primarily highlighted by our interview
respondents but had a less established literature. Continuity of care may relate to the implications of
disclosure for the ongoing treatment of the patient but was also conceptualised in relation to the ongoing
nature of a disclosure process. Often ‘good disclosures’ or training for disclosure models were represented
in the literature in terms of a single conversation between patient and provider. Interview data and a small
number of written accounts suggested that conceptualising disclosure as an ongoing dialogue between
patient and health-care team was of great importance for ensuring real transparency.31,85 Only a small
number of professional respondents recognised disclosure as a dialogue, suggesting that mismatched
expectations of the disclosure process between patient and provider may be an issue. Preparing health
professionals for a disclosure conversation may exacerbate the belief that disclosure occurs at a single point
in time; therefore, defining disclosure more explicitly as an ongoing process in any guidance, but also in
training and education, may be helpful.
A failure to recognise disclosure as a process over time may be part of a broader lack of recognition of
patient and carer expectations about disclosure. Patient and carer expectations of communication with
health professionals are referenced in broader health-care literature, particularly in relation to patient
involvement and shared decision-making. However, the literature that focused on open disclosure revealed
that patient and carer expectations of disclosure, and the ability of health professionals to recognise these,
received little attention. In contrast, interviewees who were health-care managers and representatives of
professional organisations consistently raised the need to consider and respond to patient and carer
expectations. More work may be needed to establish the most effective way to support health
professionals in determining patient expectations and representing these in disclosure dialogue, in order to
promote responses and reactions that meet the needs of patients or carers and allow them to contribute
to the disclosure discussion.
Interview data revealed a lack of consistent agreement regarding who is responsible for leading disclosure
communications with patients and carers, and this appeared to contribute to inconsistency and some
confusion for both clinicians and patients. Although Being Open identified multidisciplinary team
responsibility as one of the 10 principles, most respondents identified the most senior doctor in the team
as responsible for disclosure. Perceptions of the roles of other team members varied widely, particularly
in relation to nurses and junior team members. In keeping with the limited literature that we
found,99,100,168–170 nurses were not depicted as central to disclosure conversations by respondents, despite
the common belief that nurses are often closer to the patient than other team members. There was
divergence between interviewees regarding the degree of responsibility that should be held by junior team
members. Some felt that junior staff should be protected from challenging discussions with patients,
whereas others suggested that involvement in disclosure is critical to their learning and may also be helpful
for the patient if the junior team member was directly involved in the incident. Interestingly, although the
literature around disclosure training demonstrates that much of the training has been directed at junior
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medical staff, studies exploring the role of the wider multidisciplinary team in disclosures beyond the lead
doctor were limited.175 Such findings suggest that although multidisciplinary responsibility is identified as
a principle of Being Open, there is a lack of clarity about what role each team member should play and
how teams can work together to deliver more effective disclosures.
Reference was made to the majority of the principles in the Being Open guidance to at least some extent
in both the literature and interviews, but we noted an absence of evidence from existing literature or our
interviews that related explicitly to three of the principles: confidentiality, risk management and systems
improvement and clinical governance.
Confidentiality around disclosure was not raised by patients or other stakeholders as a primary concern
and this was reflected in the absence of literature that discussed this. Moreover, it was apparent from
interviews with patients and health professionals that concerns about breaking confidentiality may be used
by health-care providers as a reason for delaying or not revealing certain information to patients. Being
unable to discuss an error with those directly involved seemed to be a particular frustration for families for
whom this was an important part of the process of coming to terms with what had happened. In the
literature, limited work made reference to the level of confidentiality offered to the health professionals
involved in an incident, but it was not clear how confidentiality would be conceptualised in the context of
open disclosure beyond patient confidentiality that is part of day-to-day practice. Confidentiality regarding
serious adverse events was highlighted as challenging, and many respondents identified that in the case of
serious errors information was often widely discussed within the organisation beyond the immediate team
and risk management. Teams may wish to explore the motives around maintaining confidentiality in
relation to health-care staff in their reporting of error and harm to patients, and the value of this approach
in relation to both patient expectation and learning. Issues around confidentiality may be particularly
challenging in the area of mental health care where patients may not wish discussion about their care to
take place with family members or representatives, and this requires further exploration.
Implications of disclosure for risk management and systems improvement were discussed in the context of
clinical governance by some health-care managers, but these were not addressed as distinct issues.
Literature from the USA reports the role of risk managers in relation to incident disclosure to some extent,
but work originating from the UK does not explore the role of this group, which may be very different
from the US context. The explicit links between disclosure, risk management and clinical governance
remain underinvestigated. Establishing which outcomes might link these areas requires more examination.
Interview data linking disclosure with risk management, clinical governance or systems improvement were
limited to the reporting of risk incidents and action taken with staff as a result. The contribution of patient
perspectives was described by some interviewees as a source of information that might guide systems
improvement but is currently not exploited to its full potential. This strategy relates closely to a broader
literature on patient involvement,236 but respondents did not explicitly make this link. Risk management,
clinical governance and systems improvement may each be critical to open disclosure and informed by
open disclosure, but these principles are currently under-represented in the literature.
The recent debate on duty of candour as a contractual rather than statutory duty was contentious;
however, the recent Francis report6 may mean that this is reviewed and changed to a statutory
requirement. Since 1 April 2013 the new standard NHS contract has been used by all organisations
commissioning NHS services, with the exception of services commissioned under primary care contracts.
The contract requires all NHS and non-NHS providers of services to NHS patients to comply with the duty
of candour. Unlike professional ethical duty (e.g. Good Clinical Practice), the contractual duty of candour
only applies to incidents that result in moderate to severe harm or death. This will present considerable
challenges for both organisations and professional bodies in terms of clinical governance and monitoring.
The impact of contractual or statutory duty of candour is unknown but there seems to be a concern from
practitioners that an over-reliance on measurement and reporting of open disclosure could reduce the
principle of openness to numbers of disclosures, with a focus on documentation. This may result in the loss
of information regarding which criteria represent a good quality disclosure. The interviews suggest that the
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messages from the various sources and organisations that clinicians look to for support are interpreted
inconsistently and differently. In the UK, the requirement to be open about adverse events is currently
disseminated as guidance, although a contractual duty of candour may mean that the pace of change is
accelerated. Those in favour of statutory duty of candour feel that genuinely essential practice can only be
achieved through this route.201 NHSLA guidance emphasises openness, and the MDU and MPS have
publicly advocated candour. However, the evidence in the literature and the interviews in this study
demonstrates that despite this practice is often different, and more recently, A Promise to Learn200 has
called for a clearer supervisory and regulatory system, with clearer incentives which do not conflict, to
ensure that individuals and organisations feel confident in being transparent.
The challenge of defining appropriate outcomes for individual trusts to allow them to demonstrate both
quality and quantity of disclosure needs further clarification. The current emphasis is on championing a
no-blame culture, despite a lack of evidence that this improves safety in health care. The concept of just
blame is becoming increasingly discussed, but there is an enduring concern that genuine mistakes should
not be punished to ensure that health professionals are confident to be open and feel supported by their
organisation. This has been reinforced by Berwick et al.200 in their recent report into the NHS, which has
called for recognition that transparency is essential and that organisations, health professionals and
patients should expect and insist on it. This recommendation was balanced with a clear message that
blaming staff should end and that they should be trusted to do the right thing with adequate support
throughout their careers.
Although this report concentrated on open disclosure, we are aware that there are a number of theoretical
perspectives which might be brought to bear on any examination of the disclosure of adverse events. The
area itself is undertheorised but there appear to be several useful perspectives from related fields which
might be employed to progress thinking in this area and inform future research questions. Patient safety
more generally draws upon a theoretical body of work around systems and behavioural change in
health professionals and organisations. There is also a body of change management, transformational,
entrepreneurial and ethical leadership, and organisational change literature equally relevant to this report.
Although a detailed analysis of appropriate theoretical models is beyond the scope of this work, we are
aware of some approaches which appear to sit well with our current analysis of the available literature but
in particular with our interview findings.
In theory, the UK NHS is a collection of organisations that share, to a greater or lesser extent, a common
mission and values. It is referred to as a ‘national institution’ and described by both staff and patients in a
way that depicts a well-recognised brand. However, Checkland et al.237 suggest it is more accurate to
consider it as a heterogeneous and evolving organisation, which is becoming more diverse as it evolves in
response to the considerable changes which have occurred in recent years. This makes it a complex
adaptive system, and as such there are a number of theories through which we would be able to view the
attempts to introduce greater transparency around adverse events. The purpose of the complex adaptive
systems perspective is to draw attention to basic tenets or principles rather than provide hard and fast rules
about what works. The recommendation of this approach is that policy should avoid elaborate checklists
or specific instructions for change. The idea that health-care systems are complex adaptive systems has
been established for a number of years, and several influential papers from a number of authors in
mainstream medical journals are emphasising the usefulness of the complex adaptive systems lens in
understanding improvement and transformation in health care.238,239
The majority of literature on transformation in health care describes change on a relatively small scale,
often by one organisation or service.240 Generally it lacks both definition and an evidence base.241
Best and Holmes240 define large-scale transformation in health-care interventions as change which is aimed
at ‘system wide change affecting multiple organizations and care providers with the significant goal of
significant improvements in the efficiency of healthcare delivery, the quality of patient care, and
population-level patient outcomes’ (p. 422). Embedding a culture of openness in the NHS can, at least to
some extent, be considered a large-scale transformation. Therefore, this work may be usefully employed
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here. Lanham et al.242 has stressed the need to move away from top-down efforts and focus instead on
the natural creativity of health professionals to adapt and develop new ways of achieving quality – a
suggestion which was recently endorsed by Berwick et al.200 in their report on the NHS. However, this can
only be achieved when positive conditions allow a supportive work environment. Those working in health
care need to be able to make use of relationships and skills within the system, and it may be at this point
that complex adaptive systems theory is able to link into the systems theory. The focus of systems theory
on just blame may complement organisational theory in terms of supporting the development of a culture
where candour is able to become a more ingrained cultural norm in health care.
Work from a realist review of large system transformation (LST) in health care has identified a number of
findings which may be applied to the practice of disclosure but are, as yet, largely untested outside of
individual accounts.240 Our review highlights examples where the principles of LST, which makes use of the
engagement of individuals at all levels in leading change, have been applied. There are examples in
practice-based literature where this need has been recognised, and where there are identified individuals
leading on efforts to mobilise delivery of change in terms of disclosure.150–154 This would suggest that each
trust should have an individual lead for openness. However, engagement at the levels of policy, regulation
and indemnity bodies through to risk management and patients all need to be considered. The model of
more distributed responsibility may be useful and possibly more sustainable, but in the few reported
examples where organisations are perceived to have adopted more transparent ways of working, they
appear to have significant figureheads usually accompanied by a stakeholder, often from among relatives
who have been instrumental in helping to bring about change. Distributed leadership appears to focus on
practice and relationships in leadership as well as developing leadership through mentoring. Pedagogical
approaches which support and model good practice to promote leadership may be useful models with
effective feedback loops to further bolster learning and development. A number of recommendations for
LST change have been suggested by Best and Holmes240 and are discussed below in relation to
open disclosure.
Ensuring that it is valuable and safe for staff to engage in good disclosure practice is crucial to success. The
need to promote the reflection of important values and principles in practice, and to provide cultural and
interpretive support for those values, is likely to be important and has been highlighted in our data. When
staff or patients are concerned, or suspect error, the organisation needs to be receptive and welcome
reports. This would be echoed in current patient safety thinking which emphasises feedback and learning.
A Promise to Learn200 emphasises the need to engage both staff and patients in gathering information
about risks and harm and the involvement of both in establishing the important information that needs to
be collected. Additionally, it seems important to focus on how this might be achieved, as this will avoid
measures that could potentially influence behaviours in negative and unintended ways, and employ metrics
which capture things of importance to both clinicians and patients.
Clarification of concepts, and consistency and transparency of definition have also been highlighted as
important. There is a pervasive problem around definitions of error and harm which are defined solely by
one side (the provider) and are driven by definitions of events which are classed as moderate or severe. We
would suggest that the naming of harm, beyond so-called ‘never events’ (or those that the organisation
judges to have harmed the patient), appears to be open to interpretation and would benefit from such
examination and consistency. This lack of clarity was conspicuous in the accounts of stakeholders in our
data. Unless definitions are applied and seen to be used consistently, patients will be frustrated by such
inconsistencies and report this in their accounts of instances where they seek an apology. Incentivising
acting on feedback should include patient feedback but has to be sustained to avoid gaming.
Open disclosure could connect to the valued commitment to learn from previous safety problems to
prevent future errors and harms. Careful analysis of events is an important step but will not predict how
things might happen in the future. Analysis of events should be viewed as an opportunity for sensitive
discussion and planning of how to avoid the situation or, more realistically, how to handle a situation if it
happens again. Although the aspiration of the NHS may be zero harm, in the journey to this aspiration the
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usefulness of the approach of handling how to disclose error must not be forgotten. Broader literature
on quality and safety will need to address how the aspiration of zero harm can be made to sit more
comfortably with values and behaviour in relation to open disclosure where the very aspiration of a
service has been challenged by the occurrence of error. It is exactly this tension which was raised by our
stakeholders, and failure to address this as part of ongoing support and development is unlikely to result in
changes in action.
The importance of engaging physicians and their indemnity and professional bodies in LST change has
been identified. The issue of who makes decisions about disclosure and how it is done seem largely to fall
in the domain of doctors, although our data do support the active participation and in some cases
leadership of nursing colleagues. Transformative initiatives are often championed by nurses or non-clinical
mangers (who have less power) involved in the system and the literature identified the frustration
expressed by nurses in relation to their involvement in disclosure. Although doctors in the UK tend not to
operate as independent practitioners (though GPs and those in private practice may be an exception to
this), their collegial regulatory framework is geared towards detecting extreme examples of poor practice
or unethical behaviour to protect the profession rather than monitoring quality. That gives them a great
deal of power in responding to transformative events. Our interviews supported this and it was clear that
professional regulatory guidance had most influence on the moral perspective articulated in practice. The
influence of professional regulation was apparent during the duty of candour debate, with the medical
profession objecting to a legal duty of candour on the grounds that their professional regulatory
framework already meant they had a duty to be open with patients. Nurses and patient organisations, on
the other hand, were supportive of regulation around openness in care which went beyond a statutory
duty. As doctors often have a power of veto when other groups adopt a normative aspirational target, the
engagement of the medical profession in making this a normative aspiration seems essential and the
current literature and our interview data would suggest that this is currently equivocal.
The role of situated judgement in both the literature review and the interviews with stakeholders has been
discussed in all sections, and the importance of attention to context in both practice (for professionals) and
in evaluating practice (for those who would judge them) is clear. Context has emerged in the theoretical
literature as important and is discussed separately from effectiveness of interventions.243,244 In a systematic
review of interventions, context was highlighted as poorly described and reference to the general lack of
understanding that still exists in relation to context in patient safety practice interventions was made.243
Implications for research suggested by some patient safety researchers are that there needs to be clarity
about both theory and concepts in relation to any safety practice244 and this could equally apply to the
broader but related value of openness in health care. Defining the events to be disclosed without due care
and attention to the multiple values inherent in decisions about disclosure behaviour fails to address
contextual issues and thus the effectiveness of guidance such as Being Open.
Providing care for individual patients and organisation of care for populations are related but different
endeavours and this may lead to tensions, which has been highlighted by Shale245 in relation to the
concept of ethical leadership. Health-care professionals and health-care organisations aspire to provide the
best possible care for individuals but the reality of health care, especially in a system such as the NHS, is
that this is achieved through providing shared resources at a population level. Thus, there is an inherent
challenge in managing a shared resource in an ethical way which often differs from managing a resource
for an individual. Therefore, managing the reputation of an organisation to maintain the trust of the larger
population may conflict with disclosing information about an individual error.
Such dilemmas are apparent at all levels from the boardroom to the bedside and solutions present a
constant challenge. These observations were reflected in every interview and by the differing perspectives
represented in the review literature. Such work may also be useful in starting to unpick why moral values
do not automatically translate into ethical action.
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Shale245 also points out the importance of doing the right thing in the right way and this point is
particularly salient in disclosure conversations. Training, where it exists, focuses on raising awareness of the
moral and legal imperative, but occasionally also on how to have a challenging conversation. In both the
literature review and our interview findings, clinicians highlight their anxiety about having disclosure
conversations and patients highlight the damage that can be done by the right thing being done in the
wrong way. A doctor who wishes to tell a patient that an error in his or her care has occurred is ethically
correct, but blurted out in the wrong circumstances and in the wrong way, it would not be considered an
action which was necessarily morally strong. So the skill involved in doing the moral thing in the right way
is important. Finding the right place, having all the information and rehearsing this all underpin efforts to
train people to do this well, if the ethical course of action is to be carried out in a morally appropriate way.
Preferences of the family or patient need to be taken into account; therefore, the person disclosing should
have good knowledge of the individual being dealt with, and this has implications for who discloses. Moral
communication requires skills and these skills need to be practised and experienced. There are the real
skills of expressing the situation clearly, listening and tailoring information to suit the context. However,
the degree of emotional intelligence required in such situations is important in relation to managing
difficult conversations; being able to express empathy, and managing anger and distress are all important
in making the communication with the patient or family sensitive. Equally important are the skills enabling
the professional to self-manage his or her own emotional response, as feelings of defensiveness, distress,
shame and anger are often cited by professionals in relation to errors. Forgiveness may not be forthcoming
from the patient and family and dealing with this response when an individual and an organisation feel
they have acted with integrity can be hard to accept.
Interventions to train people in disclosure may well find the work around ethical leadership and emotional
intelligence useful as a starting point for their construction. Although emotional intelligence theory would
not state that managing emotions either in oneself or in others is easy, or that every individual can become
skilled in such conversations, it does support the notion that skills can be developed and that levels of
improvement can be measured. The simple ethical question of ‘is it the right thing to do?’ to disclose error
is easily answered. An ethical perspective and our data suggest that the answer is yes, but any exploration
of its enactment highlights the numerous challenges associated with action. It is both emotionally and
legally sensitive and takes considerable skill that is not captured well by current guidance, which is unlikely
to be able to address the complexity of decision-making underpinning disclosure of an adverse event,
whether serious or associated with less or no apparent harm.
There is an inherent sense of risk for organisations in relation to disclosure and the wider principle of
candour. In order to achieve an open culture they must be prepared to give up some control. Patient
safety initiatives are, for the most part, aimed at exerting as much control over processes as possible,
limiting the points where initiative or opinion come into play in order to prevent error, and checking the
process at as many identified points as possible to reduce the likelihood of mistakes. However, disclosure
requires a degree of resilience and the ability to manage uncertainty if organisations and individuals are to
deal with errors and disclosure effectively. The process linking the monitoring of quality and safety is
unlikely to be able to measure or quantify a sea change in openness which may be imperceptible even to
those using health-care services, and so cannot be conceptualised in the same way as the majority of
safety interventions. Disclosure of adverse events should be focused around informing future practice and
improving quality and safety but it has wider implications for the staff and patients involved. For these
reasons, sitting disclosure entirely within the current patient safety theoretical models is unlikely to fully
address its challenges, and theoretical models which are able to address the complexity of values within
health care and emotional intelligence in practice are also likely to be useful.
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Strengths and weaknesses of the work
The review was extensive. All identified potential sources published over a 22-year period were searched.
This inevitably produced a large volume of literature but should ensure that most relevant literature has
been appraised and included. Publications were not excluded on grounds of quality and peer-reviewed
publications sit alongside journalistic literature and guidance from professional bodies. This was necessary
to gain a wider sense of the movement in the attitudes as well as the evidence base within the field of
open disclosure, much of which has involved disparate, common-sense responses adopted by individual
organisations or in particular areas.
A large part of this literature originates in the USA and refers to US health systems, and for this reason
applicability in other countries may be limited. However, the range of interventions described from
different countries with different health-care systems illustrate that similar approaches are being adopted
within many systems. The practitioner–patient relationship, which is at the heart of all health organisations
and systems, appears to have key similarities worldwide; that is, a knowledge and status imbalance which
means that the ability of a patient to access information in relation to their care, and to fully contribute to
making an impact on safety-related behaviours within health care, depends upon a number of things. The
behaviour of patients is likely to be profoundly affected by the information their health-care professional
chooses to share with them and the extent to which the health-care system is prepared to engage in
dialogue after an error or adverse event. The review conducted here has illustrated how few empirical
findings exist in relation to open disclosure and how few models of good practice have been described or
tested, and indeed, how unclear the possible outcome measures that are applicable to such work are.
These factors make any recommendations challenging from the perspective of both generalisability and a
lack of any firm evidence base on which to base them.
There may be examples which have not been captured by the searches where implementation of
disclosure policy is being conducted consistently and linked to safety outcomes within organisations and is
being evaluated. Such accounts may not have been written up for dissemination.
The searches were conducted in 2011 and rerun at the end of 2012. Although we have not systematically
searched all reports published since this date, we have, through monitoring relevant publications,
attending conferences and maintaining contact with experts in the field through the project steering
group, closely observed the field for any new themes or ideas. We are not aware of any literature which
would change our overall conclusions.
The qualitative component of this project makes an original contribution to the field of patient safety
research by providing empirical data relating to stakeholders’ awareness and understanding of open
disclosure and their personal experiences and perceptions of both the principle of openness in relation to
disclosure of adverse incidents and the Being Open guidance, in the context of their own position in
relation to health care. A major strength of the study was the deliberate inclusion of a wide range of
participants (drawn from different stakeholder groups) in order to capture a broad range of views and
perspectives from people with varying disciplinary and professional characteristics as well as patients and
families who had been affected by health-care error.
In-depth interviews proved to be a highly effective way of exploring people’s knowledge, beliefs and
experiences in relation to open disclosure of adverse events and policy implementation, allowing the
interviewers to probe and clarify responses in order to produce a rich data set that was grounded in the
experiences of interviewees themselves. Individual interviews yielded highly detailed information on aspects
of process (e.g., on the nature of communication between patients and health-care professionals) which
contributed to identification of the ways in which particular beliefs or experiences were likely to
influence behaviour.
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Although the original protocol had planned to conduct focus groups, a number of challenges meant that
we were unable to achieve this. Research governance processes took longer than expected which, given
the 18 months available to conduct this study, meant that the time available to achieve these was short.
This, coupled with the reluctance of stakeholders to discuss this topic in groups, meant that the qualitative
data are based on interview data rather than a combination of methods. However, the breadth of the
interviews was extensive and it seems unlikely that focus groups would have resulted in a change in
our conclusions.
There are well-recognised limitations to the qualitative approach used in the study. One of the obvious
disadvantages is that it does not support the formulation of quantitative estimates of either the frequency
or distribution of particular views or experiences within a population. The current study was designed in
order to explore how knowledge, beliefs and experiences in relation to open disclosure of adverse events
and policy implementation might vary according to job role, professional discipline and distance from direct
patient care. It is feasible, therefore, that findings from the current study could be used to usefully inform
future survey work to investigate the significance of such contextual variables in a quantitative fashion.
Owing to the large number of data collected, and the complexity of that data, analysis of the study data is
currently primarily descriptive in nature, which imposes limitations on the generalisability of the study
findings at this point in time. Although the analysis that has been undertaken enables us to meet the study
objectives, and to comprehensively answer the research questions (as stated in the protocol), further
analyses are possible. These will be carried out prior to the production of papers for publication in order to
develop theoretical hypotheses and to refine an explanatory model. This should allow for inferential and
theoretical generalisation from the study findings.
The evidence-based guidance for managers to facilitate the implementation of open disclosure had been
planned as a consultation event. The lack of evidence currently available to support this activity meant that
the work is only able to support a short pragmatic set of suggestions which have emerged from the work
covered, and we remain somewhat tentative in suggesting these in light of our work as presented here.
What is apparent from this project is the need for a focused programme of work to determine an evidence
base for almost every aspect of open disclosure policy. Until this time, such guidance is advice based on
expert opinion but little more. There appears to be a fundamental problem with attempts to simplify and
standardise an area as complex as disclosure, which has been clearly articulated in work by several authors
in the reviews and in our stakeholder interviews, and has been further supported by extended discussions
in our synthesis and calls from both the Francis6 and Berwick200 reports which have been published as this
research was ongoing.
The majority of work in the literature and in primary research has engaged with secondary care services.
However, error occurs in all areas of both health and social care. Although we were able to interview some
primary care practitioners, they made up a small number within our sample and we acknowledge that the
generalisability of this work to other areas may be limited. This said, the principles of transparency in
care may encounter some differences of context but the issues raised by our predominantly secondary
care-focused sample of stakeholders have many themes which are likely to translate well to other settings.
Finally, we would highlight a limitation which has been articulated in other work reviewing LST.240 The
time frame in which to conduct this work was short (18 months). Although this was useful in providing
focus and discipline and keeping us aligned with the fast-paced change in policy and structure within the
NHS, it has posed a challenge in making less time for reflection on the complexity of disclosure values and
practice and the wider literature which might apply. Thus, our work and discussion has been limited by
what we have been able to achieve within this time frame. We intend to extend this work with further
analysis of our findings in the future.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
Health-care reforms are often difficult to enact and the changes that policy-makers envisage andaspire to may not translate into practice, or change may take longer because working practices are
institutionalised. This is apparent in a policy of open disclosure and is complicated by the levels at which
the policy needs to be delivered. The US VA classifies the strength of patient safety interventions based on
the probability that they will reduce risks; checklists are classed as weak interventions. Being Open is, in
fact, a clear set of guidance rather than a checklist per se, but short pieces of advice run the risk of being
used in such a way. It is intended to act as a simple reminder of what to do, but unless it is coupled with
attitude change and efforts to remove barriers to actually disclosing, it will continue to have limited impact.
This has been demonstrated by both the reviews of the literature and the interviews with stakeholders.
Both the literature reviews and participants’ accounts identified a range of benefits of a more open culture
as well as reasons for the reluctance within health-care institutions to fully implement policies of open
disclosure in an international context and, more specifically, in the context of the Being Open guidance.
Virtually all stakeholders discussed the need for cultural change when considering ways to make Being
Open become more ingrained in health-care practice. Respondents explicitly referred to how a change was
needed from persistent negative associations in relation to reporting incidents towards a focus on the
positive outcomes of learning from mistakes, and improving practice and care. Although there was a lack
of familiarity with the guidance itself beyond general principles, there was a widely held belief that poor
implementation may be due to a lack of appreciation of hypothesised benefits. Despite the enthusiasm for
a move to a culture of openness, issues around defining the events that should be disclosed persist, and
there is a pressing need to establish a robust evidence base in relation to open disclosure practice.
Health-care institutions and the individuals who work within them need to be receptive and responsive to
patient concerns about unanticipated outcomes in relation to their care, whether these are mistakes, errors
or simply a case of unmet expectations. This approach may allow patients to participate in the broader
agenda of contributing to improving quality and safety of care. The nature of the patient–professional
relationship would seem to be crucial in achieving a disclosure which supports information-giving to
patients and families and mitigates risk for the organisation, but this is currently unsupported by
established training or professional support.
A number of gaps in the evidence base persist and current practice is based mostly on expert consensus
rather than an existing evidence base. This needs to be addressed if culture change is to occur and
disclosure is to be performed consistently and with skill. At a fundamental level, there is a tension between
the pragmatic guidance issued by a number of professional bodies and organisations and the more
in-depth critiques of what being consistent and transparent in health care really means. The tension
between a more reflexive sociological approach and a systems failure paradigm has not been fully
resolved. There appears to be a protective agenda from the systems approach which focuses on learning
and the non-attribution of blame. However, the literature and respondent accounts highlight that
emotions are a very real part of disclosure for both patients and their families and the members of the
health-care teams involved. Further work needs to focus on how these two paradigms can be used to
inform disclosure of events to patients and support for patients and professionals, and to provide learning
for health-care systems effectively.
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It has been suggested that there are several common contextual factors which contribute to successful
implementation of safety practices: commitment from the top, dedicated staff and financial resource, an
open process to encourage buy-in and enthusiasm from end users, and sheer persistence.246 In the small
number of reports of institutions where authors report progress in open disclosure, these factors are all
apparent, and it would seem that efforts to improve open disclosure practice in the UK will require the
same. The impetus for change is currently strong, with influential reports and public opinion very much
behind increased openness in health care and more transparency in relation to learning from error, and we
would suggest that efforts towards change should ensure that this normative cultural change in the policy
and public spheres is captured and facilitated in practice. This will require visible support from influential
parties such as professional and indemnifying organisations and senior members of trust boards to facilitate
clinicians in having the confidence to negotiate complex decision-making in relation to disclosure practice,
and to promote skill-building throughout careers through formal support and insightful mentoring.
CONCLUSION
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Chapter 6 Future research
This work has highlighted that there are a number of areas which require further investigation.
At the level of individual health-care trusts we have little information about how the Being Open guidance
is being interpreted and implemented in local policy. Mapping this would allow the identification of any
potentially well-developed implementation which could be tested in other settings. More work is required
to better understand the facilitating and impeding factors that have the greatest influence on disclosure
and how these might vary by context (at the level of profession, trust, patient and clinician characteristics).
Exploration of the links between outcomes of interest for risk managers (and those concerned with clinical
governance) and open disclosure is needed to determine whether or not outcomes relating to safety can
be used as proxy measures for a successful disclosure process.
Very little is currently known about the influence of specific factors such as how the level of training
undertaken, speciality or professional environment might affect attitudes towards disclosure, or the effect
of particular training models in supporting or discouraging disclosure. Future research will need to
determine whether or not educational and institutional interventions actually reduce the influence of
impeding factors or enhance the influence of facilitating factors. This requires good-quality effectiveness
studies with robust controlled studies and appropriate outcomes that reflect both patient-centred
outcomes and clinician and organisational outcomes. Future studies should explore the mechanisms
through which open disclosure might address and reduce some of the psychological and health-related
consequences of error for patients, their families and the health-care providers involved.
Observational work in any context is challenging but in the context of disclosure conversations this may be
even more so. Practitioners often find the observation of practice challenging, and using observational
methods in relation to disclosure conversations would pose many difficulties for consent and methods. This
said, there seems to be a need for a number of interesting but methodologically challenging studies. Being
able to understand in more detail the impact of organisational culture and leadership styles on disclosure
practice at the hospital and departmental level, and the ways in which individuals interact during specific
disclosure conversations, seems essential for understanding and improving the status quo. These studies
are likely to employ complex mixed-methods approaches to capture observational, experiential and
quantitative outcomes in relation to disclosure practice. What is also clear is that any evidence base is
unlikely to be able to make hard and fast statements about what works. More likely are broad statements
about what tends to work, for whom and in what circumstances. Best and Holmes240 also suggest realist
evaluation as a tool to generate such statements to understand and explain different outcomes. The realist
review is still an emergent field but may be a useful way to take forward a more detailed examination of
contexts where openness is perceived to be established. Future research might examine which disclosure
styles patients perceive as competent, and assess their causal impacts on objective and relational disclosure
outcomes. The involvement of patients and the insights this perspective may bring to the prevention of
adverse events and promotion of service improvement should also be considered. The need to observe and
explore real-time disclosure as well as in anticipation of and after disclosure interactions is apparent.
Most of the work looking at disclosure takes place in secondary care and the majority of respondents we
engaged with were based in secondary care. There is almost no literature addressing other contexts more
specifically, either internationally or in the UK. We know little about some health-care contexts, such as
private health care, social care providers, general practice, learning disability or mental health settings as
five examples, but this is not an exhaustive list. These areas require focused exploration to determine the
transferability of findings from other, more general contexts.
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Chapter 7 Summary of evidence-based guidance
for managers to facilitate the implementation of open
disclosure in individual trusts
As part of the commissioning brief for this project we were asked to produce some short evidence-based pragmatic guidance which NHS managers may wish to consider in relation to developing and
implementing local policy for open disclosure. The lack of a robust evidence base in relation to the majority
of individual Being Open principles, and the arguments presented in this work for the problems associated
with the use of such guidance to improve or guide practice, means that the following suggestions are
based largely on expert opinion and consensus. In using them organisations should be mindful of their
extensive and inherent limitations. As such, they are tentative observations. These would need to be
revisited and revised as the evidence base in relation to specific principles develops.
Organisations may wish to consider assembling a multidisciplinary team to establish the working definitions
to which the policy will apply. As part of this they may wish to consider the following factors in team
composition. All levels of the organisation, from the board down, should be represented, including senior
and junior doctors and nurses, and service managers including clinical governance and risk management.
Consideration should be given to the inclusion of lay members to keep policy and practice focused on the
needs of patients and families who have experienced harm. This is supported by the findings from both
reviews and our interviews with stakeholders.
In considering the specific principles of the Being Open guidance, we suggest the following points for
consideration by trusts.
Acknowledgement Try to ensure that everyone in the organisation is working to the same definition of an
event that requires disclosure and that patients and families are also clear about the events that will be
disclosed. Explore and acknowledge the difficulties associated with definitions. Consider a small group
who can discuss any contentious events, perhaps with lay representation to enhance transparency.
Truthfulness, timeliness and clarity of communication Try to ensure that patients and families are given
information relating to events as soon as possible. Although investigations may be ongoing, convey this
uncertainty to families and keep them updated with facts as they emerge.
Apology Apologies are important to families. These should be sincere and issued as soon as any error or
mistake is established. Trusts may wish to provide regular updates and support to ensure that clinicians
and risk management are clear about both professional and legal obligations in relation to open disclosure.
Recognising patient and carer expectations If the expectations of the patients and carers are established
before, during and after treatment, this may help in discussing perceptions of harm and error when
outcomes are unexpected. This can be facilitated by ensuring that accurate information is given, that
patients and families understand possible outcomes and risks and that information is updated if and when
necessary to manage expectations.
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Professional support Trusts may wish to consider the availability of professional support for those involved
in disclosure. This may take the form of individuals who model good practice within the institution or
specific training available in open disclosure. There is little evidence for any particular model of training
over another, but given the observed complexity of decision-making in relation to disclosure and disclosure
work, opportunities to practise conversations and apply reflexive thinking alongside reflection on real
disclosure are likely to provide the most useful approaches. Consider multidisciplinary training and support.
Working alongside patient groups and advocates to ensure that such training is also focused on the needs
of patients is also likely to be important.
Risk management and systems improvement Patients may have useful insights into systems informed by a
unique perspective and as experts in their own care. Viewing the disclosure process as a conversation will
allow patients and families to add their views on factors which may have contributed to errors or harms.
Multidisciplinary responsibility Errors are usually systemic in nature, involving a number of team members.
There is no evidence to support any particular discipline as being more effective in disclosure. Trusts may
consider exploring the use of team disclosure and consulting with patients about the information they
require to tailor the best approach and the best team to be involved in the disclosure process.
Clinical governance Try to ensure that the focus of disclosures remains in the realm of quality. Counting
and recording disclosures is important but not at the expense of monitoring quality. A more reflective
approach to capturing performance of the organisation in relation to disclosure processes is likely to yield
more sophisticated insights into quality and help to inform future efforts to improve. Asking individuals
how the process met their needs and what could be improved, in the case of both individuals enacting
disclosures and families, may be useful.
Confidentiality Try to ensure that issues of confidentiality are not invoked to prevent patients from
accessing information or discussions which they need to understand error or harm. Being unable to discuss
an error with those directly involved can be a particular frustration for families, for whom this may be part
of the process of coming to terms with what has happened to them. Try to support clinicians to be able to
talk directly with patients and families.
Continuity of care The focus of open disclosure should be on the care of patients rather than on
mitigating organisational risk. Preserving continuity of care by respecting patient choice and consulting
with them about what their care preferences are moving forward after an adverse event are likely to
contribute to maintaining the patient–provider relationship in the best interests of the patient.
EVIDENCE-BASED GUIDANCE TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPEN DISCLOSURE
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Appendix 1 Sampling strategy for
qualitative interviews
Group Recruitment strategy
Recruitment for individual
interviews and/or
focus groups Sampling notes
Senior managers
(n= 10)
Participants recruited from
local trusts. Targeted written
explanations with an invitation
to be interviewed
Individual interviews only.
A focus group of these senior
figures likely to be impractical
Senior-level managers in
secondary and primary care
including chief executives,
medical directors and directors
of nursing and midwifery
NHS litigation
(n= 5)
Individual interviews only.
A focus group of these senior
figures likely to be impractical
Authority and key senior
figures in NHS litigation
(as identified by DR from
the team)
Professional bodies
(n= 10 maximum)
Targeted written explanations
with an invitation to be
interviewed. Start with board
members and key contacts
identified by the team. Senior
colleagues may suggest
someone to take part
Participants will be invited for
interview. The practicalities of
a focus group will be explored
and pursued as practical
BMA, GMC, the Royal
Colleges, RCN, RCM, NMC,
Royal College of Pharmacists
Patient groups
(maximum three
focus groups)
Disseminate invitations via the
patient groups and key
contacts within the groups.
Individuals will be asked to
take part in a focus group
A focus group will be explored
and pursued as practical with
AvMA, WHO and PA
Contacts via AvMA, National
Patient Champions, WHO,
AIMS, MRSA support groups
and other patient support
groups. Patients who have
been part of a disclosure and
those who have not
Maximum of three focus
groups
Health professionals
(n= 50 maximum)
Individual participants invited
via publicity within trusts
across the UK and through
key contacts within the trusts
approached. Focus groups
will take place in trusts
across Yorkshire
Participants will be invited for
individual interviews. Separate
focus groups will be set up in
more local trusts as this is a
more feasible approach
Ensure representation from
health professionals at all
levels and in all professions
including doctors, nurses,
midwives, pharmacists and
other allied health
professionals
Focus groups likely to consist
of one group of health
professionals. Once analysis
starts the team may consider a
more mixed group of it is
considered appropriate
Maximum of five focus groups
PALS
(one focus group)
Individual participants invited
via publicity within trusts
across the UK and through
key contacts within the
trusts approached
Individual interviews only.
A focus group of these people
is likely to be impractical
As broad a representation of
trusts as possible. Ensure a
mental health trust if at
all possible
continued
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Group Recruitment strategy
Recruitment for individual
interviews and/or
focus groups Sampling notes
Other
(n= 5 maximum)
Individuals who emerge as
significant players in the field
of open disclosure in the UK
who have not been previously
considered will be invited by
letter or, if appropriate, in an
opportunistic strategy. These
people may emerge in the
course of visits to other
participants or in the course of
meetings to disseminate the
project. They may also become
apparent from ongoing
monitoring of the project at
team meetings
Participants will be invited for
interview. If there is a
significant group who would
provide useful data in a focus
group setting, this will
be considered
Maximum of one focus group
if appropriate
AIMS, Association for Improvements in the Maternity Services; AvMA, Action Against Medical Accidents; MRSA, methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus; PA, Patients Association; PALS, Patient Advice and Liaison Service; RCM, Royal College of
Midwives; RCN, Royal College of Nursing; WHO, World Health Organization.
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Appendix 2 Search strategy
Health-related databases
MEDLINE and MEDLINE In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations
OvidSP, http://ovidsp.ovid.com/
1948 to November week 2, 2011.
Searched on 18 November 2011; 3222 records were retrieved.
1. Disclosure/ (9552)
2. Truth Disclosure/ (10,655)
3. disclos$.ti,ab. (45,475)
4. (nondisclos$ or undisclos$).ti,ab. (641)
5. (candour or candor or candid).ti,ab. (413)
6. duty of care.ti,ab. (489)
7. duty to advise.ti,ab. (8)
8. apolog$.ti,ab. (768)
9. sorry.ti,ab. (321)
10. openness.ti,ab. (2522)
11. being open.ti,ab. (277)
12. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 regret$).ti,ab. (123)
13. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 remorse).ti,ab. (15)
14. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 sympathy).ti,ab. (45)
15. or/1-14 (66,283)
16. Medical Errors/ (10,486)
17. Diagnostic Errors/ (27,982)
18. exp Medication Errors/ (9010)
19. Iatrogenic Disease/ (11,989)
20. Malpractice/ (24,338)
21. (adverse adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (82,145)
22. (safety adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (178)
23. (serious adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (173)
24. (sentinel adj2 event$).ti,ab. (564)
25. ((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (1729)
26. ((harm or harms or harmful) adj3 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (591)
27. (unexpected adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (1151)
28. (unintended adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (121)
29. (unintentional$ adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (67)
30. (unanticipated adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (156)
31. ((unexpected or unintended or unintentional$ or unanticipated) adj2 injur$).ti,ab. (1281)
32. (medical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (321)
33. (surgical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (703)
34. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 adverse).ti,
ab. (10,028)
35. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (harm or
harms or harmful)).ti,ab. (2763)
36. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (mistake$ or
error or errors)).ti,ab. (3712)
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37. ((professional$ or worker$ or dentist$ or nurs$ or doctor$ or physician$ or surgeon$ or surgical$ or
surger$ or pharmac$ or human or practitioner$ or psychiatrist$ or psychologist$ or anaesthe$ or
anesthe$ or GP) adj3 (mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (4085)
38. ((medical or diagnos$ or treatment$ or medication$ or healthcare or care or hospital$ or system$) adj3
(mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (17,663)
39. misdiagnosis.ti,ab. (6617)
40. (iatrogenic or iatrogenesis).ti,ab. (18,465)
41. (negligence or negligent).ti,ab. (3159)
42. malpractice.ti,ab. (7847)
43. litigat$.ti,ab. (4718)
44. (legal adj (action$ or proceeding$)).ti,ab. (857)
45. (lawsuit$ or law suit$).ti,ab. (2425)
46. near miss.ti,ab. (688)
47. near misses.ti,ab. (402)
48. err is human.ti,ab. (249)
49. things go wrong.ti,ab. (63)
50. or/16-49 (213,095)
51. 15 and 50 (3156)
52. open disclosure.ti,ab. (42)
53. ((communicat$ or discuss$ or convers$ or talk$ or explain$ or explanation$ or tell$ or told or
acknowledg$ or consult$ or inform$ or notif$) adj3 (patient$ or family or families or inpatient$ or
outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or carer$ or caregiver$ or user$) adj3 (adverse or
harm$ or error or errors or mistake$ or incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (301)
54. 51 or 52 or 53 (3423)
55. limit 54 to yr="1980 -Current" (3222)
Key
/= indexing term [medical subject heading (MeSH)]
exp= exploded MeSH
$= truncation
.ti,ab.= terms in either title or abstract fields
adj2= terms within two words of each other (any order)
EMBASE
OvidSP, http://ovidsp.ovid.com/
1980 to week 45, 2011.
Searched on 18 November 2011; 3655 records were retrieved.
1. *interpersonal communication/ (29,453)
2. disclos$.ti,ab. (50,225)
3. (nondisclos$ or undisclos$).ti,ab. (683)
4. (candour or candor or candid).ti,ab. (434)
5. duty of care.ti,ab. (573)
6. duty to advise.ti,ab. (8)
7. apolog$.ti,ab. (801)
8. sorry.ti,ab. (367)
9. openness.ti,ab. (2813)
10. being open.ti,ab. (317)
11. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 regret$).ti,ab. (129)
12. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 remorse).ti,ab. (12)
13. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 sympathy).ti,ab. (47)
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14. or/1-13 (83,329)
15. exp medical error/ (66,530)
16. exp *iatrogenic disease/ (124,806)
17. sentinel event/ (118)
18. malpractice/ (28,065)
19. negligence/ (2761)
20. lawsuit/ (7778)
21. (adverse adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (108,362)
22. (safety adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (216)
23. (serious adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (245)
24. (sentinel adj2 event$).ti,ab. (653)
25. ((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (2047)
26. ((harm or harms or harmful) adj3 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (714)
27. (unexpected adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (1400)
28. (unintended adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (132)
29. (unintentional$ adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (70)
30. (unanticipated adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (198)
31. ((unexpected or unintended or unintentional$ or unanticipated) adj2 injur$).ti,ab. (1330)
32. (medical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (342)
33. (surgical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (779)
34. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 adverse).ti,
ab. (13,061)
35. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (harm or
harms or harmful)).ti,ab. (3311)
36. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (mistake$ or
error or errors)).ti,ab. (4391)
37. ((professional$ or worker$ or dentist$ or nurs$ or doctor$ or physician$ or surgeon$ or surgical$ or
surger$ or pharmac$ or human or practitioner$ or psychiatrist$ or psychologist$ or anaesthe$ or
anesthe$ or GP) adj3 (mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (4883)
38. ((medical or diagnos$ or treatment$ or medication$ or healthcare or care or hospital$ or system$) adj3
(mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (19,843)
39. misdiagnosis.ti,ab. (7808)
40. (iatrogenic or iatrogenesis).ti,ab. (21,661)
41. (negligence or negligent).ti,ab. (3538)
42. malpractice.ti,ab. (8078)
43. litigat$.ti,ab. (5423)
44. (legal adj (action$ or proceeding$)).ti,ab. (962)
45. (lawsuit$ or law suit$).ti,ab. (2480)
46. near miss.ti,ab. (808)
47. near misses.ti,ab. (516)
48. err is human.ti,ab. (280)
49. things go wrong.ti,ab. (97)
50. or/15-49 (386,847)
51. 14 and 50 (3407)
52. open disclosure.ti,ab. (44)
53. ((communicat$ or discuss$ or convers$ or talk$ or explain$ or explanation$ or tell$ or told or
acknowledg$ or consult$ or inform$ or notif$) adj3 (patient$ or family or families or inpatient$ or
outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or carer$ or caregiver$ or user$) adj3 (adverse or harm
$ or error or errors or mistake$ or incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (400)
54. 51 or 52 or 53 (3776)
55. limit 54 to yr="1980 -Current" (3655)
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Key
/= indexing term (EMTREE heading)
*= focused EMTREE heading
exp= exploded EMTREE heading
$= truncation
.ti,ab.= terms in either title or abstract fields
adj2= terms within two words of each other (any order)
PsycINFO
OvidSP, http://ovidsp.ovid.com/
1806 to November week 3, 2011.
Searched on 18 November 2011; 697 records were retrieved.
1. interpersonal communication/ (12,219)
2. disclos$.ti,ab. (15,916)
3. (nondisclos$ or undisclos$).ti,ab. (388)
4. (candour or candor or candid).ti,ab. (732)
5. duty of care.ti,ab. (176)
6. duty to advise.ti,ab. (4)
7. apolog$.ti,ab. (1521)
8. sorry.ti,ab. (234)
9. openness.ti,ab. (6694)
10. being open.ti,ab. (197)
11. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 regret$).ti,ab. (120)
12. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 remorse).ti,ab. (50)
13. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 sympathy).ti,ab. (125)
14. or/1-13 (37,231)
15. Errors/ (6987)
16. Misdiagnosis/ (333)
17. professional liability/ (1723)
18. litigation/ (919)
19. (adverse adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (8032)
20. (safety adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (43)
21. (serious adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (97)
22. (sentinel adj2 event$).ti,ab. (53)
23. ((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (2099)
24. ((harm or harms or harmful) adj3 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (292)
25. (unexpected adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (531)
26. (unintended adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (90)
27. (unintentional$ adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (12)
28. (unanticipated adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (101)
29. ((unexpected or unintended or unintentional$ or unanticipated) adj2 injur$).ti,ab. (416)
30. (medical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (34)
31. (surgical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (6)
32. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3
adverse).ti,ab. (771)
33. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (harm or
harms or harmful)).ti,ab. (881)
34. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (mistake$ or
error or errors)).ti,ab. (767)
APPENDIX 2
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
120
35. ((professional$ or worker$ or dentist$ or nurs$ or doctor$ or physician$ or surgeon$ or surgical$ or
surger$ or pharmac$ or human or practitioner$ or psychiatrist$ or psychologist$ or anaesthe$ or
anesthe$ or GP) adj3 (mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (1063)
36. ((medical or diagnos$ or treatment$ or medication$ or healthcare or care or hospital$ or system$) adj3
(mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (2637)
37. misdiagnosis.ti,ab. (903)
38. (iatrogenic or iatrogenesis).ti,ab. (1173)
39. (negligence or negligent).ti,ab. (906)
40. malpractice.ti,ab. (1104)
41. litigat$.ti,ab. (2642)
42. (legal adj (action$ or proceeding$)).ti,ab. (649)
43. (lawsuit$ or law suit$).ti,ab. (807)
44. near miss.ti,ab. (147)
45. near misses.ti,ab. (114)
46. err is human.ti,ab. (45)
47. things go wrong.ti,ab. (56)
48. or/15-47 (31,213)
49. 14 and 48 (620)
50. open disclosure.ti,ab. (27)
51. ((communicat$ or discuss$ or convers$ or talk$ or explain$ or explanation$ or tell$ or told or
acknowledg$ or consult$ or inform$ or notif$) adj3 (patient$ or family or families or inpatient$ or
outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or carer$ or caregiver$ or user$) adj3 (adverse or
harm$ or error or errors or mistake$ or incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (92)
52. 49 or 50 or 51 (722)
53. limit 52 to yr="1980 -Current" (697)
Key
/= subject heading
$= truncation
.ti,ab.= terms in either title or abstract fields
adj2= terms within two words of each other (any order)
Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC)
OvidSP, http://ovidsp.ovid.com/
1979 to September 2011.
Searched on 18 November 2011; 236 records were retrieved.
1. "disclosure of information"/ (401)
2. "duty of care"/ (2)
3. openness/ (23)
4. disclos$.ti,ab. (947)
5. (nondisclos$ or undisclos$).ti,ab. (18)
6. (candour or candor or candid).ti,ab. (21)
7. duty of care.ti,ab. (127)
8. duty to advise.ti,ab. (1)
9. apolog$.ti,ab. (48)
10. sorry.ti,ab. (52)
11. openness.ti,ab. (391)
12. being open.ti,ab. (33)
13. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 regret$).ti,ab. (7)
14. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 remorse).ti,ab. (1)
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15. ((express$ or show$ or communicat$ or convey$) adj2 sympathy).ti,ab. (5)
16. or/1-15 (1803)
17. exp errors/ (910)
18. iatrogenic disease/ (39)
19. exp medical malpractice/ (1085)
20. clinical negligence/ (94)
21. legal proceedings/ (480)
22. litigation/ (351)
23. adverse events/ (420)
24. (adverse adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (1413)
25. (safety adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (113)
26. (serious adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (73)
27. (sentinel adj2 event$).ti,ab. (20)
28. ((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (326)
29. ((harm or harms or harmful) adj3 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (49)
30. (unexpected adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (23)
31. (unintended adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (16)
32. (unintentional$ adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (0)
33. (unanticipated adj2 (event$ or incident or incidents or outcome$)).ti,ab. (8)
34. ((critical or clinical) adj2 (incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (297)
35. ((unexpected or unintended or unintentional$ or unanticipated) adj2 injur$).ti,ab. (64)
36. (medical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (72)
37. (surgical adj (accident$ or injur$)).ti,ab. (5)
38. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 adverse).ti,
ab. (191)
39. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (harm or
harms or harmful)).ti,ab. (276)
40. ((patient$ or inpatient$ or outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or user$) adj3 (mistake$ or
error or errors)).ti,ab. (165)
41. ((professional$ or worker$ or dentist$ or nurs$ or doctor$ or physician$ or surgeon$ or surgical$ or
surger$ or pharmac$ or human or practitioner$ or psychiatrist$ or psychologist$ or anaesthe$ or
anesthe$ or GP) adj3 (mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (245)
42. ((medical or diagnos$ or treatment$ or medication$ or healthcare or care or hospital$ or system$) adj3
(mistake$ or error or errors)).ti,ab. (681)
43. misdiagnosis.ti,ab. (54)
44. (iatrogenic or iatrogenesis).ti,ab. (101)
45. (negligence or negligent).ti,ab. (587)
46. malpractice.ti,ab. (200)
47. litigat$.ti,ab. (566)
48. (legal adj (action$ or proceeding$)).ti,ab. (134)
49. (lawsuit$ or law suit$).ti,ab. (38)
50. near miss.ti,ab. (32)
51. near misses.ti,ab. (80)
52. err is human.ti,ab. (24)
53. things go wrong.ti,ab. (72)
54. or/17-53 (5580)
55. 16 and 54 (207)
56. open disclosure.ti,ab. (12)
57. ((communicat$ or discuss$ or convers$ or talk$ or explain$ or explanation$ or tell$ or told or
acknowledg$ or consult$ or inform$ or notif$) adj3 (patient$ or family or families or inpatient$ or
outpatient$ or consumer$ or citizen$ or public or carer$ or caregiver$ or user$) adj3 (adverse or
harm$ or error or errors or mistake$ or incident or incidents)).ti,ab. (38)
58. 55 or 56 or 57 (236)
59. limit 58 to yr="1980 -Current" (236)
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Key
/= subject heading
exp= exploded subject heading
$= truncation
.ti,ab.= terms in either title or abstract fields
adj2= terms within two words of each other (any order)
The Cochrane Library
Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
l Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR), Issue 11, November 2011
l Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE), Issue 4, October 2011
l Health Technology Assessment (HTA) Database, Issue 4, October 2011
l Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), Issue 4, October 2011.
The above four databases were searched on 22 November 2011, via The Cochrane Library.
Ninety-three records were retrieved in total: 10 from CDSR, 1 from DARE, 0 from HTA, 82 from CENTRAL.
ID Search Hits
#1 MeSH descriptor Disclosure, this term only 80
#2 MeSH descriptor Truth Disclosure, this term only 167
#3 disclos*:ti,ab 1409
#4 (nondisclos* or undisclos*):ti,ab 27
#5 (candour or candor or candid):ti,ab 10
#6 "duty of care":ti,ab 0
#7 "duty to advise":ti,ab 0
#8 apolog*:ti,ab 11
#9 sorry:ti,ab 4
#10 openness:ti,ab 69
#11 being NEXT open:ti,ab. 4
#12 ((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) NEAR/2 regret*):ti,ab 3
#13 ((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) NEAR/2 remorse):ti,ab 0
#14 ((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) NEAR/2 sympathy):ti,ab 2
#15 (#1 OR #2 OR #3 OR #4 OR #5 OR #6 OR #7 OR #8 OR #9 OR #10 OR #11 OR #12 OR #13 OR #14) 1680
#16 MeSH descriptor Medical Errors, this term only 82
#17 MeSH descriptor Diagnostic Errors, this term only 211
#18 MeSH descriptor Medication Errors explode all trees 147
#19 MeSH descriptor Iatrogenic Disease, this term only 61
#20 MeSH descriptor Malpractice, this term only 10
#21 (adverse NEAR/2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 24,785
#22 (safety NEAR/2 (incident or incidents)):ti,ab 2
#23 (serious NEAR/2 (incident or incidents)):ti,ab 6
#24 (sentinel NEAR/2 event*):ti,ab 9
#25 ((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) NEAR/2 (incident or incidents)):ti,ab 55
#26 ((harm or harms or harmful) NEAR/3 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 62
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ID Search Hits
#27 (unexpected NEAR/2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 200
#28 (unintended NEAR/2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 7
#29 (unintentional* NEAR/2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 2
#30 (unanticipated NEAR/2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)):ti,ab 19
#31 ((unexpected or unintended or unintentional* or unanticipated) NEAR/2 injur*):ti,ab 46
#32 (medical NEXT (accident* or injur*)):ti,ab 1
#33 (surgical NEXT (accident* or injur*)):ti,ab 31
#34 ((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) NEAR/3 adverse):ti,ab 2215
#35 ((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) NEAR/3 (harm or
harms or harmful)):ti,ab
162
#36 ((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) NEAR/3 (mistake* or
error or errors)):ti,ab
149
#37 ((professional* or worker* or dentist* or nurs* or doctor* or physician* or surgeon* or surgical* or
surger* or pharmac* or human or practitioner* or psychiatrist* or psychologist* or anaesthe* or
anesthe* or GP) NEAR/3 (mistake* or error or errors)):ti,ab
93
#38 ((medical or diagnos* or treatment* or medication* or healthcare or care or hospital* or system*) NEAR/
3 (mistake* or error or errors)):ti,ab
401
#39 misdiagnosis:ti,ab 43
#40 (iatrogenic or iatrogenesis):ti,ab 287
#41 (negligence or negligent):ti,ab 18
#42 malpractice:ti,ab 12
#43 litigat*:ti,ab 50
#44 (legal NEXT (action* or proceeding*)):ti,ab 7
#45 lawsuit*:ti,ab. 8671
#46 law NEXT suit*:ti,ab 1
#47 "near miss":ti,ab 11
#48 "near misses":ti,ab 6
#49 "err is human":ti,ab 1
#50 "things go wrong":ti,ab 0
#51 (#16 OR #17 OR #18 OR #19 OR #20 OR #21 OR #22 OR #23 OR #24 OR #25 OR #26 OR #27 OR #28
OR #29 OR #30 OR #31 OR #32 OR #33 OR #34 OR #35 OR #36 OR #37 OR #38 OR #39 OR #40 OR
#41 OR #42 OR #43 OR #44 OR #45 OR #46 OR #47 OR #48 OR #49 OR #50)
35,181
#52 (#15 AND #51) 103
#53 (open NEXT disclosure):ti,ab 0
#54 ((communicat* or discuss* or convers* or talk* or explain* or explanation* or tell* or told or
acknowledg* or consult* or inform* or notif*) NEAR/3 (patient* or family or families or inpatient* or
outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or carer* or caregiver* or user*) NEAR/3 (adverse or
harm* or error or errors or mistake* or incident or incidents)):ti,ab
6
#55 (#52 OR #53 OR #54) limited to CDSR, DARE, HTA, CENTRAL 94
#56 (#52 OR #53 OR #54), from 1980 to 2011 limited to CDSR, DARE, HTA, CENTRAL 93
MeSH descriptor= indexing term (MeSH).
*= truncation.
:ti,ab= terms in either title or abstract fields.
NEAR/2= terms within two words of each other (any order).
NEXT= terms are next to each other.
" "= phrase search.
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Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL)
Via EBSCOhost.
Inception to 9 December 2011.
Searched on 21 December 2011; 1300 records were retrieved.
# Query Results
S62 S59 or S60 or S61 Limiters - Published Date from: 19800101- 1300
S61 TI ( (communicat* or discuss* or convers* or talk* or explain* or explanation* or tell* or told or
acknowledg* or consult* or inform* or notif*) N3 (patient* or family or families or inpatient* or
outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or carer* or caregiver* or user*) N3 (adverse or harm* or
error or errors or mistake* or incident or incidents) ) OR AB ( (communicat* or discuss* or convers* or
talk* or explain* or explanation* or tell* or told or acknowledg* or consult* or inform* or notif*) N3
(patient* or family or families or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or carer* or
caregiver* or user*) N3 (adverse or harm* or error or errors or mistake* or incident or incidents) )
183
S60 TI "open disclosure" OR AB "open disclosure" 26
S59 S53 and S58 1165
S58 S10 or S54 or S55 or S56 or S57 11,431
S57 TI ( (express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) N2 sympathy ) OR AB ( (express* or show* or
communicat* or convey*) N2 sympathy )
28
S56 TI ( (express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) N2 remorse ) OR AB ( (express* or show* or
communicat* or convey*) N2 remorse )
4
S55 TI ( (express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) N2 regret* ) OR AB ( (express* or show* or
communicat* or convey*) N2 regret* )
29
S54 TI "being open" OR AB "being open" 67
S53 S11 or S12 or S13 or S14 or S15 or S16 or S17 or S18 or S19 or S20 or S21 or S22 or S23 or S24 or S25
or S26 or S27 or S28 or S29 or S30 or S31 or S32 or S33 or S34 or S35 or S36 or S37 or S38 or S39 or
S40 or S41 or S42 or S43 or S44 or S45 or S46 or S47 or S48 or S49 or S50 or S51 or S52
60,878
S52 TI "things go wrong" OR AB "things go wrong" 59
S51 TI "err is human" OR AB "err is human" 124
S50 TI "near misses" OR AB "near misses" 194
S49 TI "near miss" OR AB "near miss" 234
S48 TI ( lawsuit* or "law suit*" ) OR AB ( lawsuit* or "law suit*" ) 1609
S47 TI ( "legal action*" or "legal proceeding*" ) OR AB ( "legal action*" or "legal proceeding*" ) 295
S46 TI litigat* OR AB litigat* 1731
S45 TI malpractice OR AB malpractice 2361
S44 TI ( negligence or negligent ) OR AB ( negligence or negligent ) 1625
S43 TI ( iatrogenic or iatrogenesis ) OR AB ( iatrogenic or iatrogenesis ) 1587
S42 TI misdiagnosis OR AB misdiagnosis 765
S41 TI ( (medical or diagnos* or treatment* or medication* or healthcare or care or hospital* or system*) N3
(mistake* or error or errors) ) OR AB ( (medical or diagnos* or treatment* or medication* or healthcare
or care or hospital* or system*) N3 (mistake* or error or errors) )
5467
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# Query Results
S40 TI ( (professional* or worker* or dentist* or nurs* or doctor* or physician* or surgeon* or surgical* or
surger* or pharmac* or human or practitioner* or psychiatrist* or psychologist* or anaesthe* or
anesthe* or GP) N3 (mistake* or error or errors) ) OR AB ( (professional* or worker* or dentist* or nurs*
or doctor* or physician* or surgeon* or surgical* or surger* or pharmac* or human or practitioner* or
psychiatrist* or psychologist* or anaesthe* or anesthe* or GP) N3 (mistake* or error or errors) )
1521
S39 TI ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) N3 (mistake* or
error or errors) ) OR AB ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or
user*) N3 (mistake* or error or errors) )
1332
S38 TI ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) N3 (harm or harms
or harmful) ) OR AB ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*)
N3 (harm or harms or harmful) )
1281
S37 TI ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) N3 adverse ) OR
AB ( (patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) N3 adverse )
2580
S36 TI ( "surgical accident*" or "surgical injur*" ) OR AB ( "surgical accident*" or "surgical injur*" ) 35
S35 TI ( "medical accident*" or "medical injur*" ) OR AB ( "medical accident*" or "medical injur*" ) 79
S34 TI ( (unexpected or unintended or unintentional* or unanticipated) N2 injur* ) OR AB ( (unexpected or
unintended or unintentional* or unanticipated) N2 injur* )
611
S33 TI ( unanticipated N2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( unanticipated N2 (event* or
incident or incidents or outcome*) )
80
S32 TI ( unintentional* N2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( unintentional* N2 (event*
or incident or incidents or outcome*) )
27
S31 TI ( unintended N2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( unintended N2 (event* or
incident or incidents or outcome*) )
45
S30 TI ( unexpected N2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( unexpected N2 (event* or
incident or incidents or outcome*) )
281
S29 TI ( (harm or harms or harmful) N3 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( (harm or
harms or harmful) N3 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) )
268
S28 TI ( (critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) N2 (incident or incidents) ) OR AB ( (critical or clinical or
medical or healthcare) N2 (incident or incidents) )
1083
S27 TI sentinel N2 event* OR AB sentinel N2 event* 399
S26 TI ( serious N2 (incident or incidents) ) OR AB ( serious N2 (incident or incidents) ) 68
S25 TI ( safety N2 (incident or incidents) ) OR AB ( safety N2 (incident or incidents) ) 145
S24 TI ( adverse N2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*) ) OR AB ( adverse N2 (event* or incident or
incidents or outcome*) )
16,562
S23 (MH "Legal Procedure+") 3916
S22 (MH "Negligence") 3985
S21 (MH "Malpractice") 6020
S20 (MH "Iatrogenic Disease") 1129
S19 (MH "Sentinel Event") 631
S18 (MH "Adverse Drug Event") 2596
S17 (MH "Adverse Health Care Event") 2237
S16 (MH "Failure to Diagnose") 1025
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# Query Results
S15 (MH "Human Error") 454
S14 (MH "Diagnostic Errors") 4111
S13 (MH "Medication Errors") 7424
S12 (MH "Treatment Errors") 4066
S11 (MH "Health Care Errors") 1914
S10 S1 or S2 or S3 or S4 or S5 or S6 or S7 or S8 or S9 11,321
S9 TI openness OR AB openness 814
S8 TI sorry OR AB sorry 245
S7 TI apolog* OR AB apolog* 391
S6 TI "duty to advise" OR AB "duty to advise" 8
S5 TI "duty of care" OR AB "duty of care" 333
S4 TI ( candour or candor or candid ) OR AB ( candour or candor or candid ) 132
S3 TI ( nondisclos* or undisclos* ) OR AB ( nondisclos* or undisclos* ) 167
S2 TI disclos* OR AB disclos* 5581
S1 (MH "Truth Disclosure") 5370
MH= indexing term (CINAHL heading).
+= exploded CINAHL heading.
*= truncation.
TI=words in the title.
AB=words in the abstract.
" "= phrase search.
N2= terms within two words of each other (any order).
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Science Citation Index (SCI)
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)
Conference Proceedings Citation Index – Science (CPCI-S)
Conference Proceedings Citation Index – Social Science & Humanities
(CPCI-SSH)
Web of Science – ISI Web of Knowledge, www.isinet.com/
SCI, 1899 to present; SSCI, 1956 to present; CPCI-S, 1990 to present; CPCI-SSH, 1990 to present.
The above four databases were searched together with the strategy as set out below on 6 December
2011; 3778 records were retrieved in total.
Query number Results Query
# 45 3778 #44
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=1980-2011
# 44 3785 #43 OR #42 OR #41
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 43 2145 TS=((communicat* or discuss or discussed or convers* or talk* or explain* or explanation*
or tell* or told or acknowledg* or consult* or inform or informs or informed or informing or
notif*) SAME (patient* or family or families or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or
citizen* or public or carer* or caregiver* or user*) SAME (adverse or harm or harms or
harmful or error or errors or mistake* or incident or incidents))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 42 43 TS="open disclosure"
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 41 1724 #40 AND #12
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 40 > 100,000 #39 OR #38 OR #37 OR #36 OR #35 OR #34 OR #33 OR #32 OR #31 OR #30 OR #29 OR
#28 OR #27 OR #26 OR #25 OR #24 OR #23 OR #22 OR #21 OR #20 OR #19 OR #18 OR
#17 OR #16 OR #15 OR #14 OR #13
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 39 112 TS="things go wrong"
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 38 195 TS="err is human"
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 37 2818 TS=(lawsuit* or "law suit*")
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 36 948 TS=("legal action*" or "legal proceeding*")
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 35 10,948 TS=litigat*
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 34 5625 TS=malpractice
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 33 3358 TS=(negligence or negligent)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
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Query number Results Query
# 32 13,183 TS=(iatrogenic or iatrogenesis)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 31 5123 TS=misdiagnosis
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 30 82,099 TS=((medical or diagnos* or treatment* or medication* or healthcare or care or hospital* or
system*) SAME (mistake* or error or errors))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 29 12,738 TS=((professional* or worker* or dentist* or nurs* or doctor* or physician* or surgeon* or
surgical* or surger* or pharmac* or human or practitioner* or psychiatrist* or psychologist*
or anaesthe* or anesthe* or GP) SAME (mistake* or error or errors))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 28 17,176 TS=((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*)
SAME (mistake* or error or errors))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 27 6815 TS=((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*)
SAME (harm or harms or harmful))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 26 42,210 TS=((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*)
SAME adverse)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 25 448 TS=("surgical accident*" or "surgical injur*")
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 24 272 TS=("medical accident*" or "medical injur*")
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 23 1680 TS=((unexpected or unintended or unintentional* or unanticipated) SAME injur*)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 22 437 TS=(unanticipated SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 21 237 TS=(unintentional* SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 20 462 TS=(unintended SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 19 2944 TS=(unexpected SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 18 2159 TS=((harm or harms or harmful) SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 17 4755 TS=((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) SAME (incident or incidents))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
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Query number Results Query
# 16 407 TS=(sentinel SAME event*)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 15 486 TS=(serious SAME (incident or incidents))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 14 1242 TS=(safety SAME (incident or incidents))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 13 82,616 TS=(adverse SAME (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 12 59,602 #11 OR #10 OR #9 OR #8 OR #7 OR #6 OR #5 OR #4 OR #3 OR #2 OR #1
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 11 188 TS=((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) SAME sympathy)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 10 42 TS=((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) SAME remorse)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 9 386 TS=((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) SAME regret*)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 8 8673 TS=openness
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 7 618 TS=sorry
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 6 2060 TS=apolog*
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 5 6 TS="duty to advise"
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 4 452 TS="duty of care"
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 3 775 TS=(candour or candor or candid)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 2 763 TS=(nondisclos* or undisclos*)
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
# 1 46,329 TS=disclos*
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All Years
TS= topic tag; searches terms in title, abstract, author keywords and keywords plus fields.
*= truncation.
" "= phrase search.
SAME= terms within same sentence.
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Latin American and Caribbean Health Sciences Literature (LILACS)
http://bases.bireme.br/cgi-bin/wxislind.exe/iah/online/?IsisScript=iah/iah.xis&base=LILACS&lang=i
Searched on 20 December 2011; 83 records were retrieved.
disclos$ or nondisclos$ or undisclos$ or candour or candor or candid or apolog$ or sorry or openness
[Words field]
934 records
AND
error$ or mistake$ or adverse or harm$ or misdiagnosis or sentinel or safety or iatrogenic or iatrogenesis or
negligence or negligent or malpractice or litigat$ or "NEAR-MISS" or "NEAR-MISSES" [Words field]
42,474 records
83 records
Key
$= truncation
PASCAL
Dialog, www.dialog.com/
1973 to December week 3, 2012.
Searched on 9 January 2012; 921 records were retrieved.
Set Items Description
1 16,404 DISCLOS?/TI,AB,DE
2 243 (NONDISCLOS? OR UNDISCLOS?)/TI,AB,DE
3 173 (CANDOUR OR CANDOR OR CANDID)/TI,AB,DE
4 0 DUTY(W)OF(W)CARE/TI,AB,DE
5 0 DUTY(W)TO(W)ADVISE/TI,AB,DE
6 286 APOLOG?/TI,AB,DE
7 63 SORRY/TI,AB,DE
8 2026 OPENNESS/TI,AB,DE
9 73 BEING(W)OPEN/TI,AB,DE
10 76 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REGRET?/TI,AB,DE
11 9 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REMORSE/TI,AB,DE
12 21 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)SYMPATHY/TI,AB,DE
13 19,178 S1:S12
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Set Items Description
14 39,042 ADVERSE(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
15 109 SAFETY(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
16 97 SERIOUS(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
17 151 SENTINEL(2N)EVENT?/TI,AB,DE
18 750 (CRITICAL OR CLINICAL OR MEDICAL
OR HEALTHCARE)(2N)(INCIDENT OR
INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
19 321 (HARM OR HARMS OR HARMFUL)(3N)(EVENT?
OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
20 745 UNEXPECTED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
21 61 UNINTENDED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
22 31 UNINTENTIONAL?(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
23 89 UNANTICIPATED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
24 452 (UNEXPECTED OR UNINTENDED OR UNINTENTIONAL?
OR UNANTICIPATED)(2N)INJUR?/TI,AB,DE
25 78 MEDICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
26 216 SURGICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
27 6560 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)ADVERSE/TI,AB,DE
28 986 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(HARM OR HARMS OR
HARMFUL)/TI,AB,DE
29 2779 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(MISTAKE? OR ERROR
OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
30 8055 (PROFESSIONAL? OR WORKER? OR DENTIST?
OR NURS? OR DOCTOR? OR PHYSICIAN?
OR SURGEON? OR SURGICAL? OR SURGER?
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Set Items Description
OR PHARMAC? OR HUMAN OR PRACTITIONER?
OR PSYCHIATRIST? OR PSYCHOLOGIST?
OR ANAESTHE? OR ANESTHE? OR GP)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
31 24,079 (MEDICAL OR DIAGNOS? OR TREATMENT?
OR MEDICATION? OR HEALTHCARE OR
CARE OR HOSPITAL? OR SYSTEM?)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
32 2086 MISDIAGNOSIS/TI,AB,DE
33 21,351 (IATROGENIC OR IATROGENESIS)/TI,AB,DE
34 2975 (NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENT)/TI,AB,DE
35 1937 MALPRACTICE/TI,AB,DE
36 1605 LITIGAT?/TI,AB,DE
37 194 LEGAL(W)(ACTION? OR PROCEEDING?)/TI,AB,DE
38 390 (LAWSUIT? OR LAW(W)SUIT?)/TI,AB,DE
39 302 NEAR(W)MISS/TI,AB,DE
40 165 NEAR(W)MISSES/TI,AB,DE
41 48 ERR(W)IS(W)HUMAN/TI,AB,DE
42 23 THINGS(W)GO(W)WRONG/TI,AB,DE
43 105153 S14:S42
44 431 S13 AND S43
45 15 OPEN(W)DISCLOSURE/TI,AB,DE
46 514 (COMMUNICAT? OR DISCUSS? OR CONVERS?
OR TALK? OR EXPLAIN? OR EXPLANATION?
OR TELL? OR TOLD OR ACKNOWLEDG?
OR CONSULT? OR INFORM? OR NOTIF?)(3N)(PATIENT?
OR FAMILY OR FAMILIES OR INPATIENT?
OR OUTPATIENT? OR CONSUMER? OR
CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC OR CARER? OR CAREGIVER? OR
USER?)(3N)(ADVERSE OR HARM? OR ERROR OR ERRORS
OR MISTAKE? OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
47 924 S44:S46
48 921 S47/1980:2012
?= truncation.
/TI,AB,DE= terms in title, abstract or descriptor fields.
(W)= terms adjacent to each other (same order).
(2N)= terms within two words of each other (any order).
S1:S12= S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 . . . S12.
S47/1980:2012= limits set 47 to those records published between1980 and 2012.
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Health Systems Evidence
www.mcmasterhealthforum.org/healthsystemsevidence-en
Searched on 6 January 2012; 13 records were retrieved.
Using the open search box the following terms were entered:
disclos* OR nondisclos* OR undisclos* OR candour OR candor OR apolog* OR sorry OR openness
Key
*= truncation
Social science databases
Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA)
CSA Illumina, www.csa.com/csaillumina/
1987 to December 2011.
Searched on 20 December 2011; 199 records were retrieved.
((DE="disclosure") or(DE="truth telling") or(DE="duty of care") or(DE="apologies") or(DE="openness")
or(DE="regret") or(DE="remorse") or(DE="sympathy") or(KW=disclos*) or(KW=(nondisclos* or
undisclos*)) or(KW=(candour or candor or candid)) or(KW="duty of care") or(KW="duty to advise") or
(KW=apolog*) or(KW=sorry) or(KW=openness) or(KW="being open") or(KW=((express* or show* or
communicat* or convey*) WITHIN 2 regret*)) or(KW=((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*)
WITHIN 2 remorse)) or(KW=((express* or show* or communicat* or convey*) WITHIN 2 sympathy))) and
((DE=("errors" or "human error" or "near misses")) or(DE=("misdiagnosed" or "misdiagnosis")) or
(DE="iatrogenic effects") or(DE="medical malpractice") or(DE="medical negligence") or(DE="critical
incidents") or(DE="harm") or(DE="mistakes") or(DE=("litigation" or "claims" or "class action suits")) or
(KW=(adverse WITHIN 2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))) or(KW=(safety WITHIN 2 (incident
or incidents))) or(KW=(serious WITHIN 2 (incident or incidents))) or(KW=(sentinel WITHIN 2 event*)) or
(KW=((critical or clinical or medical or healthcare) WITHIN 2 (incident or incidents))) or(KW=((harm or
harms or harmful) WITHIN 3 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))) or(KW=(unexpected WITHIN 2
(event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))) or(KW=(unintended WITHIN 2 (event* or incident or
incidents or outcome*))) or(KW=(unintentional* WITHIN 2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*)))
or(KW=(unanticipated WITHIN 2 (event* or incident or incidents or outcome*))) or(KW=((unexpected or
unintended or unintentional* or unanticipated) WITHIN 2 injur*)) or(KW="medical accident*" or "medical
injur*") or(KW="surgical accident*" or "surgical injur*") or(KW=((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or
consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) WITHIN 3 adverse)) or(KW=((patient* or inpatient* or
outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) WITHIN 3 (harm or harms or harmful))) or(KW=
((patient* or inpatient* or outpatient* or consumer* or citizen* or public or user*) WITHIN 3 (mistake* or
error or errors))) or(KW=((professional* or worker* or dentist* or nurs* or doctor* or physician* or
surgeon* or surgical* or surger* or pharmac* or human or practitioner* or psychiatrist* or psychologist*
or anaesthe* or anesthe* or GP) WITHIN 3 (mistake* or error or errors))) or(KW=((medical or diagnos* or
treatment* or medication* or healthcare or care or hospital* or system*) WITHIN 3 (mistake* or error or
errors))) or(KW=misdiagnosis) or(KW=(iatrogenic or iatrogenesis)) or(KW=(negligence or negligent)) or
(KW=malpractice) or(KW=litigat*) or(KW=("legal action*" or "legal proceeding*")) or(KW=(lawsuit* or
"law suit*")) or(KW=("near miss" or "near misses")) or(KW="err is human") or(KW="things go wrong"))
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Key
DE= subject heading
KW= searches the title, abstract, descriptor and identifier fields
WITHIN 2= terms within two words of each other (any order)
*= truncation
" "= phrase search
Law databases
Lawtel
Westlaw
Lexus
Reports/conference proceedings/grey literature
National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
Dialog, www.dialog.com/
1964 to January week 1, 2012.
Searched on 9 January 2012; 217 records were retrieved.
Set Items Description
1 9931 DISCLOS?/TI,AB,DE
2 58 (NONDISCLOS? OR UNDISCLOS?)/TI,AB,DE
3 168 (CANDOUR OR CANDOR OR CANDID)/TI,AB,DE
4 0 DUTY(W)OF(W)CARE/TI,AB,DE
5 0 DUTY(W)TO(W)ADVISE/TI,AB,DE
6 51 APOLOG?/TI,AB,DE
7 10 SORRY/TI,AB,DE
8 379 OPENNESS/TI,AB,DE
9 25 BEING(W)OPEN/TI,AB,DE
10 2 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REGRET?/TI,AB,DE
11 0 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REMORSE/TI,AB,DE
12 5 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)SYMPATHY/TI,AB,DE
13 10,604 S1:S12
14 516 ADVERSE(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
15 192 SAFETY(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
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Set Items Description
16 72 SERIOUS(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
17 40 SENTINEL(2N)EVENT?/TI,AB,DE
18 246 (CRITICAL OR CLINICAL OR MEDICAL
OR HEALTHCARE)(2N)(INCIDENT OR
INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
19 36 (HARM OR HARMS OR HARMFUL)(3N)(EVENT?
OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
20 145 UNEXPECTED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
21 12 UNINTENDED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
22 10 UNINTENTIONAL?(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
23 57 UNANTICIPATED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
24 100 (UNEXPECTED OR UNINTENDED OR UNINTENTIONAL?
OR UNANTICIPATED)(2N)INJUR?/TI,AB,DE
25 34 MEDICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
26 4 SURGICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
27 242 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)ADVERSE/TI,AB,DE
28 131 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(HARM OR HARMS OR
HARMFUL)/TI,AB,DE
29 604 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(MISTAKE? OR ERROR
OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
30 1536 (PROFESSIONAL? OR WORKER? OR DENTIST?
OR NURS? OR DOCTOR? OR PHYSICIAN?
OR SURGEON? OR SURGICAL? OR SURGER?
OR PHARMAC? OR HUMAN OR PRACTITIONER?
OR PSYCHIATRIST? OR PSYCHOLOGIST?
OR ANAESTHE? OR ANESTHE? OR GP)(3N)(MISTAKE?
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Set Items Description
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
31 7343 (MEDICAL OR DIAGNOS? OR TREATMENT?
OR MEDICATION? OR HEALTHCARE OR
CARE OR HOSPITAL? OR SYSTEM?)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
32 20 MISDIAGNOSIS/TI,AB,DE
33 61 (IATROGENIC OR IATROGENESIS)/TI,AB,DE
34 220 (NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENT)/TI,AB,DE
35 462 MALPRACTICE/TI,AB,DE
36 1877 LITIGAT?/TI,AB,DE
37 207 LEGAL(W)(ACTION? OR PROCEEDING?)/TI,AB,DE
38 320 (LAWSUIT? OR LAW(W)SUIT?)/TI,AB,DE
39 63 NEAR(W)MISS/TI,AB,DE
40 47 NEAR(W)MISSES/TI,AB,DE
41 11 ERR(W)IS(W)HUMAN/TI,AB,DE
42 4 THINGS(W)GO(W)WRONG/TI,AB,DE
43 13,784 S14:S42
44 117 S13 AND S43
45 1 OPEN(W)DISCLOSURE/TI,AB,DE
46 144 (COMMUNICAT? OR DISCUSS? OR CONVERS?
OR TALK? OR EXPLAIN? OR EXPLANATION?
OR TELL? OR TOLD OR ACKNOWLEDG?
OR CONSULT? OR INFORM? OR NOTIF?)(3N)(PATIENT?
OR FAMILY OR FAMILIES OR INPATIENT?
OR OUTPATIENT? OR CONSUMER? OR
CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC OR CARER? OR CAREGIVER? OR
USER?)(3N)(ADVERSE OR HARM? OR ERROR OR ERRORS
OR MISTAKE? OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
47 260 S44:S46
48 217 S47/1980:2012
?= truncation.
/TI,AB,DE= terms in title, abstract or descriptor fields.
(W)= terms adjacent to each other (same order).
(2N)= terms within two words of each other (any order).
S1:S12= S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 . . . S12.
S47/1980:2012= limits set 47 to those records published between1980 and 2012.
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Dissertation Abstracts
Dialog, www.dialog.com/
1861 to December 2011.
Searched on 9 January 2012; 411 records were retrieved.
Set Items Description
1 10,298 DISCLOS?/TI,AB,DE
2 169 (NONDISCLOS? OR UNDISCLOS?)/TI,AB,DE
3 332 (CANDOUR OR CANDOR OR CANDID)/TI,AB,DE
4 0 DUTY(W)OF(W)CARE/TI,AB,DE
5 0 DUTY(W)TO(W)ADVISE/TI,AB,DE
6 1799 APOLOG?/TI,AB,DE
7 73 SORRY/TI,AB,DE
8 4576 OPENNESS/TI,AB,DE
9 160 BEING(W)OPEN/TI,AB,DE
10 50 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REGRET?/TI,AB,DE
11 12 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REMORSE/TI,AB,DE
12 108 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)SYMPATHY/TI,AB,DE
13 17,191 S1:S12
14 1189 ADVERSE(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
15 26 SAFETY(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
16 41 SERIOUS(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
17 24 SENTINEL(2N)EVENT?/TI,AB,DE
18 1655 (CRITICAL OR CLINICAL OR MEDICAL
OR HEALTHCARE)(2N)(INCIDENT OR
INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
19 111 (HARM OR HARMS OR HARMFUL)(3N)(EVENT?
OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
20 391 UNEXPECTED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
21 108 UNINTENDED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
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Set Items Description
22 14 UNINTENTIONAL?(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
23 116 UNANTICIPATED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
24 133 (UNEXPECTED OR UNINTENDED OR UNINTENTIONAL?
OR UNANTICIPATED)(2N)INJUR?/TI,AB,DE
25 11 MEDICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
26 11 SURGICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
27 217 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)ADVERSE/TI,AB,DE
28 225 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(HARM OR HARMS OR
HARMFUL)/TI,AB,DE
29 572 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(MISTAKE? OR ERROR
OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
30 669 (PROFESSIONAL? OR WORKER? OR DENTIST?
OR NURS? OR DOCTOR? OR PHYSICIAN?
OR SURGEON? OR SURGICAL? OR SURGER?
OR PHARMAC? OR HUMAN OR PRACTITIONER?
OR PSYCHIATRIST? OR PSYCHOLOGIST?
OR ANAESTHE? OR ANESTHE? OR GP)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
31 3906 (MEDICAL OR DIAGNOS? OR TREATMENT?
OR MEDICATION? OR HEALTHCARE OR
CARE OR HOSPITAL? OR SYSTEM?)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
32 170 MISDIAGNOSIS/TI,AB,DE
33 150 (IATROGENIC OR IATROGENESIS)/TI,AB,DE
34 573 (NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENT)/TI,AB,DE
35 336 MALPRACTICE/TI,AB,DE
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Set Items Description
36 2536 LITIGAT?/TI,AB,DE
37 361 LEGAL(W)(ACTION? OR PROCEEDING?)/TI,AB,DE
38 812 (LAWSUIT? OR LAW(W)SUIT?)/TI,AB,DE
39 54 NEAR(W)MISS/TI,AB,DE
40 42 NEAR(W)MISSES/TI,AB,DE
41 22 ERR(W)IS(W)HUMAN/TI,AB,DE
42 16 THINGS(W)GO(W)WRONG/TI,AB,DE
43 13,285 S14:S42
44 280 S13 AND S43
45 9 OPEN(W)DISCLOSURE/TI,AB,DE
46 133 (COMMUNICAT? OR DISCUSS? OR CONVERS?
OR TALK? OR EXPLAIN? OR EXPLANATION?
OR TELL? OR TOLD OR ACKNOWLEDG?
OR CONSULT? OR INFORM? OR NOTIF?)(3N)(PATIENT?
OR FAMILY OR FAMILIES OR INPATIENT?
OR OUTPATIENT? OR CONSUMER? OR
CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC OR CARER? OR CAREGIVER? OR
USER?)(3N)(ADVERSE OR HARM? OR ERROR OR ERRORS
OR MISTAKE? OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
47 414 S44:S46
48 11,296 47/1980:2012
49 411 S47/1980:2012
?= truncation.
/TI,AB,DE= terms in title, abstract or descriptor fields.
(W)= terms adjacent to each other (same order).
(2N)= terms within two words of each other (any order).
S1:S12= S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 . . . S12.
S47/1980:2012= limits set 47 to those records published between1980 and 2012.
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Inside Conferences
Dialog, www.dialog.com/
1993 to 6 January 2012.
Searched on 9 January 2012; 29 records were retrieved.
Set Items Description
1 1049 DISCLOS?/TI,AB,DE
2 11 (NONDISCLOS? OR UNDISCLOS?)/TI,AB,DE
3 30 (CANDOUR OR CANDOR OR CANDID)/TI,AB,DE
4 0 DUTY(W)OF(W)CARE/TI,AB,DE
5 0 DUTY(W)TO(W)ADVISE/TI,AB,DE
6 244 APOLOG?/TI,AB,DE
7 49 SORRY/TI,AB,DE
8 230 OPENNESS/TI,AB,DE
9 2 BEING(W)OPEN/TI,AB,DE
10 1 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REGRET?/TI,AB,DE
11 0 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)REMORSE/TI,AB,DE
12 0 (EXPRESS? OR SHOW? OR COMMUNICAT?
OR CONVEY?)(2N)SYMPATHY/TI,AB,DE
13 1608 S1:S12
14 668 ADVERSE(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
15 91 SAFETY(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
16 6 SERIOUS(2N)(INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
17 2 SENTINEL(2N)EVENT?/TI,AB,DE
18 166 (CRITICAL OR CLINICAL OR MEDICAL
OR HEALTHCARE)(2N)(INCIDENT OR
INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
19 9 (HARM OR HARMS OR HARMFUL)(3N)(EVENT?
OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
20 28 UNEXPECTED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
21 6 UNINTENDED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
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Set Items Description
22 0 UNINTENTIONAL?(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
23 6 UNANTICIPATED(2N)(EVENT? OR INCIDENT
OR INCIDENTS OR OUTCOME?)/TI,AB,DE
24 11 (UNEXPECTED OR UNINTENDED OR UNINTENTIONAL?
OR UNANTICIPATED)(2N)INJUR?/TI,AB,DE
25 9 MEDICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
26 5 SURGICAL(W)(ACCIDENT? OR INJUR?)/TI,AB,DE
27 68 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)ADVERSE/TI,AB,DE
28 27 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(HARM OR HARMS OR
HARMFUL)/TI,AB,DE
29 149 (PATIENT? OR INPATIENT? OR OUTPATIENT?
OR CONSUMER? OR CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC
OR USER?)(3N)(MISTAKE? OR ERROR
OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
30 673 (PROFESSIONAL? OR WORKER? OR DENTIST?
OR NURS? OR DOCTOR? OR PHYSICIAN?
OR SURGEON? OR SURGICAL? OR SURGER?
OR PHARMAC? OR HUMAN OR PRACTITIONER?
OR PSYCHIATRIST? OR PSYCHOLOGIST?
OR ANAESTHE? OR ANESTHE? OR GP)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
31 1542 (MEDICAL OR DIAGNOS? OR TREATMENT?
OR MEDICATION? OR HEALTHCARE OR
CARE OR HOSPITAL? OR SYSTEM?)(3N)(MISTAKE?
OR ERROR OR ERRORS)/TI,AB,DE
32 54 MISDIAGNOSIS/TI,AB,DE
33 219 (IATROGENIC OR IATROGENESIS)/TI,AB,DE
34 181 (NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENT)/TI,AB,DE
35 227 MALPRACTICE/TI,AB,DE
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Set Items Description
36 1198 LITIGAT?/TI,AB,DE
37 23 LEGAL(W)(ACTION? OR PROCEEDING?)/TI,AB,DE
38 72 (LAWSUIT? OR LAW(W)SUIT?)/TI,AB,DE
39 54 NEAR(W)MISS/TI,AB,DE
40 29 NEAR(W)MISSES/TI,AB,DE
41 8 ERR(W)IS(W)HUMAN/TI,AB,DE
42 19 THINGS(W)GO(W)WRONG/TI,AB,DE
43 5214 S14:S42
44 16 S13 AND S43
45 1 OPEN(W)DISCLOSURE/TI,AB,DE
46 12 (COMMUNICAT? OR DISCUSS? OR CONVERS?
OR TALK? OR EXPLAIN? OR EXPLANATION?
OR TELL? OR TOLD OR ACKNOWLEDG?
OR CONSULT? OR INFORM? OR NOTIF?)(3N)(PATIENT?
OR FAMILY OR FAMILIES OR INPATIENT?
OR OUTPATIENT? OR CONSUMER? OR
CITIZEN? OR PUBLIC OR CARER? OR CAREGIVER? OR
USER?)(3N)(ADVERSE OR HARM? OR ERROR OR ERRORS
OR MISTAKE? OR INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS)/TI,AB,DE
47 29 S44:S46
48 29 S47/1980:2012
?= truncation.
/TI,AB,DE= terms in title, abstract or descriptor fields.
(W)= terms adjacent to each other (same order).
(2N)= terms within two words of each other (any order).
S1:S12= S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 . . . S12.
S47/1980:2012= limits set 47 to those records published between1980 and 2012.
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Ongoing research resources
PROSPERO
www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/
Searched on 6 January 2012; 0 records retrieved.
disclos* OR nondisclos* OR undisclos* OR candour OR candor OR apolog* OR sorry OR openness
Key
*= truncation
Health Services Research Projects in Progress (HSRProj)
www.cf.nlm.nih.gov/hsr_project/home_proj.cfm
Searched on 9 January 2012; 33 project records retrieved.
Using the advanced search with ‘project status’ set to ‘all’ and ‘states’ set to ‘all’.
(((disclose or discloses or disclosure or disclosures or disclosed or disclosing or nondisclose or nondisclosure
or nondisclosures or nondisclosed or undisclose or undisclosed or candour or candor or candid or apology
or apologies or apologise or apologize or apologised or apologized or apologising or apologizing or sorry
or openness) AND (adverse OR harm OR harms OR harmful OR mistake OR mistakes OR error or errors OR
misdiagnosis OR iatrogenic OR iatrogenesis OR negligence OR negligent OR malpractice OR litigate OR
litigates OR litigation OR miss OR misses OR err OR incident OR incidents)))
National Research Register Archive
www.nihr.ac.uk/Pages/NRRArchiveSearch.aspx (contains records of projects from 2000 to 2007 only).
Searched on 6 January 2012; 63 records retrieved.
(disclos* or nondisclos* or undisclos* or candour or candor or apolog* or sorry or openness or
communicat* or discuss* or convers* or talk* or explain* or explanation* or tell* or told or acknowledge*
or consult* or inform* or notif* ) all fields
AND
(adverse or harm or harms or harmful or mistake* or error or errors or misdiagnosis or iatrogen* or
negligence or negligent or malpractice or litigat* or miss or misses or err or incident or incidents) in
title field
Key
*= truncation
ClinicalTrials.gov
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/search
Searched on 5 January 2012; 125 records retrieved.
disclose OR discloses OR disclosure OR disclosures OR disclosed OR disclosing OR "duty of candour" OR
"duty of candor" OR apology OR apologies OR apologise OR apologize OR apologised OR apologized OR
apologising OR apologizing OR sorry OR openness | received on or after 01/01/1980 | updated on or after
01/01/1980
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Clinical Controlled Trials
www.controlled-trials.com/mrct/searchform
Searched the metaRegister (including all active and archived registers) on 9 January 2012; 245
records retrieved.
(disclos* OR candour OR candor OR candid OR apolog* OR sorry) AND (adverse OR sentinel OR harm* OR
mistake* OR error OR errors OR misdiagnosis OR iatrogen* OR negligence OR negligent OR malpractice
OR litigat*)
Key
*= truncation
World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry
Platform Search Portal (ICTRP)
http://apps.who.int/trialsearch/Default.aspx
Searched on 6 January 2012; 54 records retrieved.
disclos* OR candour OR candor OR candid OR apolog* OR sorry OR openness
Key
*= truncation
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Appendix 3 Databases searched
The following databases were searched.
Health related
l MEDLINE and MEDLINE In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations.
l EMBASE.
l PsycINFO.
l HMIC.
l The Cochrane Library:
¢ CDSR.
¢ DARE.
¢ HTA Database.
¢ CENTRAL.
l CINAHL.
l SCI.
l LILACS.
l PASCAL.
l Health Systems Evidence.
Social science
l ASSIA.
l SSCI.
Law
l Lawtel.
l Westlaw.
l Lexus.
Reports/conference proceedings/grey literature
l NTIS.
l CPCI-S.
l CPCI-SSH.
l Dissertation Abstracts.
l Inside Conferences.
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Ongoing research
l PROSPERO.
l HSRProj.
l National Research Register Archive.
l ClinicalTrials.gov.
l Current Controlled Trials.
l WHO ICTRP.
l The websites and databases of relevant organisations [e.g. AHRQ, Canadian Patient Safety Institute
(CPSI), Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), NPSA, National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF),
Alexandria Patients Safety Alliance (APSA), Action Against Medical Accidents (AvMA), Joint Commission
Journal on Quality and Patient Safety (JCJQS), Sorry Works in the USA, Safety Improvement for Patients
in Europe (SIMPATIE)].
l Personal contact with key personnel in organisations that are actively developing work to involve
patients in efforts to improve their own safety (e.g. AHRQ, CPSI, IHI, NPSA, NPSF).
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Appendix 4 Ethical permission
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Appendix 5 Example topic guide
Topic guide
Health professional interviews
Outline of the project. Define adverse event.
General awareness of disclosure and current practice
Can you talk to me about open disclosure in health care – what does this term mean to you?
Personal experiences of disclosure
If an adverse event occurred in your ward/unit what role might you expect to play in its disclosure?
How would you feel about disclosing an adverse event?
How well-prepared do you feel if that situation was to arise now?
What would you want to achieve through the disclosure?
What do you think the patients would want from the disclosure?
What factors do you think might influence your approach to the disclosure or the things you might say?
What would your main concerns be about disclosing an event to patients or their friends or relatives?
Have you had any experience of disclosing an adverse event to a patient or their friends or relatives?
If yes go to Q4.
Can you tell me a bit about your experience?
What role did you play in the disclosure?
How did you feel about disclosing the event?
How well-prepared did you feel for that situation?
What did you want to achieve through the disclosure?
What do you think the patient wanted from the disclosure?
What factors do you feel influenced your approach to the disclosure or the things that you said?
What challenges did you face, if any?
How did you feel after the disclosure – would you have done anything differently?
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Knowledge and perceptions of open disclosure policy
You might be aware of the Being Open framework which relates to the policy of open disclosure in the
NHS. The framework sets out 10 key principles of open disclosure that NHS staff should use when
communicating with patients, their families and carers about a patient safety incident. Are you aware of
the being open policy or framework?
If yes go to 6.
If no go to 8.
Can you tell me a bit about the policy and how it works in practice from your own experiences?
What do you consider to be the main challenges in its use?
What kinds of things might you expect to see in the 10 key principles that you might need to consider in
the process of disclosing an incident?
SHOW PARTICIPANTS THE FRAMEWORK
What are your initial thoughts about this framework?
Do you see any parts that you think might raise some challenges or are there any things that you would
feel concerned about looking at this?
Disclosure, quality and patient safety
Can you tell me a bit about the disclosure policy that operates in your trust?
What are you required to do, when and who is responsible for disclosing what types of incidents?
How does it link into the incident reporting system, if at all?
Do you think there is a link between disclosing adverse events to patients and enhancing the quality or
safety of their care?
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Appendix 6 Coding framework
Why Being Open is important: for and against (including
consequences) – BRIEF ONLY
l Respect for the patient as a person.
l Showing trustworthiness of professional, organisation or profession.
l Implications for ongoing care relationship.
l What matters to the patient/family (including implications for them going forward).
l Impact on the professional going forward.
Uncertainties/complexities of what and whether to disclose
l ‘The problem’ – definitions and thresholds.
l Who might be responsible – error or not.
l Patient and their likely response.
l ‘Salience’ of the event – is it important to tell.
Whether and where disclosure is done and not done
(descriptive/epidemiology)
l Relationship, history, context.
l Setting/specialty.
How it’s done (descriptive including examples)
What makes for better and worse disclosure
(evaluative comments)
l Medium – person, letter, phone.
l Person – involved with incident, seniority, experience, role.
l Where.
l When.
l If in person – sincerity, genuine.
l Relationship history.
l Ongoing process of disclosure.
l Flexibility, subtlety, sensitivity – attitude, sincerity.
l Formality/formulaic.
l Resultant feelings – patient – clinician.
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Issues influencing whether, how, when and awareness of it
(all include what’s missing and what’s needed)
l National policy on Being Open.
l Local policy on Being Open.
l Health professional
¢ hearing mixed messages (or consistent messages) about value/appropriateness of being open
¢ vulnerability to/trust of patient
¢ vulnerability to/trust of employing organisation
¢ tension between requirement/pressures of employing organisation and professional body
¢ place in hierarchy/seniority/experience
¢ perceptions of expectations on you and perceived norms (profession, organisation, team, patient)
¢ concerns re difficult conversations and personal ability to conduct and handle them well
¢ attitudes to open disclosure (normative beliefs?)
¢ past personal experiences of open disclosure
¢ awareness of others’ experiences of open disclosure (or not)
¢ concern for self (including reputation, job security)
¢ education/training on open disclosure.
l Professional organisations
¢ principle of being open
¢ specific guidance/policy – awareness of and driving force behind.
l NHS organisations
¢ processes for disclosure/follow-up post event
¢ resources/staff allocated to it
¢ reporting for learning
¢ (whose) awareness/promotion of principle/policy of being open
¢ support for staff involved in adverse outcomes/errors
¢ reputation concerns
¢ litigation concerns
¢ costs/financial issues relating to being open or not and the consequences.
l Policy framework
¢ forked tongues (policies that pull in different directions)
¢ measurement of effective disclosure and of patient safety problems/success in addressing these
¢ reporting for learning.
l Legal framework
¢ duty of candour.
Suggestions or solutions to improve open disclosure
l Duty of candour.
l Training/education.
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Appendix 7 Key characteristics and numbers of
study participants by stakeholder group
Group Salient characteristics Recruitment Sampling notes
Policy-makers (n= 7) Individuals who had been
involved in health at political
policy level, with an interest in
open disclosure of adverse
events currently or in the
recent past
Targeted letters to those
involved in health policy with
a role in patient safety or the
Being Open guidance
Deliberately identified those
involved in the development
or implementation of
Being Open
Representatives
from professional
organisations (n= 16)
Organisations which regulate
or indemnify health
professionals in the UK
Targeted letters to leaders of
23 professional organisations
in the UK
NHS managers and
health professionals
(n= 54)
NHS managers working in
clinical or non-clinical roles.
Included risk managers
Some managers have both
clinical and non-clinical roles
13 doctors; 22 nurses;
two pharmacists
17 NHS managers
Targeted letters to senior
managers in the five recruited
trusts, and information
disseminated through them to
health professionals with our
contact details
Efforts were made to recruit
from a variety of ranks and
professions but junior doctors
were difficult to recruit
Patients and patient
organisations (n= 5)
Individuals either represented
patient organisations or had
experienced error or harm
Information distributed to
patient organisations and
sent out to patients via the
organisations with contact
information
Targeted letters to leaders
of patient organisations
Patients with positive
experiences of disclosure
were sought through
health-care trusts but none
were identified
Other relevant
individuals (n= 2)
Targeted letters to those
identified as potentially
suitable by other respondents
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Appendix 8 Detailed statement for reflexivity
Team data analysis
At significant points during the process of data analysis, the researchers most closely involved in data
collection and the early stages of analysis (YB, RH, KB) met with members of the wider research team with
extensive qualitative (VE) and clinical (IW) experience, to discuss emerging codes and categories, the
interpretation of key texts and potential new lines of enquiry, thereby drawing on the combined insights of
those ‘handling’ the data closely and members of the team with a wider perspective of methodological
and open disclosure issues.
Reliability of coding
Towards the end of the analysis of the qualitative data, a member of the wider research team (VE)
examined five transcripts which had been coded by the members of the team most closely involved in data
collection and analysis (YB, RH, KB), as an independent check on the assignment of codes to data.
Comparison of data within and across cases in the data set
This was facilitated by the use of the analytic matrix which forms the basis of the framework approach.
Comparing data within cases allowed for the exploration of contextual meaning, while comparing cases
across the data set facilitated the search for regularities (key themes) and exceptions (negative cases).
Use of memos
The careful use of memos (by the prime analysts) during initial stages of analysis provided a visible ‘audit
trail’ as the analysis moved from ‘raw’ data, through interpretation, to the production of findings.
Attention to ‘negative’ cases
Analysis included a search across the data set for ‘negative’ cases (evidence that contradicts, or appears to
contradict, the explanations being developed) and alternative ways of explaining the data were considered.
Systematic searching for negative cases or ‘outliers’ can help illuminate the connections that link the other
cases together.
Reflexivity
Reflexivity relates to sensitivity to the ways in which the researcher and the research process may shape the
data collected, including the role of prior assumptions and experience.
Prior assumptions and experience
Within the context of the current study, the members of the research team involved in face-to-face contact
with study participants needed to consider the ways in which their interactions with participants might be
influenced by their own professional background, experiences and prior assumptions. The two interviewers
(RH and KB) were both academic research fellows from non-clinical backgrounds. An important question
we needed to address in drawing conclusions from the data concerned whether or not knowing about our
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professional background could have impacted on participants’ willingness to talk openly about
experiences, or how this knowledge might have shaped what was said.
Awareness of social setting and the social ‘distance’ between the researcher
and the researched
The majority of interviews were conducted in participants’ workplaces or homes (for patients), either face
to face or over the telephone, as this was usually more convenient for them. Although we were invited in
as researchers, we were also mindful that we were guests in the participants’ work or living spaces;
respondents were therefore given the lead in ‘setting the pace’ of the interview. By deliberately adopting a
‘back seat’ approach in setting the scene for the interview to take place, the researchers hoped that
participants would feel they were exercising a measure of control over the interview process.
Fair dealing
Dingwall247 has suggested that one way of reducing bias in qualitative research is to ensure that the
research design explicitly incorporates a wide range of different perspectives, so that the viewpoint of one
group is never presented as if representing the sole truth about any situation, an analytic technique he has
referred to as ‘fair dealing’.
Our study was designed to elicit contributions from a broad range of stakeholders in open disclosure.
During the analytic process no particular group’s views were ‘privileged’ over those of others; that is to say,
data analysis included a process of constant comparison between accounts of each group of participants,
to uncover similarities and differences, which were subsequently highlighted (for example, health
professionals identified a lack of certainty around what should be disclosed to a patient or carer, more so
than other participants).
A main goal of data analysis was the identification of common themes that emerged from comparison
across cases (individual interviews). However, equal importance was attached to focusing on the minutiae
of individuals’ accounts relating to specific incidents of disclosure; in the analysis, we sought to identify the
views and experiences of individuals, as well as the majority, where these were divulged.
Awareness of wider social and political context
As a research team, we discussed the fact that participants recruited from a policy level, professional
organisation or national ‘consumer’ group might show a strong commitment to a particular personal or
political agenda, or wish to raise particular issues during group discussions which may relate only
tangentially, or not at all, to the main purpose of the discussion. We discussed how we might handle this
situation if it arose and decided to emphasise the purpose of the research prior to interview and through
the questions and probes used. This strategy appeared to be successful in keeping participants engaged in
the research process.
The role of the research team as collaborators in knowledge production
Collaborative research is highly valued for its ability to bring together multiple researchers with distinctive
and specialist perspectives to tackle large or complex research problems, though frequently the ‘putting
together’ of multiple perspectives in the construction of knowledge is not described.248
Within the Being Open research team, there was a strong commitment from the outset to work
collaboratively in the collection, analysis, interpretation and reporting of the qualitative data, though
individual involvement with the various stages of the research process necessarily varied. The three team
members most closely involved in fieldwork (YB, RH, KB) met frequently (on average at least once per week)
to discuss the progress of fieldwork and reflect on data collection; meetings intensified during the early
stages of analysis, when themes and codes were beginning to be identified. At this crucial stage, input was
sought from other members of the research team with extensive experience of qualitative research and a
broad knowledge of patient safety research (VE, IW) to assist with ‘firming up’ the coding framework.
During the early stages of analysis, an all-day meeting was convened in a location away from the
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interruptions of the office environment, which served as a kind of ‘interpretative retreat’. Throughout the
day, we explored a sample of transcripts to gain a sense of the data that were emerging, the effectiveness
of the topic guides and whether or not there may be additional participants who we wanted to invite to
take part. A more intense focus on a subset of transcripts (which had been sent to VE in advance) in a
further half-day analysis session was used to draw up the coding framework that would serve to underpin
the analysis (and interpretation) of all the interview data. This endeavour resulted in an analytic strategy that
was informed by insights from team members with a broad understanding of the research field and
methodological issues, and those with field-based contextual and experiential understanding.
Potential for psychological harm
Members of the research team involved in fieldwork (RH, KB) were acutely sensitive to the possibility that
focusing on the research topic could potentially provoke anxiety in the research participants concerning
the disclosure of adverse events. At the end of each interview, researchers took time to ensure that
participants were not feeling distressed by their participation; in these interviews, none of the participants
expressed such concerns or appeared to be distressed or uneasy.
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Appendix 9 Reference list of included literature
for reviews
References are arranged chronologically by date for unauthored citations followed by alphabetically forfirst author.
Anon. Disclosure of documents by doctors. Br Med J 1985;290:1973–4.
Anon. Needle stick: hospital refused to show patient the incidence report, court says patient can sue.
Legal Eagle Eye Newsletter for the Nursing Profession 1998;6:8.
Anon. Legal questions. Explaining an error: how to break the news. Nursing 1999;29:30.
Anon. Here’s how to admit you made a mistake. ED Manag 2000;12:124–5.
Anon. Medical mistakes: tell patients, families say risk managers in national survey. QRC Advis 2000;16:12.
Anon. Should patients, families be told of mistakes? Healthc Risk Manag 2000;22:88–90.
Anon. An ethical dilemma: Medical errors and medical culture. BMJ 2001;322:1236–7.
Anon. Policy and procedure manual: guidelines for disclosure and discussion of conditions and events with
patients, families and guardians. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001;11:165–8.
Anon. Disclosure requires some hard choices. Healthc Risk Manag 2001;23:137–9.
Anon. Legal questions. After an error: should you tell all? Nursing 2001;31:25.
Anon. News & trends. JCAHO wants doctors to admit errors. Bus Health 2001;19:14.
Anon. Patients must be told of errors. OB-GYN Malpractice Prevention 2001;8:64.
Anon. Plan how you’ll disclose unanticipated outcomes. Healthc Risk Manag 2001;23:139–40.
Anon. The insider: hospital mistakes must be disclosed to patients. Ohio Nurses Rev 2001;76:10.
Anon. John M. Eisenberg Patient Safety Awards. Individual lifetime achievement: Julianne M. Morath, RN, MS.
Jt Comm J Qual Improv 2002;28:637–45.
Anon. Open disclosure: an Australian project. Nurs Ethics 2002;9:557–8.
Anon. Mandatory patient safety training, from the board room to linen room. Healthc Benchmarks
2002;9:1–5.
Anon. Telling patients about mistakes made in their care is the right thing to do and may reduce lawsuits.
AHRQ Research Activities 2002;263:9.
Anon. Sometimes it might just pay to say you’re sorry. Patient Care Manag 2003;19:3–4.
Anon. Disclosure to patients of in-hospital medical errors has increased, but there is room for
improvement. AHRQ Research Activities 2003;275:8.
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Anon. Experts are uncertain whether full disclosure of medical errors will help avoid lawsuits.
AHRQ Research Activities 2003;280:7.
Anon. Fear of lawsuits may make physicians reluctant to disclose medical errors to patients.
AHRQ Research Activities 2003;273:12.
Anon. Disclosure of medical errors. Ann Emerg Med 2004;43:432.
Anon. Disclosure of errors preferred by patients. J Fam Pract 2004;53:525–6.
Anon. Summaries for patients. The effects of telling patients about medical errors. Ann Intern Med
2004;140:I17.
Anon. By the numbers does your organization have a board-approved policy for disclosure? Mod
Healthc 2004;34:9.
Anon. Doctors’ disclosure of medical errors improves patient satisfaction but may not prevent legal action.
AHRQ Research Activities 2004;286:22.
Anon. More hospitals disclosing errors. OR Manager 2004;20:32.
Anon. Nearly half of surveyed hospitals don’t disclose serious errors to patients. Brief Patient Saf 2004;5:4.
Anon. Physicians say they favor disclosure of medical errors to patients and families, but disclosure often
does not occur. AHRQ Research Activities 2004;290:14.
Anon. Professional update. Can apologizing actually prevent a malpractice lawsuit? Contemp OB/GYN
2004;49:25.
Anon. ‘I’m sorry’. Lancet 2005;366:1138.
Anon. Medical liability system hinders improvements in patient safety: Joint Commission expert panel
offers solutions to crisis. Jt Comm Perspect 2005;25:9–10.
Anon. Bad news bearers: telling patients about infections: straightforward apology can head off lawsuit.
Hosp Infect Control 2005;32:110, 115–16.
Anon. Disclosure gap is apparent with docs. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:138–9.
Anon. Disclosure process starts with an apology, then info. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:55–6.
Anon. How to discuss AEs with patients and families: establish a foundation of trust. Patient Educ
Manag 2005;12:67–9.
Anon. ‘I’m sorry’ laws vary, require physicians’ finesse. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:129–30.
Anon. Insurer sees good results from disclosure, apologies. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:112.
Anon. MN hospital creates a culture of full disclosure. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:53–5.
Anon. On its web site, a hospital apologizes for a fatal error. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:21.
Anon. Risk managers, doctors disagree on ‘full disclosure’. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:137–8.
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Anon. Saying ‘I’m sorry’ is starting to pay off with reduced lawsuits and legal costs: some providers seeing
dramatic cutbacks in settlement amounts. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:109–12.
Anon. Survey: doctors respond differently after error. Healthc Risk Manag 2005;27:139.
Anon. When doctors hide medical errors. New York Times 2006;9.
Anon. Bad news bearers: telling patients about infections straightforward apology can head off lawsuit.
Patient Educ Manag 2006;13:33–6.
Anon. Case study. Disclosing errors and examining mistakes: Kaiser Permanente keeps patients informed
and involved. Jt Comm Perspect Patient Saf 2006;6:9–10.
Anon. Critical care’s efforts to disclose medical errors and adverse events may not increase lawsuits.
Healthcare Purchasing News 2006;30:8.
Anon. Federal bill promotes apologies and negotiations. Contemp OB/GYN 2006;51:26–7.
Anon. How you can encourage doctors to disclose errors. Healthc Risk Manag 2006;28:115.
Anon. Physicians still resist full disclosure of errors. Healthc Risk Manag 2006;28:112–15.
Anon. Professional update. Harvard adopts disclosure and apology policy. Contemp OB/GYN 2006;51:22.
Anon. Professional update. The art of presenting bad news vs the risk of getting sued. Contemp OB/GYN
2006;51:25.
Anon. Professional update. Washington state tort reform law incorporates apology clause. Contemp
OB/GYN 2006;51:16.
Anon. Surgeons less likely to disclose errors: study says surgeons provide fewer details. Same-Day Surg
2006;30:124–5.
Anon. Surgeons vary widely in their approaches to disclosing medical errors to their patients.
AHRQ Research Activities 2006;311:3.
Anon. What patients want to know about adverse events. Bandolier 2006;13:4.
Anon. Attorney: openness can actually reduce lawsuits. Hosp Infect Control 2007;34:76–8.
Anon. Full disclosure of medical errors to patients is becoming more and more transparent.
AHRQ Research Activities 2007;328:6.
Anon. NQF updates list of safe practices, urges disclosure. Healthc Risk Manag 2007;29:5–7.
Anon. Patient safety pulse: your patient safety news. Making the case for apologies. Jt Comm Perspect
Patient Saf 2007;7:2.
Anon. Studies reveal that error disclosure is similar among American and Canadian doctors, despite
different malpractice environments. AHRQ Research Activities 2007;317:7–8.
Anon. When you have a serious adverse event should you apologize, waive charges? University of
Michigan system cuts number of pending cases by 80%. Same-Day Surg 2007;31:29–32.
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Anon. Will more hospitals adopt apology-and-disclosure policies? Contemp OB/GYN 2007;52:28.
Anon. Majority of hospitals won’t bill for ‘never events’. Healthc Benchmarks Qual Improv 2008;15:7–9.
Anon. Few medical trainees are trained to disclose errors to patients by the time they assume some patient
care. AHRQ Research Activities 2008;340:2–3.
Anon. How an apology may help you avoid litigation. Urol Times 2008;36:30.
Anon. Most patients want doctors to disclose severe medical errors. AHRQ Research Activities 2008;335:3.
Anon. Doctors, admit your mistakes. Consum Rep 2009;74:12.
Anon. Are ED nurses left out if errors are disclosed? ED Nursing 2009;12:69.
Anon. Avoid a bungled apology: first, get all the facts. Second of a two-part series. ED Legal Lett
2009;20:137, 140–1.
Anon. Don’t inform a patient about this type of error. ED Nursing 2009;12:68.
Anon. Facts concealed from family: no negligence, but civil fraud lawsuit can go forward. Legal Eagle Eye
Newsletter for the Nursing Profession 2009;17:7.
Anon. Making it easier to apologize. Can Nurse 2009;105:6.
Anon. Nurses feel left out of the medical error disclosure process. AHRQ Research Activities 2009;347:23–4.
Anon. Openness is the best policy with patients, says NPSA. Nurs Stand 2009;24:6.
Anon. Patient safety pulse: your patient safety news. Study spotlights medical error disclosure. Jt Comm
Perspect Patient Saf 2009;9:2.
Anon. Professional update. Nurses often excluded from error disclosure. RN 2009;72:15.
Anon. Should you tell patients a drug error was made? ED Nursing 2009;12:68–9.
Anon. Some pediatricians would disclose errors only if harm is evident. AHRQ Research Activities
2009;343:4–5.
Anon. Study finds failure to include nurses in process of admitting errors to patients, families. Healthcare
Purchasing News 2009;33:12.
Anon. Survey responses: do you tell patients about errors? Nursing 2009;39:26.
Anon. Summaries for patients. Does admitting mistakes to patients lead to more lawsuits. Ann Intern Med
2010;153:I-28.
Anon. If providers apologize, will there be a lawsuit? ED Manag 2010;22:20–1.
Anon. Clinical rounds. Disclosing errors: physicians and risk managers disagree. Nursing 2010;40:21.
Anon. Disclosure-with-offer program provides more transparent culture. Patient Saf Monit J 2010;11:1–3.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
164
Anon. Study recommends disclosure of medical mistakes that affect multiple patients. AHRQ Research
Activities 2010;362:20–1.
Anon. Study recommends disclosure of medical mistakes that affect multiple patients. Healthcare
Purchasing News 2010;34:8.
Anon. $3.3M verdict after surgeon says ‘sorry’. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:116–7.
Anon. Court weighs ‘I’m sorry’ vs ‘I’m responsible’. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:118–19.
Anon. Difference between ‘sorry’ and ‘my fault’. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:118.
Anon. Doc tells patient provider not happy. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:120.
Anon. Hasty error disclosure can damage others. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:121.
Anon. Must be 50 ways to say you’re sorry. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:119.
Anon. Study examines barriers to adverse-event disclosure. Jt Comm Perspect Patient Saf 2011;11:2.
Anon. Take a pause after the apology. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:117.
Anon. When, how to disclose a provider’s errors. Same-Day Surg 2011;35:119–20.
Anon. Amy Francis Inquest: Patient Died After Attempt to Remove Wrong Organ. BBC; 2012.
URL: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-16533134 (accessed 20 January 2012).
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Links to Documents and Resources Relating to Being
Open. URL: www.ahrq.gov (accessed 2 December 2012).
Action Against Medical Accidents (AvMA). Legal Duty of Candour – ‘Robbie’s Law’. URL: www.avma.org.
uk/pages/legal_duty_of_candour_-_robbies_law.html (accessed 2 December 2012).
Action Against Medical Accidents (AvMA). Links to Documents Relating to Being Open. URL: www.avma.
org.uk/pages/about_us.html (accessed 2 December 2012).
Aasland OG, Forde R. Impact of feeling responsible for adverse events on doctors’ personal and
professional lives: the importance of being open to criticism from colleagues. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:13–17.
Agapito JC. Scientia et Mores: veracity, ethics and the radiation therapist. Can J Med Radiat Technol
1998;29:18–23.
Aitkenhead AR. Anaesthetic disasters: handling the aftermath. Anaesthesia 1997;52:477–82.
Allan A. Apology in civil law: A psycho-legal perspective. Psychiatr Psychol Law 2007;14:5–16.
Allan A, McKillop D. The health implications of apologizing after an adverse event. Int J Qual Health Care
2010;22:126–31.
Allen G. Evidence for practice: Perceptions of error definition, reporting, and disclosure. AORN J
2006;84:494, 496–7.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
165
Allen S. Story telling an innovation to improve healthcare incident disclosure. Women Birth
2011;24(Suppl. 1):23.
Allman J. Bearing the burden or baring the soul: physicians’ self-disclosure and boundary management
regarding medical mistakes. Health Commun 1998;10:175–97.
Almaramhy H, Al-Shobaili H, El-Hadary K, Dandash K. Knowledge and attitude towards patient
safety among a group of undergraduate medical students in Saudi Arabia. Int J Health Sci (Qassim)
2011;5:59–67.
Amatuzio J. To tell you the truth. Minn Med 2005;88:60.
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management. Disclosure of Unanticipated Events: Creating an
Effective Patient Communication Policy. Chicago, IL: American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of
the American Hospital Association; 2003.
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management. Disclosure of Unanticipated Events: The Next Step in
Better Communication. Chicago, IL: American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of the American
Hospital Association; 2003.
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management. Disclosure: what works now and what can work even
better. J Healthc Risk Manag 2004;24:19–26.
Amori G, Popp PL. The timing of early resolution: Working at the patient’s pace. J Healthc Risk Manag
2007;27:19–23.
Appelbaum PS. Law & psychiatry: reforming malpractice: the prospects for change. Psychiatr Serv
2011;62:6–8.
Applegate WB. Physician management of patients with adverse outcomes. Arch Intern Med
1986;146:2249–52.
Armstrong D. The power of apology : how saying sorry can leave both patients and nurses feeling better.
Nurs Times 2009;105:16–19.
Asghari F, Fotouhi A, Jafarian A. Doctors’ views of attitudes towards peer medical error. Qual Saf Health
Care 2009;18:209–12.
Atterbury C. Apologies go a long way towards making amends adverse incidents. Nurs Stand 2003;17:30.
Atwood D. Impact of medical apology statutes and policies. J Nursing Law 2008;12:43–53.
Aubrey ME. The error of our ways. CMAJ 2001;165:270–2.
Ausman JI. Trust, malpractice, and honesty in medicine: should doctors say they are sorry? Surg Neurol
2006;66:105–6.
Bacon AK, Morris RW, Runciman WB, Currie M. Crisis management during anaesthesia: recovering from a
crisis. Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e25.
Baggett P. I’m sorry: apologizing for a mistake might prevent a lawsuit. Tex Med 2005;101:56–9.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
166
Bailey TM, Robertson EC, Hegedus G. Erecting legal barriers: new apology laws in Canada and the patient
safety movement: useful legislation or a misguided approach? Health Law Can 2007;28:33–8.
Bakalar N. Medical errors? Patients may be the last to know. New York Times 2006;29:F7.
Baker KR. Can I say ‘I’m sorry’? Drug Top 2011;155.
Baker S, Lauro C, Sintim-Damoa A. Malpractice allegations and apology laws: benefits and risks for
radiologists. J Am Coll Radiol 2008;5:1186–90.
Bancroft NP. Physician shame: An obstacle to disclosing adverse outcomes. Clin Manag 2007;15:3–10.
Banik DMR, Simon SR. Medical errors: Do physicians want to tell? Do geriatric patients want to know?
J Am Geriatr Soc 2005;53:S68.
Banja J. Moral courage in medicine – disclosing medical error. Bioeth Forum 2001;17:7–11.
Banja J. CM ethics Medical errors 101: a primer. Case Manager 2005;16:57–9.
Banja JD. Disclosing medical error: how much to tell? J Healthc Risk Manag 2003;23:11–14.
Banja JD. Ethically speaking: the case manager’s response to harm-causing error. Case Manager
2005;16:60–4.
Banja JD. Problematic medical errors and their implications for disclosure. HEC Forum 2008;20:201–13.
Barach P. The end of the beginning: lessons learned from the patient safety movement. J Leg Med
2003;24:7–27.
Barach P, Cantor MD. Adverse event disclosure: benefits and drawbacks for patients and clinicians.
In Clarke S, Oakley J, editors. Informed Consent and Clinician Accountability: The Ethics of Report
Cards on Surgeon Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007. pp. 76–90.
Barron WM, Kuczewski MG. Unanticipated harm to patients: deciding when to disclose outcomes.
Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2003;29:551–5.
Barsella RM. It’s hard to say ‘I’m sorry’. NurseWeek 2007;14:30–1.
Bartlett P. Doctors as fiduciaries: equitable regulation of the doctor-patient relationship. Med Law Rev
1997;5:193–224.
Baum M. Making Amends misses the point. BMJ 2004;328:407.
Baumrucker SJ. A medical error leads to tragedy: how do we inform the patient? Am J Hosp Palliat Care
2006;23:417–21.
Bayley C. Turning the Titanic: changing the way we handle mistakes. HEC Forum 2001;13:148–59.
Bayley C. Medical mistakes and institutional culture. In Sharpe VA, editor. Accountability: Patient Safety
and Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 2004. pp. 99–119.
Baylis F. Errors in medicine: nurturing truthfulness. J Clin Ethics 1997;8:336–40.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
167
Beer Z, Guttman N, Brezis M. Discordant public and professional perceptions on transparency in
healthcare. QJM 2005;98:462–3.
Bell SK, Smulowitz PB, Woodward AC, Mello MM, Duva AM, Boothman RC, et al. Disclosure, apology, and
offer programs: stakeholders’ views of barriers to and strategies for broad implementation. Milbank Q
2012;90:682–705.
Berlin L. Reporting the ‘missed’ radiologic diagnosis: medicolegal and ethical considerations.
Radiology 1994;192:183–7.
Berlin L. Malpractice issues in radiology. Admitting mistakes. AJR Am J Roentgenol 199;172:879–84.
Berlin L. Will saying ‘I’m sorry’ prevent a malpractice lawsuit? AJR Am J Roentgenol 2006;187:10–15.
Berlin L. The mea culpa conundrum. Radiology 2009;253:284–7.
Berlinger N. What is meant by telling the truth: Bonhoeffer on the ethics of disclosure. Stud Christ Ethics
2003;16:80–92.
Berlinger N. Avoiding cheap grace. Medical harm, patient safety, and the culture(s) of forgiveness. Hastings
Cent Rep 2003;33:28–36.
Berlinger N. Fair compensation without litigation: addressing patients’ financial need in disclosure.
J Healthc Risk Manag 2004;24:7–11.
Berlinger N, Wu AW. Subtracting insult from injury: addressing cultural expectations in the disclosure of
medical error. J Med Ethics 2005;31:106–8.
Bernstein M, Brown B. Doctors’ duty to disclose error: a deontological or Kantian ethical analysis.
Can J Neurol Sci 2004;31:169–74.
Bernstein M, Hébert PC, Etchells E. Patient safety in neurosurgery: detection of errors, prevention of errors,
and disclosure of errors. Neurosurg Q 2003;13:125–37.
Berry M. Saying the right thing when things go wrong. RN 2004;67:59–61.
Bismark M, Paterson R. ‘Doing the right thing’ after an adverse event. N Z Med J 2005;118:U1593.
Bismark MM. The power of apology. N Z Med J 2009;122:96–106.
Bluebond-Langner R, Rodriguez ED, Wu AW. Discussing adverse outcomes with patients and families.
Oral Maxillofac Surg Clin North Am 2010;22:471–9.
Boden TW. It’s hard for me to say I’m sorry. MGMA Connex 2011;11:36–9.
Boivin J. Confidence gained: full medical error disclosure improves quality of care. Nurs Spectr (N Engl Ed)
2005;9:13.
Bonnema RA, Gosman GG, Arnold RM. Teaching error disclosure to residents: a curricular innovation and
pilot study. J Grad Med Educ 2009;1:114–18.
Boothman RC. Apologies and a strong defense at the University of Michigan Health System. Physician
Exec 2006;32:7–10.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
168
Boston Bar Association. Medical Malpractice: Emerging Issues in Apology Disclosure and Peer Review.
Boston, MA: BBA Continuing Legal Education; 2010.
Bovbjerg RR. Medical safety: from stories to policy. Health Aff 2001;20:241–2.
Bovbjerg RR, Tancredi LR. Liability reform should make patients safer: ‘Avoidable classes of events’ are a
key improvement. J Law Med Ethics 2005;33:478–500.
Boyle D, O’Connell D, Platt FW, Albert RK. Disclosing errors and adverse events in the intensive care unit.
Crit Care Med 2006;34:1532–7.
Boyte WR. Casey’s legacy. Health Aff 2001;20:250–4.
Bradley C, Brasel K. Disclosing medical error #194. J Palliat Care Med 2009;12:555–6.
Bradley CT, Brasel KJ. Core competencies in palliative care for surgeons: interpersonal and communication
skills. Am J Hosp Palliat Med 2007;24:499–507.
Brahams D. Should doctors admit their mistakes? Med Leg J 2005;73:41–4.
Brandom BW, Callahan P, Micalizzi DA. What happens when things go wrong? Paediatr Anaesth
2011;21:730–6.
Brazeau C. Disclosing the truth about a medical error. Am Fam Physician 1999;60:1013–14.
Bressler HJ. Safety issues as exemplified by the activities of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations: context for the safety and disclosure standards. J Health Law 2002;35:179–87.
Brooke PS. Legal questions. Revealing medication errors: is honesty the best policy? Nursing 2005;35:29.
Brooke PS. Legal questions. Reporting med errors: who needs to know? Nursing 2008;38:11.
Bruder KL, Gambone JC. Patient safety series: understanding and implementing the regulatory
requirements. ACOG Clin Rev 2003;8:1–5.
Buckley J. Open Disclosure and Medical Claims Study. URL: www.cf.nlm.nih.gov/hsr_project/
view_hsrproj_record.cfm?PROGRAM_CAME=search_fields.cfm&NLMUNIQUE_ID=20104205&
SEARCH_FOR=20104205 (accessed 2 December 2012).
Buerhaus P. Is hospital patient care becoming safer? A conversation with Lucian Leape. Interview by
Peter I. Buerhaus. Health Aff 2007;26:w687–96. [Erratum published in Health Aff(Millwood) 2007;26:
following w696.]
Burchardi H. Are we honest enough with our patients? Intensive Care Med 1998;24:1237–8.
Butcher L. Lawyers say ‘sorry’ may sink you in court. Physician Exec 2006;32:20–4.
Bute JJ. Review of medical errors and medical narcissism. Health Commun 2006;20:105–7.
Calvert JF Jr, Hollander-Rodriguez J, Atlas M, Johnson KE. Clinical inquiries. What are the repercussions of
disclosing a medical error? J Fam Pract 2008;57:124–5.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
169
Camire E, Moyen E, Stelfox HT. Medication errors in critical care: risk factors, prevention and disclosure.
CMAJ 2009;180:936–43.
Canadian Patient Safety Institute. Canadian Disclosure Guidelines. Being Open with Patients and Families.
URL: www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/toolsResources/disclosure/Documents/CPSI%20Canadian%
20Disclosure%20Guidelines.pdf (accessed 2 December 2012).
Canadian Patient Safety Institute. Background Paper for the Development of National Guidelines for the
Disclosure of Adverse Events Canada. URL: www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/toolsResources/disclosure/
Documents/Background%20Paper%20for%20the%20Canadian%20Disclosure%20Guidelines.pdf
(accessed 2 December 2012).
Canadian Patient Safety Institute. Disclosure Training Programs. URL: www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/
toolsResources/disclosure/DisclosureTraining/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 2 December 2012).
Canadian Patient Safety Institute. The Impact of Disclosure of Adverse Events on Litigation and Settlement:
A Review for the Canadian Patient Safety Institute 2007. URL: www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/
toolsResources/disclosure/Documents/The%20Impact%20of%20Disclosure%20on%20Litigation%20a%
20Review%20for%20the%20CPSI.pdf (accessed 2 December 2012).
Cantor MD. Telling patients the truth: a systems approach to disclosing adverse events. Qual Saf Health
Care 2002;11:7–8.
Cantor MD, Barach P, Derse A, Maklan CW, Wlody GS, Fox E. Disclosing adverse events to patients.
Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2005;31:5–12.
Casey JM, Afable RF. Contract or covenant? Health Prog 2004;85:25–7.
Clark C. Medical error second victims get some help finally. Health Leaders Media, 17 January 2013.
URL: www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/QUA-288425/Medical-Error-Second-Victims-Get-Some-
Help-Finally## (accessed 5 February 2013).
Coustan DR, Mathieu PL, Rakatansky H, Sullivan FW, Hamolsky MW. Commentaries on reporting
physicians’ mistakes. R I Med J 1990;73:336–44.
Cramer H, Foraita R, Habermann M. Nursing errors and the consequences. Results of a survey of nurses
from inpatient care institutions. Pflege 2012;25:245–59.
Dalton GD, Samaropoulos XF, Dalton AC. Improvements in the safety of patient care can help end the
medical malpractice crisis in the United States. Health Policy 2008;86:153–62.
Danesh HN. The Ethics of Disclosure: How an Ethical Decision Making Framework Can Contribute to
Determining When Disclosure is Appropriate. Dissertation Abstracts International 2010;72:1406.
Darr K. Communication: the key to reducing malpractice claims. Hosp Top 1997;75:4–6.
Darr K. Uncircling the wagons: informing patients about unanticipated outcomes. Hosp Top 2001;79:33–5.
Daud-Gallotti RM, Morinaga CV, Arlindo-Rodrigues M, Velasco IT, Martins MA, Tiberio IC. A new method
for the assessment of patient safety competencies during a medical school clerkship using an objective
structured clinical examination. Clinics (Sao Paulo) 2011;66:1209–15.
Daugherty CG. Revealing a medication error. Am Fam Physician 2000;62:315.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
170
Davies JM. Disclosure. Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 2005;49:725–7.
de Cassia Pires Coli R, dos Anjos MF, Pereira LL. The attitudes of nurses from an intensive care unit in the
face of errors: an approach in light of bioethics. Rev Lat Am Enfermagem 2010;18:324–30.
De Freitas GF, Hoga LAK, Fernandes MDP, González JS, Ruiz MCS, Bonini BB. Brazilian registered nurses’
perceptions and attitudes towards adverse events in nursing care: a phenomenological study.
J Nurs Manag 2011;19:331–8.
Demorest BH. When it’s okay to say you’re sorry. Surv Ophthalmol 2001;46:190–1.
Department of Health. A Consultation on Strengthening the NHS Constitution. London: The Stationery
Office; 2012.
DerGurahian J. When sorry is enough. Study finds owning up to mistakes better approach. Mod Healthc
2009;39:17.
DeVita MA. Honestly, do we need a policy on truth? Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001;11:157–64.
Dewan JA. Adverse events: accountability and disclosure attitudes of student nurse anesthetists (SRNAs).
State of the Science Oral and Poster Sessions: part 2. AANA J 2006;74:465.
Dickens B. Disclosing adverse outcomes in medical care: FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human
Reproduction and Women’s Health. Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2010;111:192.
Dickens BM. Medical errors: legal and ethical responses. Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2003;81:109–14.
Dietz I, Borasio GD, Molnar C, Müller-Busch C, Plog A, Schneider G, et al. Errors in palliative care: kinds,
causes, and consequences: a pilot survey of experiences and attitudes of palliative care professionals.
J Palliat Med 2013;16:74–81.
Dintzis S, Gallagher TH. Anatomic pathologists’ attitudes and experiences regarding error disclosure.
United States and Canadian Academy of Pathology, Annual Meeting, Washington, DC,
20–26 March 2010.
Dintzis SM, Gallagher TH. Disclosing harmful pathology errors to patients. Am J Clin Pathol
2009;131:463–5.
Dintzis SM, Stetsenko GY, Sitlani CM, Gronowski AM, Astion ML, Gallagher TH. Communicating
pathology and laboratory errors: anatomic pathologists’ and laboratory medical directors’ attitudes and
experiences. Am J Clin Pathol 2011;135:760–5.
Donn SM, McDonnell WM. When bad things happen: adverse event reporting and disclosure as patient
safety and risk management tools in the neonatal intensive care unit. Am J Perinatol 2012;29:65–70.
Donohue P, Boss R, Valdez RC, Shepard J. Inherent risks vs. medical errors in the NICU: parent perceptions
and physician disclosure. Acta Paediatr 2009;98:9–10.
Doucette E, Fazio S, LaSalle V, Malcius C, Mills J, Archer TR, et al. Full disclosure of adverse events to
patients and families in the ICU: wouldn’t you want to know? Dynamics 2010;21:16–19.
Downing L, Potter RL. Heartland Regional Medical Center makes a ‘fitting response’ to medical mistakes.
Bioeth Forum 2001;17:12–18.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
171
Dresser R. The limits of apology laws. Hastings Cent Rep 2008;38:6–7.
Droppo L. Trillium Health Centre’s journey to disclosure. Healthc Q 2005;8:151–6.
Duclos CW, Eichler M, Taylor L, Quintela J, Main DS, Pace W, et al. Patient perspectives of patient-provider
communication after adverse events. Int J Qual Health Care 2005;17:479–86.
Duke MB, Wilson JF. Responding to medical error: factors that influence the likelihood of disclosure by
medical residents. J Investig Med 2007;55:S310.
Dunavan CP. Doctor files. Sometimes, it has to be said: ‘I made a mistake’. Los Angeles Times – Southern
California Edition, 27 March 2006.
Dyer C. NHS staff should inform patients of negligent acts. BMJ 2003;327:7.
Eadie A. Medical error reporting: should it be mandatory in Scotland? J Forensic Leg
Med 2012;19:437–41.
Edwin A. Non-disclosure of medical errors an egregious violation of ethical principles. Ghana Med J
2009;43:34–9.
Eisenberg D. When doctors say, ‘we’re sorry’. Time 2005;166:50–2.
Elhence P. Ethical issues in transfusion medicine. Indian J Med Ethics 2006;3:87–9.
Elwy AR. Patients’ and Providers’ Perceptions of Communicating an Adverse Event. URL: www.cf.nlm.nih.
gov/hsr_project/view_hsrproj_record.cfm?PROGRAM_CAME=search_fields.cfm&NLMUNIQUE_ID=
20094071&SEARCH_FOR=20094071 (accessed 2 December 2012).
Erlen JA. Medication errors: ethical implications. Orthop Nurs 2001;20:82–5.
Espin S, Levinson W, Regehr G, Baker GR, Lingard L. Error or ‘act of God’? A study of patients’ and
operating room team members’ perceptions of error definition, reporting, and disclosure. Surgery
2006;139:6–14.
Etchegarary JM, Gallagher TH, Bell SK, Dunlap B, Thomas EJ. Error disclosure: a new domain for safety
culture assessment. BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:594–9.
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Disclosure of medical errors
involving gametes and embryos. Fertil Steril 2006;86:513–15.
Evans SB, Decker R. Disclosing medical errors: a practical guide and discussion of radiation oncology-
specific controversies. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys 2011;80:1285–8.
Evans SB, Yu JB, Chagpar AB. Medical error disclosure attitudes among radiation oncologists. Int J Radiat
Oncol Biol Phys 2011;81:S563.
Everett JP, Walters CA, Stottlemyer DL, Knight CA, Oppenberg AA, Orr RD. To lie or not to lie: resident
physician attitudes about the use of deception in clinical practice. J Med Ethics 2011;37:333–8.
Fallowfield L. Communication with patients after errors. J Health Serv Res Policy 2010;15(Suppl. 1):56–9.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
172
Fasler K. Integrating disclosure, patient safety and risk management activities. J Healthc Risk
Manag 2008;28:19–25.
Faunce TA, Bolsin SN. Fiduciary disclosure of medical mistakes: the duty to promptly notify patients of
adverse health care events. J Law Med 2005;12:478–82.
Federico F. Hospitals disclosing harm. Health Aff 2003;22:248; author reply 249.
Fein S, Hilborne L, Kagawa-Singer M, Spiritus E, Keenan C. Conceptual Model for Disclosure of Medical
Errors. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2005.
Fein SP, Hilborne LH, Spiritus EM, Seyman GB, Keenan CR, Shojania KG, et al. Shades of gray: the
spectrum of medical error disclosure and its influences. J Gen Intern Med 2004;19:210.
Fein SP, Hilborne LH, Spiritus EM, Seymann GB, Keenan CR, Shojania KG, et al. The many faces of error
disclosure: a common set of elements and a definition. J Gen Intern Med 2007;22:755–61.
Feinmann J. You can say sorry. BMJ 2009;339:b3057.
Feinmann J. Why sorry doesn’t need to be the hardest word. BMJ 2011;342:1238–9.
Fentiman I. Litigation and doctor-patient communication. Clin Risk 2003;9:180–1.
Fiesta J. Legal aspects of medication administration. Nurs Manage 1998;29:22–3.
Fischer MA, Mazor KM, Baril J, Alper E, DeMarco D, Pugnaire M. Learning from mistakes. Factors that
influence how students and residents learn from medical errors. J Gen Intern Med 2006;21:419–23.
Fisseni G, Pentzek M, Abholz H-H. Responding to serious medical error in general practice – consequences
for the GPs involved: analysis of 75 cases from Germany. Fam Pract 2008;25:9–13.
Fleming C. New Health Affairs: Some Physicians Not Always Honest With Patients. Health Affairs Blog;
8 February 2012. URL: http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/08/new-health-affairs-some-physicians-
not-always-honest-with-patients (accessed 2 December 2012).
Flemons WW, Davies JM, MacLeod B. Disclosing medical errors. CMAJ 2007;177:1236.
Flotta D, Rizza P, Bianco A, Pileggi C, Pavia M. Patient safety and medical errors: knowledge, attitudes and
behavior among Italian hospital physicians. Int J Qual Health Care 2012;24:258–65.
Fox PK, Patterson S. Practical ethics. To apologize or not, that is the question. Hosp Health Netw
2006;80:24.
Fox R. I am sorry that we lost your leg. J R Soc Med 1996;89:181.
Freckelton I. Apologies, medicine and the law. J Law Med 2008;16:200–8.
Freeman Cook A, Hoas H, Guttmannova K, Joyner JC. An error by any other name. Am J Nurs
2004;104:32–43.
Freitas GF. Daily activities of nursing auxiliaries and technicians in relation to ethical events. Rev Lat Am
Enfermagem 2009;17:449–54.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
173
Frenkel DN, Liebman CB. Words that heal. Ann Intern Med 2004;140:482–3.
Friedman AL, Lee KC, Lee GD. Errors in ABO labeling of deceased donor kidneys: case reports and
approach to ensuring patient safety. Am J Transplant 2007;7:480–3.
Gallagher TH. A 62-year-old woman with skin cancer who experienced wrong-site surgery: review of
medical error. JAMA 2009;302:669–77.
Gallagher TH, Bell SK, Smith KM, Mello MM, McDonald TB. Disclosing harmful medical errors to patients:
tackling three tough cases. Chest 2009;136:897–903.
Gallagher TH, Cook AJ, Brenner RJ, Carney PA, Miglioretti DL, Geller BM, et al. Disclosing harmful
mammography errors to patients. Radiology 2009;253:443–52.
Gallagher TH, Denham CR, Leape LL, Amori G, Levinson W. Disclosing unanticipated outcomes to patients:
the art and practice. J Patient Saf 2007;3:158–65.
Gallagher TH, Garbutt JM, Waterman AD, Flum DR, Larson EB, Waterman BM, et al. Choosing your
words carefully: how physicians would disclose harmful medical errors to patients. Arch Intern Med
2006;166:1585–93.
Gallagher TH, Greene S, Roblin D, Calvi J, Horner K, Prouty C, et al. Patients’ views on delayed diagnosis in
cancer. JClin Oncol 2010;28(Suppl. 1):6098.
Gallagher TH, Lucas MH. Should we disclose harmful medical errors to patients? If so, how? J Clin
Outcomes Manag 2005;12:253–9.
Gallagher TH, Studdert D, Levinson W. Disclosing harmful medical errors to patients. N Engl J Med
2007;356:2713–19.
Gallagher TH, Waterman AD, Ebers AG, Fraser VJ, Levinson W. Patients’ and physicians’ attitudes
regarding the disclosure of medical errors. JAMA 2003;289:1001–7.
Gallagher TH, Waterman AD, Garbutt JM, Kapp JM, Chan DK, Dunagan WC, et al. US and Canadian
physicians’ attitudes and experiences regarding disclosing errors to patients. Arch Intern Med
2006;166:1605–11.
Garbutt J, Brownstein DR, Klein EJ, Waterman A, Krauss MJ, Marcuse EK, et al. Reporting and disclosing
medical errors: pediatricians’ attitudes and behaviors. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2007;161:179–85.
Ghalandarpoorattar SM, Kaviani A, Asghari F. Medical error disclosure: the gap between attitude and
practice. Postgrad Med J 2012;88:130–3.
Gooderham P. Disclosure of medical error. J R Soc Med 2005;98:437; author reply 437.
Grayson M. Human nature. Hosp Health Netw 2004;78:8.
Greene DA. Nursing experiences with disclosure of errors to patients. South Online J Nurs Res 2008;8:2.
Gu X, Itoh K. Patient views and attitudes to physician’s actions after medical errors in China. J Patient Saf
2012;8:153–60.
Gutheil TG. Commentary: Systems, sensitivity, and ‘sorry’. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2006;34:101–2.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
174
Hammami MM, Attalah S, Al Qadire M. Which medical error to disclose to patients and by whom?
Public preference and perceptions of norm and current practice. BMC Med Ethics 2010;11:17.
Hannawa AF. Negotiating medical virtues: toward the development of a physician mistake disclosure
model. Health Commun 2009;24:391–9.
Hannawa AF. Shedding light on the dark side of doctor–patient interactions: verbal and nonverbal
messages physicians communicate during error disclosures. Patient Educ Couns 2011;84:344–51.
Hannawa AF. ‘Explicitly implicit’: examining the importance of physician nonverbal involvement during
error disclosures. Swiss Med Wkly 2012;142:w13576.
Harrington B. Medical errors and medical culture. Changing the culture of blame requires a revolution.
BMJ 2001;323:570–1.
Hatlie MJ, Sheridan SE. The medical liability crisis of 2003: must we squander the chance to put patients
first? Health Aff 2003;22:37–40.
Hébert PC. Patients must be told of unintended injuries during treatment. BMJ 1999;318:1762.
[Erratum published in BMJ 1999;319:1253.]
Hébert PC, Levin AV, Robertson G. Bioethics for clinicians: 23. Disclosure of medical error. CMAJ
2001;164:509–13.
Hébert PC, Levin AV, Robertson G. Disclosure of medical error. In Singer PA, Viens AM, editors.
The Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2008. pp. 257–65.
Henry LL. Disclosure of medical errors: ethical considerations for the development of a facility policy and
organizational culture change. Policy Polit Nurs Pract 2005;6:127–34.
Hevia A, Hobgood C. Medical error during residency: to tell or not to tell. Ann Emerg Med
2003;42:565–70.
Hingorani M, Wong T, Vafidis G. Patients’ and doctors’ attitudes to amount of information given after
unintended injury during treatment: cross sectional, questionnaire survey. BMJ 1999;318:640–1.
Hobgood C, Hevia A. Disclosing medical error: a professional standard. Hosp Physician 2004;40:41–52.
Hobgood C, Hevia A, Hinchey P. Profiles in patient safety: when an error occurs. Acad Emerg Med
2004;11:766–70.
Hobgood C, Hevia A, Tamayo-Sarver JH, Weiner B, Riviello R. The influence of the causes and contexts of
medical errors on emergency medicine residents’ responses to their errors: an exploration. Acad Med
2005;80:758–64.
Hobgood C, Peck CR, Gilbert B, Chappell K, Zou B. Medical errors – what and when: what do patients
want to know? Acad Emerg Med 2002;9:1156–61.
Hobgood C, Tamayo-Sarver JH, Elms A, Weiner B. Parental preferences for error disclosure, reporting, and
legal action after medical error in the care of their children. Pediatrics 2005;116:1276–86.
Hobgood C, Tamayo-Sarver JH, Weiner B. Patient race/ethnicity, age, gender and education are not related
to preference for or response to disclosure. Qual Saf Health Care 2008;17:65–70.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
175
Hobgood C, Weiner B, Tamayo-Sarver JH. Medical error identification, disclosure, and reporting:
do emergency medicine provider groups differ? Acad Emerg Med 2006;13:443–51.
Hobgood C, Xie J, Weiner B, Hooker J. Error identification, disclosure, and reporting: practice patterns of
three emergency medicine provider types. Acad Emerg Med 2004;11:196–9.
Hofmann PB. Telling patients of mistakes. Hastings Cent Rep 2006;36:7.
Holden J. Saying sorry is not the same as admitting legal liability. BMJ 2009;338:370.
Huntoon MA, Levy RM. How to keep a bad outcome from becoming a lawsuit. Pain Med
2008;9(Suppl. 1):128–32.
Hurst JA. Puzzling out disclosure programs: where do you fit into the picture? Nursing 2011;41:50–4.
Ibrahim A, Garba ES, Asuku ME. Challenges in disclosure of adverse events and errors in surgery;
perspectives from sub-Saharan Africa. Pan Afr Med J 2012;12:82.
Iedema R, Allen S. Anatomy of an incident disclosure: the importance of dialogue. Jt Comm J Qual Patient
Saf 2012;38:435–42.
Iedema R. Attitudes toward error disclosure need to engage with systems thinking. Jt Comm J Qual Patient
Saf 2010;36:99–100.
Iedema R, Allen S, Britton K, Piper D, Baker A, Grbich C, et al. Patients’ and family members’ views on
how clinicians enact and how they should enact incident disclosure: the ‘100 patient stories’ qualitative
study. BMJ 2011;343:d4423.
Iedema R, Jorm C, Wakefield J, Ryan C, Dunn S. Practising Open Disclosure: clinical incident
communication and systems improvement. Sociol Health Illn 2009;31:262–77.
Iedema R, Jorm C, Wakefield J, Ryan C, Sorensen R. A new structure of attention?: Open disclosure of
adverse events to patients and their families. J Lang Soc Psychol 2009;28:139–57.
Iedema R, Sorensen R, Manias E, Tuckett A, Piper D, Mallock N, et al. Patients’ and family members’
experiences of open disclosure following adverse events. Int J Qual Health Care 2008;20:421–32.
Iedema RAM, Mallock NA, Sorensen RJ, Manias E, Tuckett AG, Williams AF, et al. The National Open
Disclosure Pilot: evaluation of a policy implementation initiative. Med J Aust 2008;188:397–400.
Itoh K, Andersen HB. Patient reactions to staff apology after adverse event and changes of their views in
four year interval. In Palanque PVJWM, editor. Human Error, Safety and Systems Development. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin; 2010. pp. 28–43.
Itoh K, Andersen HB, Madsen MD, Ostergaard D, Ikeno M. Patient views of adverse events: comparisons
of self-reported healthcare staff attitudes with disclosure of accident information. Appl Ergon
2006;37:513–23.
Jeffs L, Espin S, Rorabeck L, Shannon SE, Robins L, Levinson W, et al. Not overstepping professional
boundaries: the challenging role of nurses in simulated error disclosures. J Nurs Care Qual 2011;26:320–7.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
176
Jeffs L, Espin S, Shannon SE, Levinson W, Kohn MK, Lingard L. A new way of relating: perceptions
associated with a team-based error disclosure simulation intervention. BMJ Qual Saf
2010;19(Suppl. 3):i57–60.
Jerrold L. Litigation, legislation, and ethics: hiding the truth. Am J Orthod Dentofacial Orthop
1997;111:455–6.
Johnson C. We made a mistake. Nurs Manage 2000;31:22–4.
Johnson C, Horton S. Owning up to errors: put an end to the blame game. Nursing 2001;31:54.
Johnstone M. Clinical risk management and the ethics of open disclosure when things go wrong:
implications for the nursing profession. Australas Emerg Nurs J 2007;10:215–6.
Johnstone M. Clinical risk management and the ethics of open disclosure: part I. Benefits and risks to
patient safety. Australas Emerg Nurs J 2008;11:88–94.
Johnstone M. Clinical risk management and the ethics of open disclosure: part 2. Implications for the
nursing profession. Australas Emerg Nurs J 2008;11:123–9.
Jones JW, McCullough LB, Richman BW. What to tell patients harmed by other physicians. J Vasc Surg
2003;38:866–7.
Josefson D. Hospitals must inform patients of errors. BMJ 2001;323:9.
Kachalia A, Kaufman SR, Boothman R, Anderson S, Welch K, Saint S, et al. Liability claims and costs before
and after implementation of a medical error disclosure program. Ann Intern Med 2010;153:213–21.
Kachalia A, Shojania KG, Hofer TP, Piotrowski M, Saint S. Does full disclosure of medical errors affect
malpractice liability? The jury is still out. Jt Comm J Qual Saf 2003;29:503–11.
Kachalia A, Shojania KG, Hofer TP, Saint SK. How does full disclosure of medical mistakes impact
malpractice liability? J Gen Intern Med 2003;18:133.
Kaldjian LC, Jones EW, Rosenthal GE. Physician disclosure of medical errors: a literature-based framework
of relevant beliefs, values, fears, and barriers. J Gen Intern Med 2003;18:233.
Kaldjian LC, Jones EW, Rosenthal GE. Facilitating and impeding factors for physicians’ error disclosure:
a structured literature review. Jt Comm J Qual Saf 2006;32:188–98.
Kaldjian LC, Jones EW, Rosenthal GE, Tripp-Reimer T, Hillis SL. An empirically derived taxonomy of factors
affecting physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors. J Gen Intern Med 2006;21:942–8.
Kaldjian LC, Jones EW, Wu BJ, Forman-Hoffman VL, Levi BH, Rosenthal GE. Disclosing medical errors to
patients: attitudes and practices of physicians and trainees. J Gen Intern Med 2007;22:988–96.
Kalra J. Disclosure of medical error – Response. J R Soc Med 2005;98:437.
Kapp MB. Medical mistakes and older patients: admitting errors and improving care. J Am Geriatr Soc
2001;49:1361–5.
Kapp MB. Resident safety and medical errors in nursing homes: reporting and disclosure in a culture of
mutual distrust. J Leg Med 2003;24:51–76.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
177
Katsuhara Y. What moral requirements cause ethical dilemmas among nurse executives? J Jpn Acad Nurs
Sci 2003;23:1–10.
Kaul TK. Catastrophic situation & communication. J Anaesthesiol Clin Pharmacol 2008;24:381–2.
Kiersma ME, Darbishire PL, Plake KS, Oswald C, Walters BM. Laboratory session to improve first-year
pharmacy students’ knowledge and confidence concerning the prevention of medication errors.
Am J Pharm Educ 2009;73:99.
Kilpatrick K. Apology marks new era in response to medical error, hospital says. CMAJ 2003;168:757.
Kim KS, Kwon S-H, Kim J-A, Cho S. Nurses’ perceptions of medication errors and their contributing factors
in South Korea. J Nurs Manag 2011;19:346–53.
Kim S, Brock D, Prouty CD, Odegard PS, Shannon SE, Robins L, et al. A web-based team-oriented medical
error communication assessment tool: development, preliminary reliability, validity, and user ratings.
Teach Learn Med 2011;23:68–77.
Kirshtein J. Hospital errors. ‘Doctors, admit your mistakes’. Consum Rep Health 2010;75:5.
Kmietowicz Z. NHS Constitution is ‘patchy, low key, and inconsistent,’ says review. BMJ 2012;345:e7494.
Knifed E, Goyal A, Bernstein M. Moral angst for surgical residents: a qualitative study. Am J Surg
2010;199:571–6.
Koh THHG, Alcock G. Open disclosure: appropriate timing is crucial. Int J Qual Health Care 2007;19:326.
Kondro W. Adverse events disclosure. CMAJ 2008;178:1128.
Kraman SS, Hamm G. Risk management: extreme honesty may be the best policy. Ann Intern Med
1999;131:963–7.
Krizek TJ. Surgical error: ethical issues of adverse events. Arch Surg 2000;135:1359–66.
Kroll L, Singleton A, Collier J, Rees Jones I. Learning not to take it seriously: junior doctors’ accounts of
error. Med Educ 2008;42:982–90.
Kronman AC, Paasche-Orlow M, Orlander JD. Factors associated with disclosure of medical errors by
housestaff. BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:271–8.
Ladouceur R. Owning up to medical errors. Can Fam Physician 2007;53:201.
Lamb R. Open disclosure: the only approach to medical error. Qual Saf Health Care 2004;13:3–5.
Lamb RM, Studdert DM, Bohmer RMJ, Berwick DM, Brennan TA. Hospital disclosure practices: results of a
national survey. Health Aff 2003;22:73–83.
Lape CP. Disclosing medical mistakes. J Gen Intern Med 1998;13:283–4.
Lazare A. Apology in medical practice: an emerging clinical skill. JAMA 2006;296:1401–4.
Leape L. Doctors and patients. Disclose, apologize, explain. Newsweek 2006;148:50.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
178
Leape L, Berwick D, Clancy C, Conway J, Gluck P, Guest J, et al. Transforming healthcare: a safety
imperative. Qual Saf Health Care 2009;18:424–8.
Leape LL, Berwick DM. Five years after To Err Is Human: what have we learned? JAMA 2005;293:2384–90.
Leape LL. Apology for errors: whose responsibility? Front Health Serv Manage 2012;28:3–12.
Lesnewski R. A piece of my mind. Mistakes. JAMA 2006;296:1327–8.
Leung GKK, Patil NG. Patient safety in the undergraduate curriculum: medical students’ perception.
Hong Kong Med J 2010;16:101–5.
Levinson W. Disclosing medical errors: we’re halfway there. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2008;162:991–2.
Levinson W. Disclosing medical errors to patients: a challenge for health care professionals and institutions.
Patient Educ Couns 2009;76:296–9.
Levinson W, Gallagher TH. Disclosing medical errors to patients: a status report in 2007. CMAJ
2007;177:265–7.
Liang BA. A system of medical error disclosure. Qual Saf Health Care 2002;11:64–8.
Liang NL, Herring ME, Bush RL. Dealing honestly with an honest mistake. J Vasc Surg 2010;51:494–5.
Liebman CB, Hyman CS. A mediation skills model to manage disclosure of errors and adverse events to
patients. Health Aff 2004;23:22–32.
Limb M. Peers’ rejection of statutory duty of candour is a missed opportunity, say campaigners.
BMJ 2012;344:e1116.
Lintern S. Duty of candour will cost NHS £130 million in 10 years. Health Serv J 2012.
Linthorst GE, Kallimanis-King BL, Douwes Dekker I, Hoekstra JB, de Haes JC. What contributes to internists’
willingness to disclose medical errors? Neth J Med 2012;70:242–8.
Localio AR. Patient compensation without litigation: a promising development. Ann Intern Med
2010;153:266–7.
López L, Weissman JS, Schneider EC, Weingart SN, Cohen AP, Epstein AM. Disclosure of hospital adverse
events and its association with patients’ ratings of the quality of care. Arch Intern Med 2009;169:1888–94.
Loren DJ, Garbutt J, Dunagan WC, Bommarito KM, Ebers AG, Levinson W, et al. Risk managers,
physicians, and disclosure of harmful medical errors. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2010;36:101–8.
Loren DJ, Klein EJ, Garbutt J, Krauss MJ, Fraser V, Dunagan WC, et al. Medical error disclosure among
pediatricians: choosing carefully what we might say to parents. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med
2008;162:922–7.
Love D. Advancing Communication of Medical Error: Bridging the Gap Between Transgression and
Transparency. Masters Abstracts 2011;49:3526.
Luk LA, Ng WIM, Ko KKS, Ung VH. Nursing management of medication errors. Nurs Ethics
2008;15:28–39.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
179
Lyckholm L. Medical errors and medical culture. There is no easy way around taking responsibility for
mistakes. BMJ 2001;323:570.
Lynch TG. Editorial comment: regarding ‘Moral angst for surgical residents: a qualitative study’. Am J Surg
2010;199:577–9.
MacDonald N, Attaran A. Medical errors, apologies and apology laws. CMAJ 2009;180:11.
Madden B, Cockburn T. Bundaberg and beyond: duty to disclose adverse events to patients. J Law Med
2007;14:501–27.
Magnavita N, Magnavita G, Fileni A, Bergamaschi A. Ethical problems in radiology: medical error and
disclosure. Radiol Med 2009;114:1345–55.
Malaty W, Crane S. How might acknowledging a medical error promote patient safety? J Fam Pract
2006;55:775–80.
Malcolm L, Barnett P. Disclosure of treatment injury in New Zealand’s no-fault compensation system.
Aust Health Rev 2007;31:116–22.
Manser T. Managing the aftermath of critical incidents: meeting the needs of health-care providers and
patients. Best Pract Res Clin Anaesthesiol 2011;25:169–79.
Manser T, Staender S. Aftermath of an adverse event: supporting health care professionals to meet patient
expectations through open disclosure. Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 2005;49:728–34.
Mantone J. Clarion call. National forum on patient safety stresses disclosure. Mod Healthc 2005;35:10.
Martinez W, Lo B. Medical students’ experiences with medical errors: an analysis of medical student essays.
Med Educ 2008;42:733–41.
Mason DJ. To forgive, divine: it’s time to drop the veil of secrecy about disclosing errors. Am J Nurs
2005;105:11.
Massó Guijarro P, Aranaz Andrés JM, Mira JJ, Perdiguero E, Aibar C. Adverse events in hospitals: the
patient’s point of view. Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19:144–7.
Mastroianni AC, Mello MM, Sommer S, Hardy M, Gallagher TH. The flaws in state ‘apology’ and
‘disclosure’ laws dilute their intended impact on malpractice suits. Health Aff 2010;29:1611–19.
Matheson GO. Who said medicine means never having to say you’re sorry? Phys Sportsmed 2005;33:2
Matlow A, Stevens P, Harrison C, Laxer R. Achieving closure through disclosure: experience in a pediatric
institution. J Pediatr 2004;144:559–60.
Matlow A, Stevens P, Harrison C, Laxer RM. Disclosure of medical errors. Pediatr Clin North Am
2006;53:1091–104.
Matlow AG, Moody L, Laxer R, Stevens P, Goia C, Friedman JN. Disclosure of medical error to parents
and paediatric patients: assessment of parents’ attitudes and influencing factors. Arch Dis Child
2010;95:286–90.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
180
Maurer MJ. Nurses’ Perceptions Of and Experiences With Medication Errors. PhD thesis. Toledo, OH:
University of Toledo; 2010.
Mavroudis C, Mavroudis CD, Naunheim KS, Sade RM. Should surgical errors always be disclosed to the
patient? Ann Thorac Surg 2005;80:399–408.
Maxston BE, Fenna N. Disclosing your mistakes to patients: a legal perspective. Dent Pract Manage Spring
1992:9–11.
Mazor KM. Understanding patients’ perceptions of medical errors. J Commun Healthc 2009;2:34–46.
Mazor KM, Greene SM, Roblin D, Lemay CA, Firneno CL, Calvi J, et al. More than words: patients’ views
on apology and disclosure when things go wrong in cancer care. Patient Educ Couns 2013;90:341–6.
Mazor KM, Reed GW, Yood RA, Fischer MA, Baril J, Gurwitz JH. Disclosure of medical errors: what factors
influence how patients respond? J Gen Intern Med 2006;21:704–10.
Mazor KM, Simon SR, Gurwitz JH. Communicating with patients about medical errors: a review of the
literature. Arch Intern Med 2004;164:1690–7.
Mazor KM, Simon SR, Yood RA, Martinson BC, Gunter MJ, Reed GW, et al. Health plan members’ views
about disclosure of medical errors. Ann Intern Med 2004;140:409–18.
Mazor KM, Simon SR, Yood RA, Martinson BC, Gunter MJ, Reed GW, et al. Health plan members’ views
on forgiving medical errors. Am J Manag Care 2005;11:49–52.
McAuliffe DM. The requirement to disclose unanticipated outcomes. Fla Nurse 2001;49:13–14.
McBride JL. Five ways to respond to a medical mistake. Fam Pract Manag 2009;16:40.
McCaffrey J. Honest talk. Disclosure is not about asset protection – it is about doing the right thing.
Hosp Health Netw 2003;77:94.
McCarthy M. Medicare to shift stance on medical errors disclosure. Lancet 2001;357:128.
McDonald TB, Helmchen LA, Smith KM, Centomani N, Gunderson A, Mayer D, et al. Responding to
patient safety incidents: the ‘seven pillars’. Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19:e11.
McDonnell WM, Guenther E. Narrative review: do state laws make it easier to say ‘I’m sorry?’. Ann Intern
Med 2008;149:811–16.
McKinney EMH. Medical Error: Overcoming Barriers to Truthful Disclosure. Dissertation Abstracts
International Section B: The Sciences and Engineering 2009;70:2801.
McKinney M. Going beyond saying you’re sorry. More hospitals using quick remediation strategies
following medical errors. Mod Healthc 2011;41:32–3.
McLennan S, Beitat K, Lauterberg J, Vollmann J. Regulating open disclosure: a German perspective.
Int J Qual Health Care 2012;24:23–7.
McNeill PM, Walton M. Medical harm and the consequences of error for doctors. Med J Aust
2002;176:222–5.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
181
Medical Protection Society (MPS). Briefing Paper: Culture of Candour. London: MPS; 2010.
Medical Protection Society (MPS). A Culture of Openness in NHS Scotland. London: MPS; 2011.
Micalizzi DA. The aftermath of a ‘never event’. A child’s unexplained death and a system seemingly
designed to thwart justice. Mod Healthc 2008;38:24–5.
Miller LA. Apology, disclosure, and unanticipated outcomes. J Perinat Neonatal Nurs 2011;25:10–11.
Mitka M. Disclosing medical errors does not mean greater liability costs, new study finds. JAMA
2010;304:1656–7.
Mlott K. Don’t say you’re sorry: surviving a lawsuit by Jay Weaver in the September issue. EMS Magazine,
December 2007, p. 14.
Monson MS. Legal checkpoints. Disclosing adverse events: you said it, now write it. Nurs Manage
2006;37:16–17.
Moskop JC, Geiderman JM, Hobgood CD, Larkin GL. Emergency physicians and disclosure of medical
errors. Ann Emerg Med 2006;48:523–31.
Moskowitz A. Survey: physicians more likely to disclose obvious medical errors. Ocular Surgery News
2006;24:163.
Moskowitz E, Veloski JJ, Fields SK, Nash DB. Development and evaluation of a 1-day interclerkship
program for medical students on medical errors and patient safety. Am J Med Qual 2007;22:13–17.
Murtagh L, Gallagher TH, Andrew P, Mello MM. Disclosure-and-resolution programs that include generous
compensation offers may prompt a complex patient response. Health Aff (Millwood) 2012;31:2681–9.
Myers V. When something goes wrong: how to disclose an error. Am Nurse Today 2001;6.
URL: www.americannursetoday.com/article.aspx?id=8302&fid=8276# (accessed 27 February 2013).
Nassrally MS. Difficulty in admitting error. An equally hard thing: supporting the admission of error.
BMJ 2012;344:e3563.
National Patient Safety Agency. Being Open E-learning Module. URL: https://report.npsa.nhs.uk/
boatoolelearning/course/courselaunch.htm (accessed December 2011).
National Patient Safety Agency. Being Open: Communicating Patient Safety Incidents With Patients and
Their Carers. London: National Patient Safety Agency; 2005.
National Patient Safety Agency. Being Open: Communicating Patient Safety Incidents With Patients,
Their Families and Their Carers. London: National Patient Safety Agency; 2009.
Newell A. Bulletin board. Apologies can heal: new book helps providers say ‘I’m sorry’. Nurs Womens
Health 2007;11:205–6.
Newfield JS. The evolution of the apology. Home Health Care Manag Pract 2007;19:137–9.
Nicklin W, Mass H, Affonso DD, O’Connor P, Ferguson-Pare M, Jeffs L, et al. Patient safety culture and
leadership within Canada’s Academic Health Science Centres: towards the development of a collaborative
position paper. Nurs Leadersh 2004;17:22–34.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
182
Gara N, on behalf of Government Affairs and Reimbursement Committee of the American Association of
Physicians Assistants.. Apologizing for adverse outcomes. JAAPA 2007;20:47–8.
Nie Y, Li L, Duan Y, Chen P, Barraclough BH, Zhang M, et al. Patient safety education for undergraduate
medical students: a systematic review. BMC Med Educ 2011;11:33.
Noland CM, Rickles NM. Reflection and analysis of how pharmacy students learn to communicate about
medication errors. Health Commun 2009;24:351–60.
Northcott H, Vanderheyden L, Northcott J, Adair C, McBrien-Morrison C, Norton P, et al. Perceptions of
preventable medical errors in Alberta, Canada. Int J Qual Health Care 2008;20:115–22.
Nowicki M, Chaku M. Do healthcare managers have an ethical duty to admit mistakes? Healthc Financ
Manage 1998;52:62–4.
Nwomeh BC, Caniano DA. Emerging ethical issues in pediatric surgery. Pediatr Surg Int 2011;27:555–62.
O’Connell D. Apology laws. CMAJ 2009;180:644.
O’Connell D, Reifsteck SW. Disclosing unexpected outcomes and medical error. J Med Pract Manage
2004;19:317–23.
O’Connell D, White MK, Platt FW. Disclosing unanticipated outcomes and medical errors. J Clin Outcomes
Manag 2003;10:25–9.
O’Connor E, Coates HM, Yardley IE, Wu AW. Disclosure of patient safety incidents: a comprehensive
review. Int J Qual Health Care 2010;22:371–9.
Ofri D. Ashamed to admit it: owning up to medical error. Health Aff 2010;29:1549–51.
Ogundiran TO, Adebamowo CA. Surgeon–patient information disclosure practices in southwestern Nigeria.
Med Princ Pract 2012;21:238–43.
Okamoto S, Kawahara K, Algren M. Transformative possibilities of communication in medical error cases in
Japan. Int J Qual Health Care 2011;23:26–35.
O’Neill AT. Patients deserve full disclosure. BMJ 2012;344:29.
Oppenheim EB. New JCAHO standards create affirmative duty to disclose hospital error. Trauma
2004;46:79–99.
O’Reilly KB. Fear of Punitive Response to Hospital Error Lingers. American Medical News, 20 February
2012. URL: www.amednews.com/article/20120220/profession/302209938/2/ (accessed 12 March 2013).
Ornstein H, Baum N. The power of saying ‘I’m sorry’: a well-planned apology can go a long way towards
patient satisfaction. Podiatry Manag 2008;27:49–50.
Ott M. Key considerations on drafting a policy on disclosure of unanticipated outcomes. J Healthc Risk
Manag 2001;21:27–34.
Overly FL, Sudikoff SN, Duffy S, Anderson A, Kobayashi L. Three scenarios to teach difficult discussions in
pediatric emergency medicine: sudden infant death, child abuse with domestic violence, and medication
error. Simul Healthc 2009;4:114–30.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
183
Pace WD, Staton EW. Improving the disclosure of medical incidents: a genuine apology is only the first step
in the process. BMJ 2011;343:d4340.
Panting G. How to avoid being sued in clinical practice. Postgrad Med J 2004;80:165–8.
Parker M. A fair dinkum duty of open disclosure following medical error. J Law Med 2012;20:35–43.
Pedley L. Medication errors and ethical nursing practice. Perspectives 2002;26:10–13.
Pelletier LR. On truth telling. J Healthc Qual 2001;23:2.
Pelletier E, Robson R. Giving back the pen: disclosure, apology and early compensation discussions after
harm in the healthcare setting. Health Q 2008;11:85–90.
Pelt JL, Faldmo LP. Physician error and disclosure. Clin Obstet Gynecol 2008;51:700–8.
Pendrak R. Anger management in disclosure of adverse events: how to deal with anger and other
emotions in adverse events and error disclosure. J Healthc Risk Manag 2005;25:8.
Penson RT, Svendsen SS, Chabner BA, Lynch TJ Jr, Levinson W. Medical mistakes: a workshop on personal
perspectives. Oncologist 2001;6:92–9.
Perez B, Didona T. Assessing legislative potential to institute error transparency: a state comparison of
malpractice claims rates. J Healthc Qual 2010;32:36–41.
Peterkin A. Guidelines covering disclosure of errors now in place at Montreal Hospital. CMAJ
1990;142:984–5.
Peterson LM, Brennan T. Medical ethics and medical injuries: taking our duties seriously. J Clin Ethics
1990;1:207–11.
Pfrimmer DM. Nursing’s role in disclosure and apology. J Contin Educ Nurs 2010;41:342–3.
Pham JC, Story JL, Hicks RW, Shore AD, Morlock LL, Cheung DS, et al. National study on the frequency,
types, causes, and consequences of voluntarily reported emergency department medication errors.
J Emerg Med 2011;40:485–92.
Philpott S. The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Nurs N Z 2005;11:16–18.
Pinker S. Quebec moves toward full disclosure of medical errors. CMAJ 2002;166:800.
Pinto A, Faiz O, Vincent C. Managing the after effects of serious patient safety incidents in the NHS:
an online survey study. BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:1001–8.
Pollack C, Bayley C, Mendiola M, McPhee S. Helping clinicians find resolution after a medical error.
Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2003;12:203–7.
Pollock G, Pesto MM, Sirridge M, Van Way CW III. Disclosing medical errors in Missouri: how to say
‘I’m sorry’. Mo Med 2010;107:338–44.
Popp PL. How to – and not to – disclose medical errors to patients. Manag Care 2002;11:52–3.
Popp PL. How will disclosure affect future litigation? J Healthc Risk Manag 2003;23:5–9.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
184
Porto GG. Disclosure of medical error: facts and fallacies. J Healthc Risk Manag 2001;21:67–76.
Posner G, Naik V, Bidlake E, Nakajima A, Sohmer B, Arab A, et al. Assessing residents’ disclosure of
adverse events: traditional objective structured clinical examinations versus mixed reality. J Obstet
Gynaecol Can 2012;34:367–73.
Powell SK. When things go wrong: responding to adverse events: a consensus statement of the Harvard
hospitals. Lippincotts Case Manag 2006;11:193–4.
Purtilo RB. Beyond disclosure: seeking forgiveness. Phys Ther 2005;85:1124–6.
Quinley K. ‘Sorry works’ – or does it? Insurance coverage implications of patient apology programs.
Med Mal Law Strat 2007;25:3–4.
Quinn RE, Eichler MC. The 3Rs program: the Colorado experience. Clin Obstet Gynecol 2008;51:709–18.
Quirk M, Mazor K, Haley H-L, Philbin M, Fischer M, Sullivan K, et al. How patients perceive a doctor’s
caring attitude. Patient Educ Couns 2008;72:359–66.
Rait JL, Van Ekert EH. Legal aspects of open disclosure II: attitudes of health professionals – findings from a
national survey. Med J Aust 2011;194:48.
Rajendran PR. Ethical issues involved in disclosing medical errors. JAMA 2001;286:1078.
Raju TNK, Suresh G, Higgins RD. Patient safety in the context of neonatal intensive care: research and
educational opportunities. Pediatr Res 2011;70:109–15.
Rathert C, Phillips W. Medical error disclosure training: evidence for values-based ethical environments.
J Bus Ethics 2010;97:491–503.
Reitman V. Healing Sound of a Word – Sorry. Los Angeles Times, 24 March 2003. URL: http://articles.
latimes.com/print/2003/mar/24/health/he-risk24 (accessed 16 April 2012).
Remakus BL. Talking about our mistakes. Maybe we should, in spite of what our lawyers and insurance
companies say. Med Econ 2005;82:64–5.
Renwick KK Jr. Should doctors disclose mistakes? West J Med 2000;172:10.
Rickles NM, Noland CM, Tramontozzi A, Vinci MA. Pharmacy student knowledge and communication of
medication errors. Am J Pharm Educ 2010;74:60.
Ritchie JH, Davies SC. Professional negligence: a duty of candid disclosure? BMJ 1995;310:888–9.
Robbennolt JK. Apologies and medical error. Clin Orthop Relat Res 2009;467:376–82.
Roberts RG. The art of apology: when and how to seek forgiveness. Fam Pract Manag 2007;14:44–9.
Robertson G. Fraudulent concealment and the duty to disclose medical mistakes. Alta Law Rev
1987;25:215–23.
Robertson GB. When things go wrong: the duty to disclose medical error. Queens Law J 2002;28:353–62.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
185
Robinson AR, Vanni AJ, Anderson RJ. Medical students’ attitudes on disclosure of medical errors.
J Gen Intern Med 2003;18:252.
Robinson J. Consumer comments. A duty of candour: will it really make amends? Br J Midwifery
2003;11:542.
Rohrich RJ. It’s okay to say ‘I’m sorry’. Plast Reconstr Surg 2007;120:1425–7.
Roland M, Rao SR, Sibbald B, Hann M, Harrison S, Walter A, et al. Professional values and reported
behaviours of doctors in the USA and UK: quantitative survey. BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20:515–21.
Roman L. Finding the words: how to handle difficult conversations. RN 2007;70:34–8.
Rowe M. Doctors’ responses to medical errors. Crit Rev Oncol Hematol 2004;52:147–63.
Salladay SA. Ethical problems. Medication error: shrouded in secrecy. Nursing 1998;28:72–3.
Sanford DE, Fleming DA. We meant no harm, yet we made a mistake; why not apologize for it?
A student’s view. HEC Forum 2010;22:159–69.
Saxton JW, Finkelstein MM. Adverse event management: your evidence to decrease professional liability
risk. J Med Pract Manage 2008;24:5–8.
Scheirton LS. Proportionality and the view from below: analysis of error disclosure. HEC Forum
2008;20:215–41.
Schneck LH. Oops . . . disclosing medical errors and adverse outcomes, establishing dialogue with patients.
MGMA Connex 2003;3:28–30.
Scholefield H. Embedding quality improvement and patient safety at Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation
Trust. Best Pract Res Clin Obstet Gynaecol 2007;21:593–607.
Schoonover-Shoffner K. Editorial. A confession. J Christ Nurs 2008;25:183.
Schuer KM, Quality Care Committee of the AAPA. Disclosure of medical errors: the right thing to do.
JAAPA 2010;23:27–9.
Schuling J, Conradi MH. Errors in general practice: what should the doctor do next? Int J Risk Saf Med
1998;11:165–70.
Schulte D. What you should know about Michigan’s new ‘I’m sorry’ law. J Mich Dent Assoc 2011;93:16.
Schulte DJ. New ‘I’m sorry’ law does not immunize physicians from admitted malpractice. Mich Med
2011;110:6.
Schwappach DLB, Koeck CM. What makes an error unacceptable? A factorial survey on the disclosure of
medical errors. Int J Qual Health Care 2004;16:317–26.
Schwartz B. Errors in dentistry: a call for apology. J Am Coll Dent 2005;72:26–32.
Schwartz B. Apology legislation: the time has come. J Can Dent Assoc 2009;75:621.
Scott H. Health professionals must learn to say sorry. Br J Nurs 1999;8:792.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
186
Selbst SM. The difficult duty of disclosing medical errors. Contemp Pediatr 2003;20:51–2.
Shannon SE, Foglia MB, Hardy M, Gallagher TH. Disclosing errors to patients: perspectives of registered
nurses. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2009;35:5–12.
Shapiro E. Disclosing medical errors: best practices from the ‘leading edge’: part I. Care Manag
2008;14:14–18.
Shapiro E. Disclosing medical errors: best practices from the ‘leading edge’: part II. Care Manag
2008;14:11–17.
Sheridan S, Conrad N, King S, Dingman J, Denham CR. Disclosure through our eyes. J Patient Saf
2008;4:18–26.
Sheu S-J, Wei I-L, Chen C-H, Yu S, Tang F-I. Using snowball sampling method with nurses to understand
medication administration errors. J Clin Nurs 2009;18:559–69.
Shift TJ. Sample disclosure note to put in patient record. Healthc Risk Manag 2006;28:41.
Silversides A. Apologies abound: advances in adverse-event disclosure. CMAJ 2009;180:382.
Simone JV. Simone’s OncOpinion. Telling patients the truth. Oncology Times 2007;29:3–5.
Simons SL. Full disclosure when bad things happen. Neonatal Netw 2007;26:131–2.
Singer PA. Commentary: learning to love mistakes. BMJ 2001;322:1238.
Singh V, Panda M, Cunningham CJ, Hetzler DC. Disclosure and documentation of unintended medical
events: what do healthcare providers believe? American Federation for Medical Research, Southern
Regional Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 17–19 February 2011.
Skarsgard ED. Managing the adverse event occurring during elective, ambulatory pediatric surgery.
Semin Pediatr Surg 2009;18:122–4.
Slovenko R. Saying you’re sorry in a litigious society. Med Law 1992;11:669–71.
Slovenko R. Admission or apology in liability prevention. American College of Forensic Psychiatry,
28th Annual Symposium, San Francisco, CA, 15–18 April 2010.
Slovenko R. Expression of sorrow or apology. Am J Forensic Psychiatry 2010;31:17–34.
Smith ML, Forster HP. Morally managing medical mistakes. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2000;9:38–53.
Sokol DK. The hardest thing: admitting error. BMJ 2012;344:e3085.
Sokol DK. ‘The patient would have died anyway’. BMJ 2013;346:f285.
Somerville M. Litigation: a saying-sorry way to heal the wounds. Directions for Canadian Healthcare:
a Framework for Sound Decisions: Do we care? conference proceedings, 1998:150–1.
Sorensen R, Iedema R, Piper D, Manias E, Williams A, Tuckett A. Health care professionals’ views of
implementing a policy of open disclosure of errors. J Health Serv Res Policy 2008;13:227–32.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
187
Sorensen R, Iedema R, Piper D, Manias E, Williams A, Tuckett A. Disclosing clinical adverse events to
patients: can practice inform policy? Health Expect 2010;13:148–59.
Sorokin R, Riggio JM, Hwang C. Attitudes about patient safety: a survey of physicians-in-training.
Am J Med Qual 2005;20:70–7.
Sorokin R, Riggio JM, Moleski S, Sullivan J. Physicians-in-training attitudes on patient safety: 2003 to 2008.
J Patient Saf 2011;7:133–8.
Sparkman CA. Legislating apology in the context of medical mistakes. AORN J 2005;82:263–6.
Springer R. Taking the OR to the office: Disclosing unanticipated events. Plast Surg Nurs 2005;25:199–201.
Spurgeon D. Quebec doctors must tell patients about medical ‘accidents’. BMJ 2002;325:1192.
Stetsenko GY, Gallagher T, Sitlani C, Gronowski AM, Astion M. Medical error disclosure: attitudes and
experiences of laboratory medical directors. Am J Clin Pathol 2009;132:41.
Stoffan PM, O’Toole P. Admitting mistakes is not enough. Health Aff 2001;20:258–60.
Stokes SL, Wu AW, Pronovost PJ. Ethical and practical aspects of disclosing adverse events in the
emergency department. Emerg Med Clin North Am 2006;24:703–14.
Stow J. Using medical-error reporting to drive patient safety efforts. AORN J 2006;84:417–20.
Straumanis JP. Disclosure of medical error: is it worth the risk? Pediatr Crit Care Med 2007;8:S38–43.
Stroud L, McIlroy J, Levinson W. Skills of internal medicine residents in disclosing medical errors: a study
using standardized patients. Acad Med 2009;84:1803–8.
Studdert D, Mello M, Gawande A, Brennan T. Open disclosure: details matter – response. Health Aff
2007;26:904–5.
Studdert DM, Mello MM, Gawande AA, Brennan TA, Wang YC. Disclosure of medical injury to patients:
an improbable risk management strategy. Health Aff 2007;26:215–26.
Studdert DM, Piper D, Iedema R. Legal aspects of open disclosure II: attitudes of health professionals –
findings from a national survey. Med J Aust 2010;193:351–5.
Studdert DM, Richardson MW. Legal aspects of open disclosure: a review of Australian law. Med J Aust
2010;193:273–6.
Sullivan RP, Waldemayer CR, Bunting RF Jr. Building confidence into communication of bad news: the role
of the patient advocate. J Healthc Risk Manag 2010;29:33–7.
Sulmasy DP. Dignity, vulnerability, and medical error. Health Prog 2006;87:12–14.
Surbone A, Rowe M, Gallagher TH. Confronting medical errors in oncology and disclosing them to cancer
patients. J Clin Oncol 2007;25:1463–7.
Suziedelis AK. Physicians and the burden of medical error. Health Care Ethics USA 2003;11:E3.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
188
Swanson DS. Physician gag clauses – the hypocrisy of the Hippocratic Oath. South Ill Univ Law J
1997;21:313–34.
Sweet MP, Bernat JL. A study of the ethical duty of physicians to disclose errors. J Clin Ethics
1997;8:341–8.
Symon A. Improving communication: apologies and explanations. Br J Midwifery 1997;5:594–6.
Tanasiewicz M, Bednarski J, Galazka A. The truth, misunderstanding or lie? Different forms of
doctor–patient relations. Bull Med Ethics 2005;209:13–17.
Tapper R, Malcolm L, Frizelle F. Surgeons’ experiences of complaints to the Health and Disability
Commissioner. N Z Med J 2004;117:U975.
Taylor D, Hassan MA, Luterman A, Rodning CB. Unexpected intraoperative patient death – the imperatives
of family- and surgeon-centered care. Arch Surg 2008;143:87–92.
Taylor J. Compensation culture. Do patients justice. Health Serv J 2008;20:20–2.
Teninbaum GH. Saying ‘sorry’ isn’t enough. Health Aff 2010;29:2127.
Thompson DA, Cowan J, Holzmueller C, Wu AW, Bass E, Pronovost P. Planning and implementing a
systems-based patient safety curriculum in medical education. Am J Med Qual 2008;23:271–8.
Thomson L. Patient safety corner: critical incidents and disclosure following critical patient incidents.
Manitoba RN J 2011;36:21.
Thurman AE. Institutional responses to medical mistakes: ethical and legal perspectives. Kennedy Inst Ethics J
2001;11:147–56.
Tieman J. Enforcing a new openness. JCAHO to hospitals: let patients know when their care hasn’t met
standards. Mod Healthc 2001;31:4–5.
Tammelleo AD. Failure to disclose colon nicked during hysterectomy. Medical Law’s Regan
Report 2006;39:4.
Tammelleo AD. Failure of Dr. to notify Pt. of botched surgery. Medical Law’s Regan Report 2007;40:1.
Traynor K. Patient safety standards focus on medical-error reduction, patient notification. Am J Health Syst
Pharm 2001;58:1389.
Truog RD, Browning DM, Johnson JA, Gallagher TH. Talking With Patients and Families About Medical
Error. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2010.
Wachter RM. Entering the second decade of the patient safety movement: the field matures: comment on
‘disclosure of hospital adverse events and its association with patients’ ratings of the quality of care’.
Arch Intern Med 2009;169:1894–6.
Waite M. To tell the truth: the ethical and legal implications of disclosure of medical error. Health Law J
2005;13:1–33.
Waite MA. Patient Safety and Disclosure of Medical Error: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Human
Error in Medicine. Masters Abstracts 2006;44:2152.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
189
Wakefield J, Jorm C, Ryan C. Open disclosure: details matter. Health Aff 2007;26:903–4.
Walsh P. How real is the NHS commitment to ‘Being open’? Health Care Risk Report 2009;15:12–13.
Walsh P. Don’t be daunted by duty of candour. Health Serv J, 2012. URL: www.hsj.co.uk/resource-centre/
best-practice/patient-safety-resources/dont-be-daunted-by-the-duty-of-candour/5043539.article#.
U2ojfPldWVM (accessed 20 May 2012).
Warriner DR. Apologies and legal liability. Three little words. BMJ 2009;338:b521.
Watling CJ, Brown JB. Education research: communication skills for neurology residents: structured
teaching and reflective practice. Neurology 2007;69:E20–6.
Wears RL, Wu AW. Dealing with failure: the aftermath of errors and adverse events. Ann Emerg Med
2002;39:344–6.
Weber LJ. The ethics of withholding information about mistakes. Health Prog 1994;75:65.
Wei M. Doctors, apologies, and the law: an analysis and critique of apology laws. J Health Law
2007;40:107–59.
Weinstein L. A multifacited approach to improve patient safety, prevent medical errors and resolve the
professional liability crisis. Am J Obstet Gynecol 2006;194:1160–5.
Weiss GG. Medical errors. Should you apologize? Med Econ 2006;83:50–4.
Weiss PM. To err is human – to air is humane: disclosing adverse events to patients. Obstet Gynecol Surv
2007;62:217–18.
Weiss PM, Miranda F. Transparency, apology and disclosure of adverse outcomes. Obstet Gynecol Clin
North Am 2008;35:53–62.
Weissman JS, Annas CL, Epstein AM, Schneider EC, Clarridge B, Kirle L, et al. Error reporting and
disclosure systems: views from hospital leaders. JAMA 2005;293:1359–66.
Weng L, Joynt GM, Lee A, Du B, Leung P, Peng J, et al. Attitudes towards ethical problems in critical care
medicine: the Chinese perspective. Intensive Care Med 2011;37:655–64.
Weselake T, French J. The ethics of disclosure – perspectives of radiation therapists and patients regarding
disclosure of radiation therapy errors. Can J Med Radiat Technol 2004;35:10–14.
Wetzel TG. When errors occur, ‘I’m sorry’ is a big step, but just the first. Hosp Health Netw 2010;84:41–2.
White AA, Bell SK, Krauss MJ, Garbutt J, Dunagan WC, Fraser VJ, et al. How trainees would disclose
medical errors: educational implications for training programmes. Med Educ 2011;45:372–80.
White AA, Gallagher TH, Krauss MJ, Garbutt J, Waterman AD, Dunagan WC, et al. The attitudes and
experiences of trainees regarding disclosing medical errors to patients. Acad Med 2008;83:250–6.
White SM, Deacy N, Sudan S. Trainee anaesthetists’ attitudes to error, safety and the law. Eur J
Anaesthesiol 2009;26:463–8.
Wilson J, McCaffrey R. Disclosure of medical errors to patients. Medsurg Nurs 2005;14:319–23.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
190
Winer IK. What physicians can do to reduce the risks of malpractice and litigation. J Med Pract
Manage 1993;8:213–18.
Witman AB, Park DM, Hardin SB. How do patients want physicians to handle mistakes? A survey of
internal medicine patients in an academic setting. Arch Intern Med 1996;156:2565–9.
Woffen T. Patient Safety and Legal Challenges: Disclosure of Medical Error, Class Actions, and Reporting
Systems. Masters Abstracts 2008;47:2018.
Wojcieszak D, Banja J, Houk C. The Sorry Works! Coalition: making the case for full disclosure. Jt Comm J
Qual Patient Saf 2006;32:344–50.
Wojcieszak D, Saxton JW, Finkelstein MM. Ethics training needs to emphasize disclosure and apology.
HEC Forum 2008;20:291–305.
Woods MS. Commentary: Let’s start admitting our mistakes. Clin Advis Nurse Pract 2008;11:142.
Woodward HI, Mytton OT, Lemer C, Yardley IE, Ellis BM, Rutter PD, et al. What have we learned about
interventions to reduce medical errors? Annu Rev Public Health 2010;31:479–97.
Woolf L. Clinical negligence: what is the solution? How can we provide justice for doctors and patients?
Med Law Int 2000;4:133–44.
Sorry Works! Sorry Works! Making Disclosure a Reality for Healthcare Organizations. URL: www.
sorryworks.net (accessed 30 March 2013).
Wright J, Opperman G. The disclosure of medical errors: a catalyst for litigation or the way forward for
better patient management? Clin Risk 2008;14:193–6.
Wu A, Pronovost P. Telling patients the truth. Health Aff 2003;22:249.
Wu AW. Handling hospital errors: is disclosure the best defense? Ann Intern Med 1999;131:970–2.
Wu AW. Commentary: doctors are obliged to be honest with their patients. BMJ 2001;322:1238–9.
Wu AW. Is there an obligation to disclose near-misses in medical care? In Sharpe VA, editor.
Accountability: Patient Safety and Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 2004.
pp. 135–42.
Wu AW, Cavanaugh TA, McPhee SJ, Lo B, Micco GP. To tell the truth: ethical and practical issues in
disclosing medical mistakes to patients. J Gen Intern Med 1997;12:770–5.
Wu AW, Folkman S, McPhee SJ, Lo B. Do house officers learn from their mistakes? JAMA
1991;265:2089–94.
Wu AW, Folkman S, McPhee SJ, Lo B. Do house officers learn from their mistakes? Qual Saf Health Care
2003;12:221–6.
Wu AW, Huang IC, Stokes S, Pronovost PJ. Disclosing medical errors to patients: it’s not what you say,
it’s what they hear. J Gen Intern Med 2009;24:1012–17.
Wusthoff CJ. Medical mistakes and disclosure: the role of the medical student. JAMA 2001;286:1080–1.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02200 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 20
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Birks et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
191
Yardley IE, Yardley SJ, Wu AW. How to discuss errors and adverse events with cancer patients. Curr Oncol
Rep 2010;12:253–60.
Zammit R. How to Say You Are Sorry A Guide to the Background and Risks of Apology Legislation.
Masters Abstracts 2009;48:2012.
Zimmerman R. Doctors’ new tool to fight lawsuits: saying ‘I’m sorry.’ Malpractice insurers find owning up
to errors soothes patient anger. ‘The risks are extraordinary’. J Okla State Med Assoc 2004;97:245–7.
Zimmerman TM, Amori G. Including patients in root cause and system failure analysis: legal and
psychological implications. J Healthc Risk Manag 2007;27:27–34.
Zimmermann PG, Kobs A, Heilicser B. Managers forum. Telling patients about a mistake. J Emerg Nurs
2002;28:456–7.
APPENDIX 9
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
192
Appendix 10 Studies excluded at second stage
Author and year Title Reason for exclusion
Barrios 2009220 Framing family conversation after early diagnosis
of iatrogenic injury and incidental findings
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Bell 2010221 Improving the patient, family, and clinician
experience after harmful events: the ‘when things
go wrong’ curriculum
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Daud-Gallotti 2011222 A new method for the assessment of patient
safety competencies during a medical school
clerkship using an objective structured
clinical examination
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Gillies 2011223 Teaching medical error apologies: development
of a multi-component intervention
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Hannawa 2009224 When the truth hurts: toward a validation of the
physician mistake disclosure (PMD) model
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Keller 200998 An effective curriculum for teaching third year
medical students about medical error
and disclosure
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
Kim 2011225 A web-based team-oriented medical error
communication assessment tool: development,
preliminary reliability, validity, and user ratings
Intervention not open disclosure or
intervention to support open disclosure
Wu 2009226 Disclosing medical errors to patients: it’s not
what you say, it’s what they hear
Study not a controlled design or uncontrolled
before and after
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Appendix 11 Patient and public involvement
The majority of this work was directed at exploring implementation of policy and stakeholders werevaried. We had the expertise of Peter Walsh as a leading national patient representative who was able
to ensure representation for patients and the public as part of this work. Peter advised on patient and
public involvement at a national level.
Peter Walsh is the chief executive of AvMA and brings a wealth of experience from both the voluntary
sector and the patient perspective to this project. He is also a WHO-appointed patient safety champion, a
member of the National Patient Safety Forum and an executive member of the Clinical Disputes Forum. He
has been involved in several research projects looking at patient perspectives on patient involvement in
safety in health care and is well networked with the NPSA and WHO.
Peter was involved in this work from its inception. He helped to write the grant proposal and was an
applicant for the funding. Peter has been involved in managing the delivery of the research, assisting with
recruitment of stakeholders, designing recruitment materials and writing the final report, and will be
involved in future dissemination of the findings of this report to both lay and professional organisations.
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